Grievance Comm. v. Ennis

Decision Date31 July 1911
CourtConnecticut Supreme Court
PartiesGRIEVANCE COMMITTEE v. ENNIS.

Appeal from Superior Court, Fairfield County; Lucien F. Burpee, Judge.

Proceeding by Grievance Committee against George H. Ennis, an attorney. From a judgment of suspension, respondent appeals. Reversed.

The complaint of the Grievance Committee, dated June 20, 1900, and filed in the superior court July 15, 1909, alleges that in February, 1909, one Nellie Schuster, a Russian girl, 19 years of age, and unable to speak or understand English, employed the respondent, an attorney at law, to prosecute a claim against the Warner Bros. Company of Bridgeport for an injury she had sustained while in its employ; that understanding from the statement of the respondent that he could procure for her several thousand dollars, and that she was not to accept any sum said company might offer in settlement of her claim, she agreed that said attorney should receive for his services one-half of the amount he might obtain; that the company thereafter offered her $300, which she refused; that upon his application, and at her request, the respondent was appointed her guardian; that he advised a conference with the company with a view to settlement, promising that before accepting any settlement he would report to her; that afterwards without reporting to her, and without authority from the court of probate, he settled the claim for $500 and retained $250 for his services, and offered Miss Schuster the remaining $250, which she refused; that the sum so retained by the respondent for his services was "excessive and unjust, and his agreement with his said ward as to his fee was improper." To this complaint the respondent filed a special answer stating the circumstances of his employment by Miss Schuster, and of the settlement of the claim, all of which averments were either admitted by the reply of the state's attorney, who prosecuted the complaint in the superior court, or were practically found true upon the trial. the facts, stated either in the finding of the trial judge, or in the paragraphs of the draft finding marked "proven," were in substance these:

March 23, 1909, Miss Schuster, a minor and a foreigner who did not speak English, through her sister and brother-in-law, requested one Neikind, an interpreter, to bring the respondent to her said brother-in-law's house in order that she might consult him as to obtaining redress from the Warner Bros. Company for an injury she had sustained while in their employ. In compliance with such request the respondent visited Miss Schuster, who was then confined to her bed from said injury, and she, through said interpreter and in the presence of her brother and sister, and brother-in-law, told the respondent how she was injured, and that it was while doing an act directed by the forewoman of the room in which she was working, and that many of her associates would testify that she was so directed to do said act. During the interview Miss Schuster, through the interpreter, asked the respondent if he would take the case, and if so what his charges would be. The respondent replied that he would take the case, "upon the payment to him of reasonable counsel fees as the work progressed." Miss Schuster, her brother-in-law and sister, through the interpreter, replied that "they had no money to pay him in that way." Thereupon the respondent, through the Interpreter, "suggested he would take the case upon her giving him one-half the money he could obtain from the Warner Bros. Company." To this proposal they, including Miss Schuster, agreed through said interpreter. The respondent said he would bring a suit for $5,000 or $10,000 and obtain a large sum, and said agreement was made with that understanding. The respondent told Miss Schuster not to accept any offer of settlement as he could get more if it was left to him. Miss Schuster and her relatives promised to obtain the names and presence at said house of witnesses in her behalf. On the 31st of March, 1909, the respondent, upon an application signed by Miss Schuster, was appointed by the court of probate her guardian for the purpose of bringing suit or adjusting her claim.

In April the respondent visited Miss Schuster to interview witnesses, but none appeared, nor were the names of any given to him. A few days later, he met at said house one Victoria Novak, who had been obtained by Miss Schuster and her relatives as a witness, who after a long conversation informed the respondent that the injury to Miss Schuster was caused by her disobedience of the order of the forewoman, and the rules of the factory, and said Victoria Novak gave to the respondent a written statement in her own language of how the accident occurred. No other witnesses in behalf of Miss Schuster, nor the names of any, were furnished the respondent.

