Griffin v. Alexander

• Decision Date: 25 August 2011
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 9:09-CV-1334 (TJM/DEP)
• Parties: DONALD GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. GEORGE ALEXANDER, Chairman, New York State Division of Parole, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

DONALD GRIFFIN, Plaintiff,

v. GEORGE ALEXANDER, Chairman,New York State Division of Parole, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 9:09-CV-1334 (TJM/DEP)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

Dated: August 25, 2011

APPEARANCES:

FOR PLAINTIFF:

DONALD GRIFFIN, Pro Se

Upstate Correctional Facility

FOR DEFENDANT:

HON. ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN

Office of Attorney General

State of New York

The Capitol

Litigation Bureau

OF COUNSEL:

JUSTIN C. LEVIN, ESQ.

Assistant Attorney General

DAVID E. PEEBLES

U.S. MAGISTRATE JUDGE

REPORT, RECOMMENDATION AND ORDER

Pro se plaintiff Donald Griffin, a New York State prison inmate, has commenced this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants have deprived him of his civil rights during the period of his incarceration. In his complaint, plaintiff maintains that his right to freely exercise his religion under the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 ("RLIUPA"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc et seq., and the First Amendment to the United States Constitution was violated when he was denied parole based upon his refusal to sign an acknowledgment accepting responsibility for the conduct that resulted in his criminal conviction, precluding his participation in a sex offender treatment program and, according to plaintiff, resulting in the denial of parole. As relief, plaintiff seeks a judgment declaring that defendant's parole denial constituted a violation of the RLIUPA and the First Amendment as well as a mandatory injunction directing his release on parole and precluding the defendant from using his refusal to sign the treatment and acknowledgment form as a basis to deny parole.¹

Currently pending before the court is defendant's motion to dismiss plaintiff's complaint on the grounds that 1) plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 2) his claims are barred by Heck v. Humphrey,² 3) plaintiff has failed to allege defendant's personal involvement in the statutory and constitutional violations asserted, and 4) the defendant is entitled to qualified immunity from suit. For the reasons set forth below, I recommend that defendant's motion be granted, and that plaintiff's complaint be dismissed in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND³

Plaintiff is a prison inmate entrusted to the care and custody of the New York State Department of Corrections and Community Supervision ("DOCCS") (formerly known as the New York State Department ofCorrectional Services, or the "DOCS"). See generally Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 13). At times relevant to his claims plaintiff was designated to the Gowanda Correctional Facility ("Gowanda"), located in Gowanda, New York, for the purpose of participating in a Sex Offender Counseling and Treatment Program ("SOCTP"). See id.

According to plaintiff's second amended complaint, which is the operative pleading in this action, on August 11, 2008, while at Gowanda, plaintiff spoke with a corrections counselor regarding a pre-sentence report prepared in connection with Griffin's criminal conviction, advising the corrections counselor that the report falsely accused him of sexually assaulting a particular victim. Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 13) p. 3. Griffin informed the counselor that he could not admit committing the act referenced in the pre-sentence report because he would be lying, in contravention of his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. Id. During the conversation, plaintiff showed the corrections counselor an excerpt from his daily religious scriptures warning against the sin of lying. Id. Plaintiff claims that his participation in the SOCTP would require that he violate this religious belief because in order to progress to the third level in the program he would have to sign a "Limits of Confidentiality, PartialWaiver of Confidentiality and Acknowledgment Form", which, according to Griffin, would "on its face direct[ him] to demonstrate acceptance of responsibility for conduct [he] and Jehovah God knows [he] is not guilty of." Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 13) p. 3.

Plaintiff further recounts that the corrections counselor agreed with Griffin that he would have to admit to the alleged sex offense in order to complete the SOCTP, and provided plaintiff with a program refusal form, which he signed in the presence of the counselor. Id. In that form, a copy of which is attached to plaintiff's complaint, Griffin indicated that he was refusing to participate in the SOCTP in light of its incompatibility with his religious beliefs. Id. at Exh. A-1. In signing the form plaintiff specifically acknowledged that his refusal could result in a negative decision by the Parole Board, among other things, as well as his awareness that he could change his mind and inform program staff if he wished to participate in the treatment program. See id. The specific reason stated for his refusal was listed as "[d]ue to current religion beliefs I/M Griffin unable to participate (ie. 'to not violate his conscientious [sic] by lying')." Id.

