Griffin v. Allegheny Cnty. Prison

• Decision Date: 05 November 2018
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 17 - 1560
• Parties: TODD GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY PRISON, SUPERINTENDENT ORLANDO HARPER, and DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JOHN WILLIAMS., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

TODD GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. ALLEGHENY COUNTY PRISON,

SUPERINTENDENT ORLANDO HARPER,

and DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR JOHN WILLIAMS., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 17 - 1560

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

November 5, 2018

District Judge Arthur J. Schwab

Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants Orlando Harper and the Allegheny County Jail (ECF No. 15) be granted as to Allegheny County Jail and denied as to Orlando Harper. It is also recommended that the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant John Williams (ECF No. 23) be denied.

II. REPORT

A. Procedural Background

Todd Griffin ("Plaintiff") is a former inmate of the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections and proceeding in this action pro se. He initiated this action by the filing of a Motion for Leave to Proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 1), which was granted on December 4, 2017 (ECF No. 2). His Complaint, which was filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, was docketed by the Clerk the same day. (ECF No. 3.)

Defendants Orlando Harper and the Allegheny County Prison filed a Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint on April 5, 2018 (ECF No. 15), and Defendant Williams filed a Motion to Dismiss on May 10, 2018 (ECF No. 23). Plaintiff filed responses in opposition to the Motions on May 11, 2018 (ECF No. 26) and June 1, 2018 (ECF No. 30), respectively. They are now ripe for review.

B. Standard of Review

The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit summarized the standard to be applied in deciding motions to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6):

Under the "notice pleading" standard embodied in Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a plaintiff must come forward with "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." As explicated in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), a claimant must state a "plausible" claim for relief, and "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the pleaded factual content allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Although "[f]actual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level," Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007), a plaintiff "need only put forth allegations that raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence of the necessary element." Fowler, 578 F.3d at 213 (quotation marks and citations omitted); see alsoCovington v. Int'l Ass'n of Approved Basketball Officials, 710 F.3d 114, 117-18 (3d Cir.2013).

Thompson v. Real Estate Mortg. Network, 748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. Apr. 3, 2014).

When considering pro se pleadings, a court must employ less stringent standards than when judging the work product of an attorney. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). When presented with a pro se complaint, the court should construe the complaint liberally anddraw fair inferences from what is not alleged as well as from what is alleged. Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 369 (3d Cir. 2003). In a § 1983 action, the court must "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether the pro se litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002) (quoting Holley v. Dep't of Veteran Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)). See also Nami v. Fauver, 82 F.3d 63, 65 (3d Cir. 1996) ("Since this is a § 1983 action, the [pro se] plaintiffs are entitled to relief if their complaint sufficiently alleges deprivation of any right secured by the Constitution.") (quoting Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688). Notwithstanding this liberality, pro se litigants are not relieved of their obligation to allege sufficient facts to support a cognizable legal claim. See, e.g., Taylor v. Books A Million, Inc., 296 F.3d 376, 378 (5th Cir. 2002); Riddle v. Mondragon, 83 F.3d 1197, 2102 (10th Cir. 1996).

C. Discussion

In his Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he was unlawfully held in custody at the Allegheny County Jail ("ACJ") after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016. He states that he spoke and wrote to both Defendant Orlando Harper, Warden of the ACJ, and Defendant John Williams, the ACJ Administrator, but that neither of them took action after they were informed of the situation. (ECF No. 3, generally.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his rights under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution. (ECF No. 3, p.2.)

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's Complaint for the following reasons: (1) Plaintiff was lawfully detained pursuant to a valid criminal case; (2) Plaintiff's claim is barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); (3) they are entitled to qualified immunity; and (4) Plaintiff's only remedy is to file a petition for writ of habeas corpus. (ECF No. 24, generally.)

