Griel v. Franklin Med. Center, 00-1067

• Decision Date: 08 September 2000
• Docket Number: No. 00-1067,00-1067
• Citation: 234 F.3d 731
• Parties: (1st Cir. 2000) DOLORES GRIEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FRANKLIN MEDICAL CENTER AND WILLIAM GARRAND, Defendants, Appellees. Heard
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit

Page 731

234 F.3d 731 (1st Cir. 2000)

DOLORES GRIEL, Plaintiff, Appellant, v. FRANKLIN MEDICAL CENTER AND WILLIAM GARRAND, Defendants, Appellees.

No. 00-1067

United States Court of Appeals For the First Circuit

Heard September 8, 2000

Decided December 7, 2000

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS [Hon. Michael A. Ponsor, U.S. District Judge]

Mark H. Bluver with whom Susan E. Zak and Shatz, Schwartz and Fentin, P.C. were on brief for appellant.

Jay M. Presser with whom Skoler, Abbott & Presser, P.C. was on brief for appellees.

Before Torruella, Chief Judge, Boudin and Lynch, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam.

In this employment discrimination action, appellant Dolores Griel alleges that she was wrongfully terminated as a nurse in the critical care unit of appellee Franklin Medical Center. She claims that the discharge occurred because of her status as a recovering drug addict and thereby violated the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Massachusetts anti-discrimination statute.¹ Appellee pointed to evidence showing that the discharge took place after incidents in which Griel had violated protocol requirements during the care of patients. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that no reasonable jury could disbelieve this asserted, nondiscriminatory reason.

Because the evidence is set forth in detail in the district court opinion, see Griel v. Franklin Med. Ctr., 71 F. Supp. 2d 1, 4-6 (D. Mass. 1999), we confine ourselves to a very brief description. Griel was hired in July 1992, after she candidly acknowledged that she was a recovering drug addict who had previously been terminated for diverting narcotics in another hospital. At the time of hiring, she was involved in a five-year rehabilitation program to assist nurses in the situation. For several years she performed well at the hospital, but in 1995 she injured her back while lifting a patient and had to take a year away from Franklin, taking a prescribed narcotic for pain control.

On her return to Franklin in late 1996, a co-worker raised concerns about Griel's nursing, and an acting supervisor concluded that Griel's patients were receiving narcotics too readily and in excessive amounts. Griel was briefly suspended and after a new manager took charge, he agreed with the concerns and brought Griel back to work with restrictions. Thereafter, a report was made that Griel had been rummaging through discarded medication bottles and she was asked to take a drug test. After some delay, Griel took the test and the report was negative.

In March 1997, Griel returned to work without restrictions but in the course of the next two weeks there occurred two more incidents. First, Griel asked a new nurse to administer a drug drawn by Griel--a violation of protocol--and then initially denied doing so before she ultimately admitted it. Thereafter, Griel administered a dose of drugs to another patient without acquiring the required co-signature for surplus narcotics that she wasted or recording one of the doses in the medication records or her nurse's notes. After a disciplinary hearing, Griel was terminated as presenting an unacceptable risk to patient safety.

At the summary judgment stage, Griel relied primarily upon the presumption and burden-adjusting framework established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Recognizing that Franklin had proffered an explanation for discharge that was on its face nondiscriminatory, she concentrated her attack on showing that the explanation was pretextual--or at least that there was enough evidence to take this issue to a jury--by showing that many others nurses had made errors in narcotics administration without being dismissed and that in specific cases other nurses were given verbal or written warnings or were required to take training to remedy mistakes. After discussing the evidence on both sides, the district court concluded that there was "no evidence that would remotely justify a jury in concluding [that] a nurse who was not a former substance abuser, and who committed a similar pattern of similar mistakes, was not (or would not have been) terminated." Griel, 171 F. Supp. 2d at 12.

Our review of the entry of summary judgment is de novo, and we take the inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See Thomas v. Eastman Kodak Co., 183 F.3d 38, 47 1st Cir. 1999), cert. denied, 120 S. Ct. 1174 (2000). Griel's main challenge in this appeal is to the district court's assessment of the evidence. Specifically, Griel points out that her own experts defended Griel's substantive decisions as to drugs administered to patients that worried hospital managers; she says that there was direct evidence of animus against her; and she says...