Grievance Committee of Hartford County Bar v. Broder

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Writing for the Court: WHEELER, C.J.
• Citation: 112 Conn. 263,152 A. 292
• Parties: GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF HARTFORD COUNTY BAR v. BRODER.
• Decision Date: 07 November 1930

152 A. 292

112 Conn. 263

GRIEVANCE COMMITTEE OF HARTFORD COUNTY BAR
v.
BRODER.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

November 7, 1930

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Newell Jennings, Judge.

Complaint by the Grievance Committee of the Hartford County Bar involving the character, integrity, and professional standing and conduct of Edward W. Broder, an attorney. On trial by the superior court on rule to show cause, judgment was entered dismissing the complaint, and the Grievance Committee appeals.

Error, and judgment of disbarment directed. [152 A. 293]

Disposition of disbarment proceeding is within sound judicial discretion of trial court.

Hugh M. Alcorn, State's Atty., of Hartford, Donald Gaffney, of New Britain, and Harold E. Mitchell, of Hartford, for appellant.

[112 Conn. 264] Josiah H. Peck, Francis Cole, and William D. Shew, all of Hartford, for appellee.

Argued before WHEELER, C.J., and MALTBIE, HAINES, HINMAN, and BANKS, JJ.

WHEELER, C.J.

The complaint filed by the grievance committee of Hartford county on January 6, 1930, alleged that Edward W. Broder, an attorney, was on September 24, 1929, upon his plea of guilty, convicted of the crime of adultery with Lillian S. Hastings involving his character, integrity, professional standing and conduct, and sentenced to be imprisoned in jail for four months, and prayed that such proceeding be taken thereon as the laws and rules of court direct. Upon the issuance of the rule to show cause, the attorney admitted his guilt of the charge in the complaint. At the hearing upon this complaint, the record of what transpired before the court on the trial of the adultery charge was laid in evidence. None of the facts as stated by counsel were in conflict, so far as this record shows. It is made a part of the finding, the facts of which are as follows: Mr. Broder was admitted to the bar in 1908, and has since practiced law in Hartford, enjoying an excellent reputation and a large practice. His professional integrity during his practice has never been questioned, and no complaint has been made or question raised as to his professional honesty, honor, or conduct. He has been a prominent and honored figure in Hartford, twice elected to the state Senate, and in 1926 was the candidate of one of the major parties for mayor of Hartford. At the time of the adultery as charged he was about fifty years of age and unmarried, while Mrs. Hastings was about thirty-one years of age, and a woman of refinement, having always enjoyed an excellent reputation. She had been married to Mr. Hastings just before he went abroad in service in the World War, in which he achieved a very remarkable war record, and for a number of years they lived happily together, and she had borne him three children when she met the respondent. The acquaintance rapidly ripened into a violent mutual infatuation which persisted to the time of the hearing on the complaint. The finding stated that, after the arrest of Mr. Broder and Mrs. Hastings for adultery at the Highland Court Hotel in Hartford, influences were speedily at work to suppress this matter, and that the state's attorney found it necessary, in the due administration of justice, to ask the superior court for the issuance of a bench warrant for the respondent and Mrs. Hastings. They were arrested on the bench warrant and released upon each giving a bond in the sum of $2,500. On September 24, 1929, each pleaded guilty to the information for adultery on June 5, 1929, and the court found them guilty, and sentenced each of them to four months in jail, but suspended the execution of sentence against Mrs. Hastings for the period of one year under probation. From this date, June 5, 1929, to September 24, 1929, the date of judgment, the respondent and Mrs. Hastings have persisted in their association, not only in this state, but elsewhere. The respondent without complaint, and without asking or receiving special favors, served the four months' term in jail less the allowance for good behavior, and was released on January 4, 1930. After his conviction, and as a consequence thereof, his name was stricken from the voting list of Hartford. Subsequent to the conviction, Mr. Hastings obtained a divorce from Mrs. Hastings on the ground of adultery with the respondent, and the custody of the three minor children of their marriage was awarded to him. Immediately upon his release from jail the respondent married Mrs. Hastings. His conduct since that time has been exemplary.