First, the Court notes that Plaintiff claims that his rights were violated under the Fourth and Eighth Amendments to the United States Constitution (ECF No. 3, p.2), but, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals recently stated that, unlike some other courts, it "has always analyzed over-detention claims under the Eighth Amendment. . . ." Wharton v. Danberg, 854 F.3d 234, 247 (3d Cir. 2017); Compare, Barnes v. District of Columbia, 242 F.R.D. 113, 118 (D.D.C. Mar. 26, 2007) (stating that most courts that have considered over-detention claims have agreed that they are properly channeled through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). However, the Third Circuit has acknowledged that it has always applied the Eighth Amendment because each of their over-detention cases involved convicted and sentenced inmates. Wharton, 854 F.3d at 247 (citing cases). In addressing over-detention claims made by pretrial detainees, the Third Circuit has said that there is no applicable provision more specific than the Due Process Clause, and, while acknowledging that the protections of the Eighth Amendment and Due Process Clauses are sometimes the same, it declined to examine the differences between those two analyses in the context of over-detention. Id.

Plaintiff's custody status at the time of the alleged over-detention is unknown. Nevertheless, in the context of a convicted and sentenced inmate, the Third Circuit has stated that

[a]n inmate's detention after his term of imprisonment can, under certain circumstances, constitute cruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Montanez v. Thompson, 603 F.3d 243, 250 (3d Cir. 2010). Continued incarceration beyond that point is clearly punitive, and in many cases will serve no penological justification at all. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989). That said, we also recognize that "[t]he administration of a system of punishment entails an unavoidable risk of error" and that "[e]limitation of the risk of error in many instances would be either literally impossible or unfeasible because prohibitively costly." Id. The Eighth Amendment does not, and could not, require the elimination of all such risk of error.

Wharton, 854 F.3d at 241.

The Third Circuit has established a three-part test for over-detention claims. Specifically, a plaintiff must show:

(1) a prison official had knowledge of the prisoner's problem and thus of the risk that unwarranted punishment was being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official either failed to act or took only ineffectual action under the circumstances, indicating that his response to the problem was a product of deliberate indifference to the prisoner's plight; and (3) a causal connection between the official's response to the problem and the unjustified detention.

Montanez, 603 F.3d at 252.

In the present matter, Defendants aver that even accepting his allegations as true Plaintiff has failed to set forth a prima facie case of over-detention. In support of their position, they argue that another criminal case was initiated against Plaintiff on June 26, 2016, which was less than a week after Plaintiff was sentenced to time served for the criminal case on June 21, 2016. They state that Plaintiff remained in custody for the pendency of the criminal case that was initiated against him on June 26, 2016 because he was unable to post his $50,000 bail but that Plaintiff was given credit for the 164 days that he served in the ACJ while waiting for the adjudication of that case. Defendants' argument, however, is misplaced as it fails to address Plaintiff's actual claim - that he was over-detained after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016.

Plaintiff has indeed stated a claim for over-detention under the aforementioned three-part test. Even though Plaintiff does not specify for how long he remained in custody after he was sentenced to time served on June 21, 2016, he does state that he made repeated attempts to remedy the situation through contact with Defendants Harper and Williams. Whether or not he was lawfully in custody for another criminal matter on June 26, 2016 is of little importance toanswering the question presented. Having said this, the undersigned is of the opinion that a brief period of discovery will reveal whether Plaintiff was in fact over-detained and whether Defendants were aware of, but deliberately indifferent to the situation.¹

However, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against Defendant Allegheny County Jail. In the Third Circuit, it is well-settled that a jail or prison is not a "person" that is subject to suit under § 1983. See Amaro v. Montgomery County, No. 06-3131, 2008 WL 4148610, at *4 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 8, 2008) (noting that the Montgomery County Correctional Facility was not a "person" for purposes of § 1983); Ramalho v. Montgomery County Corr. Facility, No. 06-2036, 2007 WL 1810700, at *1 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 2007) (dismissing county jail since "for purposes of the § 1983 claim" it was "not a 'person' amenable to suit"); Meyers v. Schuylkill County Prison, No. 04-1123, 2006 WL...