Grieff v. Reisinger

• Citation: 548 Pa. 13,693 A.2d 195
• Parties: Robert GRIEFF and The Emlenton Volunteer Fire Association, Inc., Appellees, v. Marlene E. REISINGER and Louis Reisinger, Appellants.
• Decision Date: 25 April 1997
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 195

693 A.2d 195

548 Pa. 13

Robert GRIEFF and The Emlenton Volunteer Fire Association, Inc., Appellees, v. Marlene E. REISINGER and Louis Reisinger, Appellants.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued Sept. 17, 1996.

Decided April 25, 1997.

[548 Pa. 14] Ralph L.S. Montana, Clarion, for Marlene and Louis Reisinger.

W. Patrick Delaney, Erie, for Robert Grieff and Emlenton Volunteer Fire Association, Inc.

Before FLAHERTY, C.J., and ZAPPALA, CAPPY, CASTILLE and NIGRO, JJ.

OPINION

NIGRO, Justice.

In this negligence action, Appellees moved for summary judgment based upon governmental immunity. The trial court denied the motion and the Commonwealth Court reversed. Because the trial court properly held that the real property exception to governmental immunity applies here, we reverse the Commonwealth Court's decision.

In August of 1990, Emlenton Volunteer Fire Association members spent a day cleaning and painting equipment for installation on a new fire truck. Marlene Reisinger, who worked in the building next to the station, went there after work and socialized with Robert Grieff, the Fire Association Chief, and other Fire Association members. She also helped them clean the station.

In order to remove paint from the floor near the kitchen, Grieff poured paint thinner onto the floor. The paint thinner flowed across the floor and under the refrigerator. At the same time, the refrigerator began to run and ignited the paint thinner. The fire travelled to where Reisinger was standing. She was engulfed in flames and sustained severe injuries.

Reisinger and her husband sued Grieff and the Fire Association for negligence. They alleged that Grieff failed to exercise due care in using and disposing of flammable materials, that he failed to supervise the disposal of these materials, and that he failed to warn Reisinger of the risk of a fire. The Reisingers made similar claims against the Fire Association. They also alleged that the parties negligently consumed or allowed the consumption of alcohol while using flammable materials.

Grieff and the Fire Association moved for summary judgment. They argued that they are immune from suit under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. §§ 8541-42 (1982). They also argued that the Reisingers did not plead that any of the enumerated exceptions to immunity under the statute apply. In response, the Reisingers asserted that the real property exception to governmental immunity applies.

The trial court denied summary judgment and held that the alleged negligent care of the fire station falls within the real property exception to immunity. The Commonwealth Court reversed because the Reisingers did not assert that the real property itself was defective. Because they alleged that Grieff's negligent handling of the paint thinner caused Reisinger's injuries, it held that the real property exception does not apply.

A motion for summary judgment may be granted when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Pa.R.Civ.P. 1035(b). In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we must determine whether there was an error of law or a clear abuse of discretion. Panichelli v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Group, 543 Pa. 114, 116, 669 A.2d 930, 931 (1996).

Under the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act, local government agencies are immune from liability for their negligence unless their actions fall within an exception enumerated by statute and would otherwise subject them to liability. 42 Pa.Cons.Stat. §§ 8541-42 (1982). At issue is whether the real property exception to governmental immunity applies. The exception provides that a local agency may be liable for its employees' or its own negligence related to "the care, custody or control of real property" in its possession. Id. §§ 8542(a)(2), 8542(b)(3).

Here, Grieff's care of the Fire Association's property caused the fire that injured Reisinger. While he was removing paint from the floor, therein caring for the real property, it ignited causing the resultant injuries to Reisinger. Under the real property exception's plain language, Grieff and the Fire Association are not immune from suit.

This case is unlike cases where the Court held that the real property exception did not apply because the government's property only facilitated injuries caused by third parties. In Mascaro v. Youth Study Center, 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118 (1987), a juvenile escaped from a detention center and attacked a family. The municipality allegedly failed to maintain its property and allowed the juvenile to escape. We held that the municipality was immune from suit because under the immunity statute, the government is not liable for harm caused by third parties. ¹

Citing Mascaro, the Court held in Snyder v. Dombrowski, 522 Pa. 424, 562 A.2d 307 (1989), that the State was immune from suit where a person fell into a strip mine adjacent to a state road. The State allegedly failed to warn about a dangerous condition on its neighbor's property. ² Similarly, in Kiley v. City of Philadelphia, 537 Pa. 502, 645 A.2d 184 (1994), the City was immune from suit where a boy was hit by a car near a demolition site. The City allegedly failed to make the area safe for pedestrians.

We intended Mascaro and its progeny to apply in similar cases where third parties cause the harm. See Crowell v. City of Philadelphia, 531 Pa. 400, 613 A.2d 1178 (1992)(explaining Mascaro decision). They were not intended to apply to a case like this. The Fire Association's property did not facilitate an injury by a third party. Rather, Grieff's and the Fire Association's alleged negligent care of the property caused Reisinger's injury. The Reisingers' claim falls squarely within the real property exception. ³ We thus hold that Grieff and the Fire Association are not immune from suit. We reverse the Commonwealth Court's...