Griffin appeared before representatives of the New York State Parole Board on October 28, 2008 and was questioned regarding hisrefusal to participate in the SOCTP. Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 13) p. 4. He informed the Board that he could not successfully complete the program because it would require him to lie, in violation of his religious beliefs as a Jehovah's Witness. Id. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Board issued a decision denying plaintiff release to parole supervision based, in part, on his refusal to participate in the SOCTP. Id.; see also Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) Exh. 1.⁴

Plaintiff timely appealed the parole denial decision; his appeal, however, was effectively denied by the failure of the Parole Board appeals unit to respond. Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 13) p. 4. As a result, on June 30, 2009, plaintiff filed a petition against the defendant in this action with the New York State Supreme Court pursuant to Article 78 of the New York Civil Practice Law and Rules, asserting that the decision of the Parole Board should be annulled on essentially the same grounds he now advances in this lawsuit. Second Amended Complaint (Dkt. No.13) p. 4; see also Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) Exh. 2. In response to plaintiff's Article 78 petition, the defendant proposed and secured the issuance of an order, over plaintiff's opposition, granting Griffin a de novo hearing on the grounds that the Parole Board had considered erroneous information in denying his release.⁵ Complaint (Dkt. No. 1) Exh. 4. Specifically, in consenting to a new parole hearing, the Board admitted that it had relied, in part, on the erroneous information to the effect that Griffin had been found guilty of a serious disciplinary rule violation. Id. It appears that plaintiff was again denied parole on rehearing.⁶

II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff filed his complaint in the action, along with an application to proceed in forma pauperis, and a motion for preliminary injunction, on November 30, 2009. Dkt. Nos. 1, 2, and 4. In his complaint Griffin names a single defendant, George Alexander, the former Chairman of the New York State Division of Parole,⁷ and claims interference with his right of free religious exercise under both the First Amendment and the RLIUPA in association with the October 28, 2009 parole denial.

On December 14, 2009, before the court had completed its initial review of those submissions, plaintiff filed an amended complaint. Dkt.No. 5. By decision and order dated February 16, 2010, the court concluded that plaintiff's amended complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Dkt. No. 8. In its decision the court noted, inter alia, that plaintiff's request for release from incarceration is not a form of relief available in this action, that he was afforded a de novo parole hearing after it was discovered that information regarding plaintiff's disciplinary history relied upon by the Parole Board was incorrect, and that plaintiff's claims regarding the SOCTP were not cognizable against the only defendant named in this action, Chairman Alexander. Id. at 2-7.

Plaintiff appealed the court's dismissal of the action to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. Dkt. No. 11. By decision issued by the court on June 7, 2010, the dismissal was vacated, and the matter was remanded to this court for further proceedings. See Dkt. No. 16. In its decision the Second Circuit found plaintiff's "pro se complaint . . . insufficiently particular to allow [it] to ascertain whether the underlying claim is frivolous", observing also that this court "analyzed [plaintiff's] First Amendment claim as a due process claim, and without adequately considering whether personal involvement is a prerequisite to liability under [RLIUPA]." Id. Accordingly, the court directed that the plaintiff beafforded an opportunity to file another amended complaint specifying both the features of the SOCTP program that would require him to violate the tenets of his religion and the religious beliefs tenets that would be violated. See id.

Following that remand, plaintiff submitted the second amended complaint, which was accepted by the court for filing. See Dkt. Nos. 13 and 17. In response to plaintiff's most recent complaint, defendant has moved seeking its dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.⁸ Dkt. No. 27. Plaintiff has since responded in opposition to defendant's motion, Dkt. No. 29, which is now ripe for determination and has been referred to me for the issuance of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Northern District of New York Local Rule 72.3(c). See also Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b).

III. DISCUSSION

A. Dismissal Motion Standard

A motion to dismiss a complaint, brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, calls upon a court to gauge the facial sufficiency of that pleading, utilizing as a...