Grider v. State

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: Grant
• Citation: Grider v. State, 69 S.W.3d 681 (Tex. App. 2002)
• Decision Date: 25 January 2002
• Docket Number: No. 06-01-00043-CR.,06-01-00043-CR.
• Parties: Eddie Wayne GRIDER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

69 S.W.3d 681

Eddie Wayne GRIDER, Appellant, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee.

No. 06-01-00043-CR.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Submitted October 26, 2001.

Decided January 25, 2002.

Ebb B. Mobley, Longview, for appellant.

Andy Porter, Asst. Dist. Atty., Longview, for appellee.

Before CORNELIUS, C.J., GRANT and ROSS, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Justice GRANT.

Eddie Wayne Grider appeals his conviction for aggravated assault for causing serious bodily injury to Rebecca Hardin, his live-in girlfriend. A jury found Grider guilty and assessed his punishment. The aggravated assault was enhanced by a prior felony conviction. He was sentenced to confinement for life and a $10,000 fine.

Grider's first point of error is that the trial court erred in denying him a pretrial psychological examination or jury hearing to determine his competency. Grider's second point of error is that the court erred in admitting an irrelevant and prejudicial extraneous offense into evidence at the guilt/innocence phase of the trial.

Grider requested a psychological examination by a disinterested expert. The court conducted a bench hearing and determined that although Grider had been diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia five years previously and was still taking medication, hearing voices, and seeing visions, there was no evidence that he lacked sufficient ability to consult with his lawyer or that he did not have a rational or factual understanding of the proceedings against him. On this basis, the court did not appoint an expert to evaluate or empanel a jury to determine Grider's competence.

Grider was charged with causing serious bodily injury to Hardin by hitting her with his hands and fists. The State notified Grider of its intent to introduce Grider's prior offenses. Grider objected at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial to the introduction of the prior assault offense. After a hearing outside the presence of the jury to determine the relevance of the evidence, the court admitted the extraneous offense, with a limiting instruction to the jury, for the purpose of rebutting Grider's defense that Hardin had sustained the injuries when she accidentally fell, as well as to prove motive, intent, and system.

A person is presumed to be competent to stand trial unless proven incompetent. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 1A(b) (Vernon Supp.2002). A person is incompetent to stand trial if that person lacks "sufficient present ability to consult with [that] person's lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or... [if that person lacks] a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against [that] person." Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 1A(1), (2) (Vernon Supp.2002). If evidence of the defendant's incompetence is brought to the court's attention from any source, the court must conduct a hearing out of the presence of the jury to determine whether there is evidence to support a finding of incompetency to stand trial. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 2(b) (Vernon 1979). When the hearing is held pre-trial, any evidence of probative value supporting a finding of incompetency requires the court to submit the issue to a jury; the court is not to weigh evidence opposing such a finding. Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § 4(a) (Vernon Supp.2002); Boitnott v. State, 48 S.W.3d 289 (Tex.App.-Texarkana 2001, pet. ref'd). Evidence of mental impairment alone does not require that a special jury be empaneled where no evidence indicates that a defendant is incapable of consulting with counsel or understanding the proceedings against him. Lingerfelt v. State, 629 S.W.2d 216, 217 (Tex.App.-Dallas 1982, pet. ref'd).

In addition, whenever the defendant's competency to stand trial is raised, the court may appoint disinterested experts to examine the defendant with regard to his competency to stand trial. See Tex.Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 46.02, § (3)(a) (Vernon Supp.2002). Although a defendant is not required to prove he is incompetent to be entitled to a psychiatric examination, he must raise an issue of competence by providing the court with some evidence to support a finding of incompetency; therefore, where there is no evidence the defendant did not understand the proceedings or could not assist in the defense, the court does not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint a mental health expert. See Porter v. State, 623 S.W.2d 374 (Tex.Crim.App.1981) (The court did not abuse its discretion in not appointing an expert when there was no evidence of present incompetence and no request for a hearing on competency.); Bowens v. State, 507 S.W.2d 785 (Tex. Crim.App.1974) (The court did not err in denying motion to appoint psychiatrist when there was no evidence that the defendant did not understand or could not assist in the defense, there was no motion for a hearing on competency, no insanity defense, and no evidence at trial raised the issue of competence.); Hall v. State, 808 S.W.2d 282, 285 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no pet.) (Testimony indicated that the defendant understood the proceedings and had the present ability to consult with counsel.).

