Gridco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Hillside Tp.

Decision Date20 March 1979
Citation400 A.2d 869,167 N.J.Super. 348
PartiesGRIDCO, INC., a Pennsylvania Corporation, Plaintiff, v. ZONING BOARD OF the TOWNSHIP OF HILLSIDE and Frank Volturo, Building Inspector, Defendants.
CourtNew Jersey Superior Court

Donald Myers, Elizabeth, for plaintiff.

Alexander J. Menza, Elizabeth, for defendants.

FELLER, J. S. C. (retired, temporarily assigned on recall).

This is an action in lieu of prerogative writs in which plaintiff appeals the denial of a variance by the Hillside Board of Adjustment. Defendant board denied plaintiff's application for a variance to permit the installation of a drive-up window to facilitate customer service at Gino's fast-food restaurant. Apparently the issues here are of first impression in this State involving certain provisions of the new Municipal Land Use Act. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-1 Et seq. Plaintiff contends that it is entitled to a variance because defendant failed to give a decision within 120 days as required by N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a) and (b) of the new Land Use Act. Briefs have been filed and oral argument has been heard on plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

The facts are not in dispute and are essentially as follows: Plaintiff is the owner of property situated at 1480 North Broad Street, Hillside, New Jersey, upon which there is a Gino's restaurant in present operation. Plaintiff wished to add a drive-up window for the convenience of its customers, and applied to defendant building inspector for a permit. The latter declined to issue the permit on the ground that subsequent to the erection of the restaurant the area was rezoned office-commercial. Thus, the restaurant became a nonconforming use.

Plaintiff appealed to the Hillside Board of Adjustment seeking a "Type D" variance from the zoning ordinance. On September 8, 1977 a hearing was held on the application and the variance was denied. Four members of the board voted to deny the applicant the requested variance, two voted against the denial. A written resolution to this effect was adopted, dated January 25, 1978, approximately 139 days later.

On June 8, 1978 an application for a rehearing was granted on the ground that there was sufficient new evidence submitted to constitute a new application. The board heard the application on the same day and denied the variance. On October 18, 1978, about 130 days after the vote was taken, plaintiff again requested a building permit, which was denied. Later a written resolution was adopted by defendant board dated November 28, 1978, which is approximately 170 days after the vote was taken.

It appears that on June 8, 1978 three members of the board voted to grant the variance and two members voted to deny it. N.J.S.A. 40:55D-70(d) gives a board of adjustment the power to grant a use variance by the affirmative vote of at least two-thirds of the full authorized membership of the board. This requires five votes. Thus, the application was denied. On June 8, 1978, however, when the final vote was taken, no resolution was acted upon.

"Definitions" N.J.S.A. 40:55D-3 of the Municipal Land Use Act provides that the term "shall" indicates a mandatory requirement and the term "may" indicates a permissive action. See also, § 22-17.1 of the implemented ordinance of the township.

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g) provides that each decision on any application for development Shall be in writing and Shall include findings of fact and conclusions based thereon. Furthermore, § 22-15.9(a) of the implemented ordinance provides that each decision on any application for development shall be set forth in writing As a resolution of the board, which shall include findings of fact and legal conclusions based thereon. Thus, it is clear that each decision must be in writing in the form of a resolution of the board which shall include findings of fact and legal conclusions based thereon. This is consistent with the definition of the word "decision," which usually means findings of fact and conclusions of law, which must be in writing and filed with the clerk. Black's Law Dictionary (rev. 4 ed.), 495. See Wilcox v. Sway, 69 Cal.App.2d 560, 160 P.2d 154, (D.Ct.App.1945).

In the present case plaintiff's variance application was an application for development N.J.S.A. 40:55D-4. See also § 21-3 of the ordinance. This was not acted on in writing in the form of a resolution until November 28, 1978, about 170 days after it was voted on.

N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(a) provides:

The board of adjustment Shall render a decision not later than 120 days after the date (1) an appeal is taken from the decision of administrative officer or (2) the submission of a complete application for development to the board of adjustment pursuant to section 59B of this act. (Emphasis supplied)

Subsection (b) of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73 provides as follows:

Failure of the board to render a decision within such 120 day period or within such further time as may be consented to by the applicant Shall constitute a decision favorable to the applicant. (Emphasis supplied)

The same provisions are also set out in the township ordinance, § 22-13.12. It is admitted that the resolution was passed on November 28, 1978. Thus it is clear that the above statutes and ordinance were disregarded. A complete application was submitted to defendant board of adjustment on June 8, 1978 at the very latest. The board was required to render a decision in writing not later than 120 days after that date, N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g), which would have been on or about October 10, 1978.

The failure of the board to render a decision in writing (in the form of a resolution) within the time period required results in a decision favorable to plaintiff. This is a mandatory requirement under the terms of N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(...

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8 cases
  • Committee for a Rickel Alternative v. City of Linden
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • July 25, 1988
    ...a decision to writing was tantamount to municipal inaction." Id. at 496, 476 A.2d 1189 (citing Gridco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Hillside, 167 N.J.Super. 348, 400 A.2d 869 (Law Div.1979)). SGC suggests that much as the Board's failure in Lizak to reduce its decision to writing constituted munic......
  • Manalapan Holding Co., Inc. v. Planning Bd. of Hamilton Tp.
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • April 2, 1982
    ...that date, the statutory approval mechanism was triggered. See N.J.S.A. 40:55D-10(g). And see Gridco, Inc. v. Hillside Tp. Zoning Bd., 167 N.J.Super. 348, 352-353, 400 A.2d 869 (Law Div.1979); Aurentz v. Little Egg Harbor Tp. Planning Bd., 171 N.J.Super. 135, 408 A.2d 140 (Law It is the pla......
  • Lizak v. Faria
    • United States
    • New Jersey Supreme Court
    • June 19, 1984
    ...resolution, Mr. Faria's attorney conferred with the township attorney in June 1980. Relying on Gridco, Inc. v. Zoning Bd. of Hillside, 167 N.J.Super. 348, 400 A.2d 869 (Law Div.1979), the two attorneys agreed that the failure to adopt a written resolution converted the Board's vote to deny ......
  • Lizak v. Faria
    • United States
    • New Jersey Superior Court — Appellate Division
    • July 11, 1983
    ...N.J.S.A. 40:55D-73(b); Kozub v. Opt'Hof, 180 N.J.Super. 482, 435 A.2d 845 (App.Div.1981), overruling Gridco, Inc. v. Hillside Tp. Zoning Bd., 167 N.J.Super. 348, 400 A.2d 869 (Law Div.1979); see Precision Industrial Design Co. v. Beckwith, 185 N.J.Super. 9, 18-19, 447 A.2d 186 (App.Div.1982......
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