Grieb v. National Bank of Kentucky's Receiver

• Citation: 68 S.W.2d 21,252 Ky. 753
• Parties: GRIEB, County Clerk, v. NATIONAL BANK OF KENTUCKY'S RECEIVER et al. GRIEB, County Clerk et al. v. NATIONAL BANK OF KENTUCKY'S RECEIVER.
• Decision Date: 05 December 1933
• Court: Court of Appeals of Kentucky

68 S.W.2d 21

252 Ky. 753

GRIEB, County Clerk, v. NATIONAL BANK OF KENTUCKY'S RECEIVER et al.

GRIEB, County Clerk et al. v. NATIONAL BANK OF KENTUCKY'S RECEIVER.

Court of Appeals of Kentucky

December 5, 1933

Rehearing Denied March 13, 1934.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County, Chancery Branch, First Division.

Action by the National Bank of Kentucky's receiver against John P. Grieb, County Clerk of Jefferson County, and another. From the judgment, each defendant appeals, and plaintiff cross-appeals.

Judgment affirmed on original appeals, and reversed on cross-appeal.

Lawrence J. Mackey, of Louisville, for appellant M. J. Brennan.

Harris Coleman and Herman Handmaker, both of Louisville, Bailey P Wootton, Atty. Gen., and W. R. Attkisson, Asst. Atty. Gen for other appellants.

Cary Tabb and Peter, Lee, Tabb & Heyburn, all of Louisville, for appellee.

RICHARDSON Justice.

The question for determination herein on these two appeals is the right of A. M. Anderson, receiver of the National Bank of Kentucky, to redeem land sold for taxes by paying the taxes interest, and penalty under the Act of 1932, c. 142.

Certain real estate situated in the city of Louisville, Jefferson county, regularly assessed for state and county taxes, was sold by the sheriff of Jefferson county in the years 1929, 1930, 1931, and 1932, for the purpose of paying the taxes thereon for the years 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1931, respectively, and, receiving no bid, it was bid in for the state at each of the sales. Section 4151-2, Ky. St.

In an action of Manuel Faust v. General Realty Corporation and Paul C. Keyes, receiver of the National Bank of Kentucky, the property was sold by the master commissioner pursuant to a judgment of the court, in August, 1932, to enforce a lien on the land when it was bought by the receiver at two-thirds of its appraised value. Desiring to redeem the land he filed this action for a judgment declaring his right to redeem it under the act of 1932, and the right of the county clerk and revenue agent to collect only the interest and penalty, under the Act of 1932, and to define their duties respecting the redemption of the land.

It is insisted by the receiver that the Act of 1932 (c. 142, Acts of 1932, p. 670) exclusively controls his right to redeem the land sold for the county and state taxes and bought in by the sheriff for the county and state for the years 1928, 1929, 1930, and 1931, respectively, by paying the taxes, interest, and penalty as prescribed therein. The county clerk and the revenue agent contend that sections 4151-2, 4154, Ky. St., which were in operation at the date of the tax sales, control the right of redemption of the owner and prescribe their duties in relation thereto and fix the amounts, the rate of interest, and penalty, which they should collect of the owner, on his redeeming the land.

The revenue agent claims that he is entitled to a 20 per cent. penalty instead of 15 per cent. provided for in section 4260-1, Ky. St. It is the receiver's position that "the revenue agent is entitled to no penalty at all since he has never advertised or sold any of the real estate, and in no event is he entitled to more than 15% penalty." The circuit court decreed that the interest and penalties provided for in the act of 1932 control on redeeming of the property for taxes for all the years involved, except as to the penalty for 1928 and 1929 taxes, and that the county clerk was the proper person to collect the redemption money with no penalty for the years 1931 and 1932 for 1930, but that the revenue agent was entitled to a penalty of 15 per cent. of the amount paid by the owner necessary to redeem the property for 1928 and 1929 taxes.

The county clerk and revenue agent have appealed. The receiver prosecutes a cross-appeal, insisting that the act of 1932 lengthened the period of redemption to five years without regard to whether the two-year period of redemption allowed by section 4151-2 had expired. The contrary is insisted by the clerk and the revenue agent. The latter also vigorously urge that "the collection of delinquent taxes on real estate; i. e., taxes delinquent prior to the passage of the Act of 1932, cannot be enforced under the provision of the Act of 1932," but that the right of redemption and liability for interest and penalties are controlled entirely by section 4151-2 and 4154. They argue that, prior to the act of 1932, the two years following the sheriff's sale for county and state taxes had expired; that the title had vested in the state, "and before it revests in the original owner, the revenue agent is required to collect all taxes accumulated thereon after the sale. In other words, if the real estate was sold for the 1928 taxes and title vested in the state in 1931, the revenue agent could not release same and re-vest title in the owner, unless he also paid taxes accumulated; that is, in this case, for 1928, 1929, 1930 and 1931." They rely on section 4074, which reads: "Redemption of lands sold for taxes.--That the owners of all such land that has heretofore been sold, or may hereafter be sold, and purchased by the state for taxes due thereon, shall be required to pay, in addition to the amount said lands were sold for, all taxes accumulated thereon after the sale of the same to the date of redemption, to the officers now required by law to receive it."