The court reached the conclusions (1) that the disbarment of an attorney is a matter within the sound discretion of the court, and (2) in the exercise of its discretion it found that the respondent is fit and qualified to practice law, that he should not be disbarred, and that the complaint should be dismissed.

the trial court was correct in its conclusion that the disposition of a disbarment proceeding was within the exercise of its sound discretion. That means a judicial discretion; the test is, Has the court exercised a reasonable discretion? In other words, has it exercised its discretion so unreasonably as to constitute an abuse of discretion? Hayward v. Plant, 98 Conn. 374, 382, 119 A. 341.

The decision of a trial court suspending or displacing an attorney is reviewable in an appeal to this court by the respondent attorney or by the maker of the complaint if the court refuses to suspend or displace him. One of the grounds for the exercise of its discretion as stated by the trial court was " because it [the act of adultery] was unconnected in any way with the respondent's professional conduct." That is not the exclusive test. There is a common standard whether it be professional or nonprofessional, and that is, whether the conduct is so indicative of moral unfitness for a member of the profession as to [152 A. 294] justify displacement as well as exclusion from the bar.

The opinion of Chief Justice Prentice in the case. In re Disbarment of Peck, 88 Conn. 447, 450, 451, 91 A. 274, 275, Ann.Cas. 1917B, 227, states our rule in these terms: " As important as it is that an attorney be competent to deal with the oftentimes intricate matters which may be intrusted to him, it is infinitely more so that he be upright and trustworthy. Unfortunately it is not easy to limit membership in the profession to those who satisfy the standard test of fitness. But scant progress in that direction can be hoped for if, in the determination of the qualification of professional fitness, nonprofessional dishonor and dishonesty in whatsoever path of life is to be ignored. Professional honesty and honor are not to be expected as the accompaniment of dishonesty and dishonor in other relations. So it is that we, in common with other courts, hold, as did Lord Mansfield more than a century ago, that misconduct, indicative of moral unfitness for the profession, whether, it be professional or nonprofessional, justifies dismission as well as exclusion from the bar. In re Durant, 80 Conn. 140, 147, 67 A. 497, 10 Ann.Cas. 539; Fairfield County Bar v. Taylor, 60 Conn. 11, 17, 22 A. 441, 13 L.R.A. 767."

The question for decision in this proceeding is this: Did the conduct of the respondent, from the time of his commission of the crime for which he was arrested to the date of his conviction upon his plea of guilty, so violate the standard of nonprofessional character and conduct which is required of the attorney by the courts, the profession of the law, and the public as to have required the court to render its judgment disbarring him?

Specifically, the determination of whether the trial judge exercised his discretion unreasonably is dependent upon the conclusion that the conviction of the respondent for adultery is indicative of such moral unfitness as to justify his displacement from the bar. The seriousness of the crime of adultery in the legislative mind is evidenced in the statutory penalty. " Every man and every married woman who shall commit adultery with each other shall be imprisoned not more than five years." General Statutes, Revision of 1918, § 6376; now Revision of 1930, § 6223. Our court holds a like view of the character of this crime. We say in State v. Avery, 7 Conn. 266, at page 270, 18 Am.Dec. 105, " I have already shown, that adultery is a very great crime, once capital, now punishable like most other felonies. *** And an attempt to commit *** such a crime, must be, at least, a high crime and misdemeanor; and we have already said, that a high crime and misdemeanor is nearly allied and equal in guilt to felony (State v. Knapp, 6 Conn. 415 [16 Am.Dec. 68])." Fimara v. Garner, 86 Conn. 434, 85 A. 670. In Drazen v. New Haven Taxicab Co., 95 Conn. 500, 506, 111 A. 861, 863, we define infamous crimes to be those " whose commission involves an...