Both failure to grant a motion for a hearing on competency and failure to appoint an expert to conduct a psychological evaluation are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Bigby v. State, 892 S.W.2d 864, 885 (Tex.Crim.App.1994); Boling v. State, 617 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1981); Garcia v. State, 595 S.W.2d 538, 543 (Tex.Crim.App. [Panel Op.] 1980).

The court conducted a hearing on the motion for a mental examination. At that hearing, Grider testified that he was hearing voices and seeing visions all the time, that he had been examined five years previously and diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic in addition to having other disorders, and that he was receiving Social Security disability payments. The report from his doctor was submitted for the limited purpose of the hearing. Grider testified that he was on medication for his condition, that when he does not take his medication he does not know what he is doing, that his medication was "messed up" and he had an appointment to see a doctor, and that he had experienced blackouts. He admitted he had been denied an evaluation by an Alabama court in 1998. In discussions with the court, Grider demonstrated an understanding of the proceedings. At a prior hearing on Grider's request that his attorney withdraw from the case, Grider had argued to the court that his lawyer had not adequately represented him and that the State should not be allowed to introduce extraneous evidence. The trial court denied the motion for an evaluation saying there was no credible evidence to indicate that Grider was not presently mentally competent to stand trial, but also commenting on the timing of the filing being so close to when jury selection was to begin.

Although Grider's testimony suggests he is impaired to some extent by a psychiatric disorder requiring medication, there was no evidence that such impairment caused Grider to lack sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding or prevented Grider from having a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against him. Although the court may have improperly considered Grider's discussions with the court as evidence that Grider was competent, based on the lack of any evidence that would support a finding that Grider was incompetent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in not empaneling a jury to determine Grider's competence. Likewise, the court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for a psychological evaluation. Grider's first point of error is overruled.

In his second point of error, Grider argues the court erred in admitting extraneous offense evidence at the guilt/innocence stage of the trial. He contends that the evidence was too remote to be relevant and that if it were relevant, it would only be relevant to prove character conformity, because there was no common scheme or system which the State referred to as a "fingerprint." Grider also contends the court failed to perform a proper balancing of the probative and prejudicial value of the evidence on finding that the evidence was relevant apart from character conformity, pointing out that the court failed to articulate any of the balancing factors required under Rule 403. Although remoteness is a factor, because Grider did not raise the issue of remoteness as a basis for his objections at trial, we are unable to review that issue. See Chambers v. State, 903 S.W.2d 21, 31 (Tex.Crim.App.1995). As the other issues were raised at trial, we will review them.

The extraneous offense at issue is a two-year-old conviction for assault. Grider raised objections under both Rules 404(b) and 403. The trial court conducted a hearing on the admissibility of the prior assault outside the presence of the jury during the State's case in chief. The court overruled Grider's renewed objection that the extraneous evidence was irrelevant, prejudicial, and being offered only to show conformity, standing by its ruling to allow the evidence with a limiting instruction when Grider renewed the objection before the testimony of the victim of the previous incident, Cynthia Blevins. Blevins testified to the facts of the prior offense, and pictures of the incident were introduced into evidence with no further objections. Both sides mentioned the incident in closing arguments, the State making side-by-side comparisons of the two incidents.

To prove Grider committed aggravated assault as charged under Tex. Pen.Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(1) (Vernon 1994), the State had to prove he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused severe bodily injury. Grider suggested to the jury in this case, through witness examination and argument, that Hardin's injuries were caused not by him, but by her accidental fall. Before the...