Griego v. Hogan
Decision Date | 17 January 1963 |
Docket Number | No. 6944,6944 |
Citation | 71 N.M. 280,377 P.2d 953 |
Parties | Flora Ann Beaty GRIEGO and William W. Beaty, Jr., Plaintiff-Appellants, v. Annie Beaty HOGAN, a/k/a Mrs. Annie Beaty; Texaco, Inc., a corporation; and Phillips Petroleum, a corporation, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | New Mexico Supreme Court |
McAtee, Toulouse, Marchiondo, Ruud & Gallagher, Albuquerque, for appellants.
Mears, Mears & Boone, Portales, for appellee Annie B. Hogan.
Appellants, brother and sister, appeal from a judgment dismissing their complaint to quiet title to certain mineral rights and for an accounting from two oil companies, lessees of the rights. The oil companies are not concerned in this appeal as all parties stipulated that the leases would be honored, appellants reserving their right to an accounting if their claim of title prevailed. The matter was heard by the trial court without a jury. At the close of appellants' case the court dismissed the complaint, specifically finding no fraud or concealment.
Appellants' father, W. W. Beaty, husband of appellee, died intestate on April 22, 1945, a resident of San Angelo, Texas, owning as his separate property an undivided one-half interest in the minerals under land in Roosevelt County, New Mexico. At the time of his death, W. W. Beaty also owned certain property in Texas in community with Annie Beaty Hogan, his wife, hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Hogan, the defendant-appellee.
The trial court found that Mr. Hogan, the stepmother of plaintiff-appellants, William W. Beaty, Jr., hereinafter referred to as William Beaty, Jr., and Flora Ann Beaty Griego, hereinafter referred to as Flora Griego, was the owner of the mineral interest in question, deriving her title in the following manner: One-fourth of the one-half interest by inheritance from W. W. Beaty; three-eighths of the one-half interest by purchase from Flora Griego; three-eighths of the one-half interest by purchase from from William Beaty, Jr.
After Flora Griego and William Beaty, Jr., had been born of the marriage of W. W. Beaty and Nannie Beaty, Nannie Beaty died. W. W. Beaty subsequently married Mrs. Hogan. William Beaty, Jr., was raised by W. W. Beaty and Mrs. Hogan, knowing no other mother than her. William Beaty, Jr., entered the Civilian Conservation Corps in 1935, married in 1940, and entered the Maritime Service in 1943. Flora Griego left the family home prior to her father's remarriage, had an early marriage, and never lived with Mrs. Hogan. Flora Griego was forty years of age and William Beaty, Jr., was thirty-one years of age when W. W. Beaty died.
After W. W. Beaty died, the family assembled in San Angelo, Texas. Flora Griego and Mrs. Hogan had retained separate attorneys. William Beaty, Jr., did not employ legal counsel. After negotiations, Flora Griego and William Beaty, Jr. executed separate deeds dated May 10 and May 16, 1945, in favor of Mrs. Hogan for considerations of $1500 each. The warranty deed from William Beaty, Jr., described the Texas property by lot and block number, the name and location of the addition, and the county of its situs. This was followed by:
'Third--All my portion of and right, title and interest in any and all property, real, personal or mixed, of whatsoever kind and wheresoever situated, inherited by me from the estate of my mother, Nannie Beaty, deceased, or from the estate of my father, W. W. Beaty, deceased.'
In addition to the warranty deed from Flora Griego to Mrs. Hogan, which described the Texas property by lot and block number, the name and location of the addition, and the county of its situs, Flora Griego and Mrs. Hogan entered into an agreement which included:
'THEREFORE, in consideration of the premises, and the sum of $1,500.00, cash in hand paid by Grantee [Mrs. Hogan] to Grantor [Flora Griego], Grantor has, and does hereby, grant, sell, convey and release unto the said Mrs. Annie Beaty, grantee, all her rights, claims, title, interest and equities, of every kind and character, which she might now or heretofore have had in or to any and all estate of the said W. W. Beaty, deceased and the said Nannie Beaty, deceased, including real, personal and mixed property and choses in action; it being the intention and understanding of the parties hereto that Grantor convey and release unto Grantee all her rights, title and claims of interest of every kind and character which has accrued to her by reason of the death of her Mother, Nannie Beaty, and by reason of the death of her Father, W. W. Beaty.'
Appellants submit two points upon which they rely for reversal:
In essence, appellants' first point is that because of the existence of a relationship of parent and child between themselves and appellee, any conveyance by them of their interests in the mineral rights in New Mexico to appellee was constructively fraudulent and accordingly voidable by them. They base this assertion on a stipulation entered into during the trial. The stipulation was made as follows:
'MR. McATEE: I want to make one further stipulation that the relationship between Mrs. Beaty Hogan and Mrs. Griego and Mr. W. W. Beaty, Jr. was that of loco parentis was a stepmother.
'MR. BOONE: Yes.'
This court, in the case of In re Quantius' Will, 58 N.M. 807, 277 P.2d 306, established the rule pertaining to stipulations. We said:
'* * * 'As a general rule, stipulations should receive a fair and liberal construction, in harmony with the apparent intention of tne parties and the spirit of justice, and in the furtherance of fair trials upon the merits, rather than a narrow and technical one calculated to defeat the purposes of their execution. The terms of a stipulation should not, however, be so construed as to extend beyond that which a fair construction justifies. * * * A stipulation must be construed in the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties and in view of the result which they were attempting to accomplish. In seeking the intent of the parties the language used will not be so construed a to give it the effect of an admission of fact obviously intended to be controverted, or the waiver of a right not plainly intended to be relinquished." (50 Am.Jur., Stipulations, Sec. 8, p. 609).
The language of the instant stipulation is ambiguous when viewed in the light of the surrounding circumstances. If the parties intended to agree that appellee is the stepmother of appellants, the stipulation may be accepted at its full face value as it is apparent that appellee became the legal stepmother of both of them when she married their father. However, if they were attempting to stipulate that the relation of loco parentis existed, this is a different matter. Appellee strenuously denied such a status during the course of the trial and the trial court found:
From the evidence adduced by all parties at the trial it appears that appellee did stand in loco parentis to W. W. Beaty, Jr., when he was a youth but did not so stand with relation to Mrs. Griego at any time.
As for the existence of the relationship at the time of the execution of the conveyances, by the very definition of loco parentis, it could not have existed with respect to either appellant at that time. Loco parentis exists when a person undertakes the care and control of another in the absence of such supervision by the latter's natural parents and in the absence of formal legal approval. It is temporary in character and is not to be likened to adoption which is permanent. In re McCardle's Estate, 95 Colo. 250, 35 P.2d 850.
Appellant contends for the rule that where a confidential relation exists, courts of equity in examining such transactions 'will carefully search for suspicious circumstances having a tendency to show unfairness or undue influence. * * *' 39 Am.Jur., Parent and Child, Sec. 101, p. 748. Appellant says that Shultz v. Ramey, 64 N.M. 366, 328 P.2d 937, follows this rule. Even if we accept this as...
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