Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. County of Santa Clara

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: AGLIANO; BRAUER
• Citation: 231 Cal.Rptr. 702,187 Cal.App.3d 480
• Parties: GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al. Defendants and Respondents. H000984.
• Decision Date: 25 November 1986

Page 702

231 Cal.Rptr. 702 187 Cal.App.3d 480 GREYHOUND LINES, INC., Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
COUNTY OF SANTA CLARA, et al. Defendants and Respondents. H000984. Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California. Nov. 25, 1986.
Review Denied Feb. 11, 1987.

[187 Cal.App.3d 482] James W. Henderson, Jr., Carroll, Burdick & McDonough, Sacramento, for plaintiff and appellant.

Kathryn K. Meier, Morgan, Morgan, Towery, Morgan & Spector, San Jose, for defendants and respondents.

AGLIANO, Presiding Justice.

Greyhound Lines, Inc. appeals from the denial of its petition seeking relief from the time requirements for filing a governmental claim for equitable indemnity. We affirm.

The operative facts are few. MaryAnn Schroeder claims to have suffered injury due to a slip-and-fall in a Greyhound bus depot in Santa Barbara on October 22, 1982. Sometime thereafter she received medical treatment [187 Cal.App.3d 483] from, among others, the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center. On October 6, 1983, she filed suit in San Francisco County Superior Court for personal injuries, with her husband joining a claim for loss of consortium. Greyhound Lines, Inc. (Greyhound) was named a defendant in that suit and was so served on October 24, 1983.

In the course of discovery in the underlying suit, Greyhound counsel arranged for an independent medical examination of plaintiff in September 1984. On October 8, 1984, the examining doctor advised counsel plaintiff's injuries had been aggravated by medical malpractice.

On January 15, 1985, Greyhound sent a letter to the director of the Santa Clara Valley Medical Center, as a health care provider, giving notice of a medical malpractice claim. (Code Civ.Proc., § 364). This letter was referred to the County of Santa Clara, which treated it as a governmental claim and rejected it by letter dated February 8, 1985. Thus did Greyhound learn the Medical Center was a governmental entity. Greyhound submitted an application to file a late claim with the County dated February 15, which was rejected by the County's letter dated February 25, 1985. ¹

On April 8, 1985, Greyhound filed in Santa Clara County Superior Court its petition for relief from governmental claim requirements. It was opposed by the County of Santa Clara. After a hearing on May 30, the trial court denied Greyhound's petition "most reluctantly" by order of the same date.

A public entity cannot be sued for tort unless (1) a timely written claim has previously been presented to the governmental entity, (2) any late claim has been presented to the public entity and been excused by it or the court, or (3) conditions described

Page 703

by Government Code section 946.4, not applicable to this case, have been met. (Gov.Code, § 945.4; all other code citations are to the Gov.Code unless otherwise noted.) A personal injury claim must be presented within 100 days from its accrual. (§ 911.2.) If a timely claim is denied, the claimant has a specified time to commence a lawsuit. (§ 945.6.)

An application to present a late personal injury claim must be presented within a reasonable time not to exceed one year from its accrual, with an excuse for the delay. (§ 911.4.) A claimant may obtain judicial relief from the entity's denial of leave to file a late claim by filing a petition under section 946.6, as Greyhound attempted here.

[187 Cal.App.3d 484] Since Greyhound sought to file a late claim seeking equitable indemnity from a governmental entity, we must interpret the statute governing the accrual of governmental claims, section 901, in particular its last sentence, added in 1981. (Stats.1981, ch. 856, § 1, p. 3286.) "For the purpose of computing the time limits prescribed by Sections 911.2, 911.4, 912, and 945.6, the date of the accrual of a cause of action to which a claim relates is the date upon which the cause of action would be deemed to have accrued within the meaning of the statute of limitations which would be applicable thereto if there were no requirement that a claim be presented to and be acted upon by the public entity before an action could be commenced thereon. However, the date upon which a cause of action for equitable indemnity or partial equitable indemnity accrues shall be the date upon which a defendant is served with the complaint giving rise to the defendant's claim for equitable indemnity or partial equitable indemnity against the public entity." (Emphasis added.)

This final sentence creates a special accrual date for pursuing equitable indemnity claims against the government. The Legislature thereby changed the rule established in People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court (1980) 26 Cal.3d 744, 163 Cal.Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673 (hereafter Frost ). (State of California v. Superior Court (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 754, 758, 192 Cal.Rptr. 198 (hereafter Shortstop ).) Frost had integrated into the governmental claim requirements the usual rule that an indemnity claim did not accrue until the party seeking indemnity paid the underlying liability. (Frost, supra, 26 Cal.3d at pp. 751-755, 163 Cal.Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673.) Also, the defendant was permitted to file an anticipatory cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against a public entity without being required to file a governmental claim on this cause of action which had not yet accrued. (Id., at p. 763, 163 Cal.Rptr. 585, 608 P.2d 673.)

The 1981 amendment of section 901 was applied in Shortstop. There the plaintiffs sued Shortstop (a corporation) and Brock (an individual) for personal injuries, property damage, and loss of consortium arising out of a collision between two trucks, one owned by Shortstop and driven by Brock. Over ten months after being served with the original complaint, Brock and Shortstop obtained leave to file a cross-complaint for equitable indemnity against the State of California, alleging their liability for the collision arose because the highway patrol and a local fire district had blocked the road. The State demurred on the basis of noncompliance with the governmental claims filing requirements, and a writ petition followed when the trial court overruled the demurrer.

The appellate court first determined that the amendment to section 901 applied to the indemnity claims of Brock and Shortstop. (Shortstop, supra, [187 Cal.App.3d 485] 143 Cal.App.3d 754, 758-760, 192 Cal.Rptr. 198.) Then the...