They argue that after the title vests in the state the property should not thereafter be assessed in the name of the original owner, otherwise section 4075, which reads as follows, would be meaningless: "Lands redeemed; clerk to certify to assessor.--That whenever the owners of said land shall redeem same, as provided in [§ 34] § 4074 of article two of this chapter, it shall be the duty of the clerk of the county court to certify said redemption to the assessor of the county, whose duty it shall be to list the same for taxation."

In support of this argument they cite James, Auditor, et al. v. Blanton et al., 134 Ky. 803, 121 S.W. 951, 123 S.W. 328; Sections 459 and 465, Ky. St.; Com. v. Paynter's Adm'r, 222 Ky. 766, 2 S.W.2d 664; Section 171 Const.; Tug River Coal Co. v. Brewer, 91 Ky. 402, 15 S.W. 1117, 13 Ky. Law Rep. 1; Section 52 Const.; City of Louisville v. Louisville Ry. Co., 111 Ky. 1, 63 S.W. 14, 23 Ky. Law Rep. 390, 98 Am.St.Rep. 387; Reed v. Bates,

115 Ky. 437, 74 S.W. 234, 24 Ky. Law Rep. 2312.

Lastly, they argue that the act of 1932 should not be given a retroactive effect, since it does not expressly declare that such shall be given it. To sustain this argument they cite Dunlap v. Littell, 200 Ky. 595, 255 S.W. 280; Greene v. Frankfort Distillery Co., 209 Ky. 427, 273 S.W. 28; Shanks v. Board of Education, 221 Ky. 471, 298 S.W. 1111; American O. Co. v. C., C., C. & St. L. Ry. Co., 216 Ky. 611, 288 S.W. 347; Ferlage v. Supreme Tribe of Ben Hur, 153 Ky. 465, 156 S.W. 139; L. & N. R. Co. v. Mottley, 133 Ky. 652, 118 S.W. 982; Louisville Water Co. v. Com., 34 S.W. 1064, 18 Ky. Law Rep. 2; 29 C.J. 738; Collier v. Smith et al., 132 Ark. 309, 200 S.W. 1008; Cooley on Taxation (3d Ed.) 1030; Black on Tax Titles, § 175; Blackwell on Tax Titles (5th) page 729; 37 Cyc. 1542; Utz v. Wallace's Adm'x, 249 Ky. 296, 60 S.W.2d 614.

The act of 1932 was passed by the General Assembly on the _______ day of March, 1932. On a later date, at the same session, an act was passed (Acts 1932, c. 156) authorizing the Governor of the commonwealth by proclamation to lengthen or delay the time of payment of taxes and interest on taxes "in case of continued unemployment due to any and all economic changes."

It is an accepted rule that the courts always take judicial knowledge of existing economic conditions and the heroic efforts which are being made by governmental agencies to relieve businesses and taxpayers of their destructive consequences. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. U. S., 284 U.S. 248, 52 S.Ct. 146, 76 L.Ed. 273.

This court in two cases has recognized the existence and prevalence of the present economic depression. Leeper Oil Co. et al. v. Rowland, 239 Ky. 295, 39 S.W.2d 486; Collopy v. Dorman, Banking & Securities Commissioner, 250 Ky. 513, 63 S.W.2d 610.

It is a matter of general knowledge that, during the prevalence of the existing oppressive economic conditions, there were, prior to the enactment of the act of 1932, many sales of land of taxpayers for the payment of their taxes for the years 1928, 1929, 1930, 1931, and 1932.

It must be presumed that the Legislature was cognizant of the general effect of these sales, when it enacted the act here involved. The court in construing every act, and declaring its effect, should effectuate the obvious intention of the Legislature; and this doctrine applies with special force when it is apparent its intention conserves a wholesome purpose. Grinstead v. Kirby, 110 S.W. 247, 33 Ky. Law Rep. 287.

In ascertaining the legislative intent, we are authorized by the prevailing rules of construction to look to the mischief the act was intended to remedy, the historical setting surrounding its enactment, the public policy of the state the conditions of the law, and all other prior and contemporaneous facts and circumstances that throw intelligent light on the intention of the Legislature. Sewell v. Bennett, 187 Ky. 626, 220 S.W. 517; Burdine v. White, 173 Ky. 158, 190 S.W. 687; Brown v. Thompson, 14 Bush, 538, 29 Am.Rep. 416. The general conditions at the date of the enactment, and the mischief intended by the Legislature to be remedied by it, the reasons for it, its object and purpose, are competent to be considered in arriving at the legislative intention of the enactment. Lanferman v. Vanzile, 150 Ky. 751, 150 S.W. 1008, Ann.Cas. 1914D, 563; Stanley v. Townsend, 170 Ky. 833, 186...