Grier v. Amisub of S.C., Inc., No. 27118.

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of South Carolina
• Citation: 397 S.C. 532,725 S.E.2d 693
• Docket Number: No. 27118.
• Parties: Evelyn GRIER, as the appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Willie James Fee, deceased, Appellant, v. AMISUB OF SOUTH CAROLINA, INC., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center, Respondent.
• Decision Date: 02 May 2012

397 S.C. 532
725 S.E.2d 693

Evelyn GRIER, as the appointed Personal Representative of the Estate of Willie James Fee, deceased, Appellant,
v.
AMISUB OF SOUTH CAROLINA, INC., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center, Respondent.

No. 27118.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

Heard March 6, 2012.
Decided May 2, 2012.

[725 S.E.2d 694]

John Gressette Felder, Jr., McGowan Hood & Felder, LLC, of Columbia, William Angus McKinnon, McGowan Hood & Felder, LLC, of Rock Hill, for Appellant.

William U. Gunn and Joshua T. Thompson, of Holcombe Bomar, P.A., of Spartanburg, for Respondent.

[725 S.E.2d 695]

Justice HEARN.

[397 S.C. 534]Willie James Fee died while in the care of AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., d/b/a Piedmont Medical Center (Piedmont). Evelyn Grier, as the personal representative of his estate, subsequently brought this medical malpractice claim against Piedmont. The circuit court dismissed Grier's claim on the ground that the expert witness affidavit she was required to submit pursuant to Sections 15–36–100 and 15–79–125 of the South Carolina Code (Supp. 2011) did not contain a competent opinion on proximate cause. Grier appeals, arguing the court erred in finding these statutes require the affidavit contain such an opinion. We agree and therefore reverse and remand for further proceedings.

FACTUAL/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Fee was admitted to Piedmont in January 2008 for treatment of a host of ailments, the list of which is not pertinent to this appeal. He remained at Piedmont until September 2008, at which point he was discharged to another facility for further care. However, he was readmitted to Piedmont twelve days later, and he remained there until his death in February 2009.

Prior to bringing wrongful death and survival proceedings against Piedmont stemming from medical malpractice allegedly committed while it was treating Fee, Grier filed a notice of intent to file suit as required by section 15–79–125(A). Her claims contend Piedmont's failure to monitor and treat Fee for bedsores and sepsis contributed to his death. In conjunction with this notice, Grier also filed an affidavit from Sharon Barber, a nurse with experience treating bedsores and their complications. In it, Nurse Barber opined, based on her review of Fee's medical records, that Piedmont breached its [397 S.C. 535]duty of care towards Fee in multiple respects and these breaches were a contributing cause of Fee's death.

Piedmont subsequently filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Nurse Barber was not qualified to render an opinion as to cause of death, which meant Grier's affidavit did not contain a competent causation opinion. The circuit court agreed that Nurse Barber was not qualified to opine as to cause of death. Additionally, the court held

that it is implicit in the Tort Reform Act, and in particular the Notice of Intent, Short and Plain Statement of Facts, and the affidavit requirements at issue in this motion, that a showing of proximate cause must be made by submission of a proper affidavit addressing proximate cause, and made by a person qualified to do so. Plaintiff in this instance has failed to submit such an affidavit, and for that reason Defendant's Motion must be granted....

While the court gave Grier thirty days to submit a qualifying affidavit, Grier failed to do so. The court accordingly dismissed Grier's claim. This appeal followed.

LAW/ANALYSIS

On appeal, Grier concedes Nurse Barber is not qualified to render an opinion as to Fee's cause of death. Thus, the only argument Grier presents is that the circuit court erred in holding the pre-suit affidavit a plaintiff statutorily is required to file before bringing a medical malpractice claim must contain an expert opinion on proximate cause. We agree.

The issue before us is purely one of statutory interpretation. “Questions of statutory interpretation are questions of law, which we are free to decide without any deference to the court below.” CFRE, LLC v. Greenville Cnty. Assessor, 395 S.C. 67, 74, 716 S.E.2d 877, 881 (2011). It is well-established that “[t]he cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature.” Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 (2000). “What a legislature says in the text of a statute is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Therefore, the courts are bound to give effect to the expressed intent of the legislature.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, we must follow the plain and unambiguous language in a statute and [397 S.C. 536]have “no right to impose another meaning.” Id. It is only when applying the words literally leads to a result so patently absurd that the General Assembly could not have intended it that we look beyond the statute's

[725 S.E.2d 696]

plain language. Cabiness v. Town of James Island, 393 S.C. 176, 192, 712 S.E.2d 416, 425 (2011).

In ascertaining the meaning of language used in a statute, we presume the General Assembly is “aware of the common law, and where a statute uses a term that has a well-recognized meaning in the law, the presumption is that the General Assembly intended to use the term in that sense.” State v. Bridgers, 329 S.C. 11, 14, 495 S.E.2d 196, 198 (1997); see also Beck v. Prupis, 529 U.S. 494, 500–01, 120 S.Ct. 1608, 146 L.Ed.2d 561 (2000) (“[W]hen Congress uses language with a settled meaning at common law, Congress ‘presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken and the meaning its use will convey to the judicial mind unless otherwise instructed. In such case, absence of contrary direction may be taken as satisfaction with widely accepted definitions, not as a departure from them.’ ” (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263, 72 S.Ct. 240, 96 L.Ed. 288 (1952))).

Finally, statutes in derogation of the common law are to be strictly construed. Epstein v. Coastal Timber Co., 393 S.C. 276, 285, 711 S.E.2d 912, 917 (2011). Under this rule, a statute restricting the common law will “not be extended beyond the clear intent of the legislature.” Crosby v. Glasscock Trucking Co., 340 S.C. 626, 628, 532 S.E.2d 856, 857 (2000). Statutes subject to this rule include those which “limit a claimant's right to bring suit.” 82 C.J.S. Statutes § 535.

With these principles in mind, we turn to the statutes at issue in this case. Section 15–79–125(A) provides, “Prior to filing or initiating a civil action alleging injury or death as a result of medical malpractice, the plaintiff shall...