Both Mr. Warner and Mr. Greenman of the Warner Bros. Company, at an interview with the respondent, informed him how the accident occurred, and that it was from the negligence and disobedience of orders by Miss Schuster. Mr. Greenman told him that the Warner Bros, always desired to act fairly with their operatives, and asked the respondent how much he would settle for. He replied that he would have to consult with his client before naming any amount. The company's doctor, who had attended Miss Schuster, had said to her that the company would probably give her about $350 or $100, if she would accept it in settlement of her claim. In accordance with the instructions from the respondent she refused to make such settlement.

Paragraph 23 of the finding of facts states that in the course of his conversation with Mr. Greenman the respondent told him that he "had obtained a written statement from the interpreter," and that "he had her in writing, and that she couldn't very well go back on that, and while he concealed the real contents of that statement, he talked of his case as if he could prove it according to the version given to him by Nellie Schuster, and as if it was one to be considered only on the basis of substantial damages, and intimated and insinuated that he could show that her forewoman had instructed and ordered Nellie Schuster to get into the dangerous position in which she was hurt, and he Intended and tried to make the superintendent so believe." At a later interview with Mr. Warner, the respondent repeated to him the statements which he had made to Greenman.

Paragraph 13 of the respondent's draft finding, marked "proven," and referring to said interview with Greenman, is as follows: "In the course of said conversation with said Greenman the appellant (the respondent) told him that he had a written statement from the interpreter, and she couldn't very well go back of that. Appellant (respondent) did not tell Greenman what the statement contained. The statement referred to was the statement made by Victoria Novak. * * * Aside from this there was no evidence that the appellant (respondent) made any false pretenses in his negotiations for settlement with relation to any evidence which he claimed he had."

Before said interviews the respondent had become convinced that Miss Schuster's injuries were caused by her own negligence and misconduct, and that the Warner Bros. Company was not legally liable therefor. After his said interview with Greenman the respondent again visited the Schusters, and asked them if they had found any other witness or evidence, and when they replied they had not, told them there was no chance of recovering by suit, and asked for authority to make a settlement, and to use his own judgment in the matter. After discussion among themselves they said they had confidence in him, and gave him the authority to settle which he asked for. The Schusters understood that any offer of settlement would be reported to them before it was accepted, but such understanding was not justified by any conduct of the respondent.

Two days later, at the interview above referred to, Mr. Warner offered the respondent $500 in settlement, which he accepted. The respondent retained $250, and deposited the remainder in a savings bank for Miss Schuster's benefit, and offered her the bank book, which she refused to accept. August 12, 1900, the respondent presented to the court of probate his final account as guardian, in which he included a payment to himself for services as attorney for his ward's estate of $242.20, and of probate fees of $7.80. February 7, 1910, the probate court made an order disallowing the item of $242.20. The respondent was occupied in the service of his client on 12 or 13 different occasions, and so spent about 40 hours of time.

The finding states that the trial court reached these conclusions: "In his dealings with his client and in his conduct of her case the respondent has been guilty of both professional and nonprofessional misconduct." "In his treatment of his ward the respondent was unfair and extortionate, and disregarded the obligation of his trust."

The judgment file states, among other things, that the court finds all the material allegations of the complaint to be proved and true; that "the agreement between the respondent and his minor client as set forth in the complaint under the circumstances disclosed was unfair, extortionate, and illegal," and that in his treatment of his ward, and "in his dealings with his client and her employer" the respondent "has been guilty of professional and nonprofessional misconduct."

The memorandum of decision says, among other things: "In his own testimony concerning these allegations (of the second defense) it appears that the respondent accomplished that result (the settlement) by means of concealment and false pretenses relating to certain evidence which he claimed he had and could produce in a suit he was threatening to bring."

The appeal alleges in substance that upon the facts above stated the superior court erred in rendering a judgment of...

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    ...See Grievance Committee v. Broder, 112 Conn. 263, 266, 152 A. 292 (1930) (review of disbarment proceedings); Grievance Committee v. Ennis, 84 Conn. 594, 602, 80 A. 767 (1911) (review of suspension proceedings); In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 149, 67 A. 497 (1907) (review of disbarment proceedi......
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