Griffin v. Bartlett

Decision Date11 March 1875
Citation55 N.H. 119
PartiesGriffin v. Bartlett.
CourtNew Hampshire Supreme Court

The same proof of user, which establishes the right to use the water of a stream in a particular way, is equally conclusive in establishing the limitations of that right. The doctrine of Burnham v. Kempton, 44 N.H. 78, affirmed.

B having gained by prescription a right to flow G.'s meadow, from October to June of each year, to the height of his ancient dam, repaired and tightened the dam, erected an additional mill, put in new and improved machinery consuming less water, and claimed the right to operate the mills as thus constructed, provided he did not raise the water above the top of his ancient dam. Held, that he could not flow G.'s land in a different manner nor to a greater extent than he had formerly done.

G having brought an action against B. for flowing his meadow showed no title to the land flowed, except a deed dated in 1831, and no possession prior to that time. B. showed that G.'s meadow had been flowed prior to 1831 by a dam over which he (B.) had exercised control since 1868, and claimed that his right to flow B.'s meadow would be presumed, and that the burden of proof was on G. to show that he had acquired a right to hold his land free of water. Held, that the burden of proof was on B. to show that he had a right to flow as claimed by him

CASE for flowing the plaintiff's meadow, situated on the shore of Jenness pond in Northwood. The declaration alleged that the defendant, ever since the first day of January, 1867, had maintained, kept up, and continued a mill-dam in said Northwood, across a brook forming the outlet of said pond and by means thereof has raised and kept up the water in said pond, and thereby made it to overflow and drown the plaintiff's meadow, whereby the plaintiff's grass growing on said meadow was damaged, etc. Plea, the general issue. It appeared at the trial that the dam named in the declaration had existed since about the year 1828, and that a dam had existed near the site of the present dam beyond the memory of man, and that they were used originally to supply water to a certain ancient saw-mill which was owned by the father of the plaintiff in common with the father of the defendant and others, each owner having the right to use the mill one day in twenty-four for every share owned by him during the life of the mill,---the father of the defendant owning one share; and that for twenty-nine years last past the defendant has drawn water from the same dam to supply his shingle and clapboard mill, situated below the sawmill, subject to the right of the owners of the old saw-mill, so long as it was in use, and since 1869 to supply a grist-mill also, having in 1868 and 1869 repaired and tightened the dam (and, as the plaintiff claimed, raised it), and from that time assumed control over it. It

did not appear whether or not the defendant drew water from the dam for a shingle and grist-mill during the time named in the declaration differently from or in less quantity than before. One of the claims set up by the plaintiff was, that the ancient saw-mill was used almost entirely in the spring of the year; that it consumed large quantities of water; and that by its use the water was so drawn from the pond by the end of May that the lands of the plaintiff on the shore of the pond were left dry and free from water during the summer months and the months of September and October. It also appeared that the saw-mill was suffered by the owners thereof to be disused and to decay, and that the same had not been used since the year 1859 or thereabouts; and the plaintiff claimed and offered evidence to show that after that time the gate in said dam had been raised in the spring of the year, and the water drawn off so that the plaintiff's land continued to be left dry and free from water during the months above stated, down to about the time the defendant repaired the dam, when he refused to hoist the gate or allow it to be hoisted, since which time the water has remained upon the plaintiff's land during the summer months. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff, claiming title under his father, who owned one share in the mill, is estopped to complain of any damage arising from its disuse; but the court ruled otherwise, and the defendant excepted. The defendant also asked the court to instruct the jury that the mere neglect or refusal of the defendant to open the gate of said dam under the above circumstances does not entitle the plaintiff to maintain this action; but the court instructed the jury that the law would be as stated by the defendant if he did not maintain the dam: but the defendant having repaired the dam and assumed control over it, he is liable, unless he has a right to keep the water as he did keep it; to which the defendant excepted. The plaintiff showed no title to the land flowed except a deed dated in 1831, and no possession prior to that time. The defendant offered evidence to show that the dam had existed before 1831, and claimed that it was substantially of its present height, while the plaintiff claimed and offered evidence tending to show that its efficient height was increased by the defendant when he repaired it in 1868 and 1869. The evidence showed that the dam had been used prior to and since 1831 to raise the water upon the land claimed by the plaintiff, and that it had raised the water to the full height of the dam at certain seasons of the year; but the plaintiff offered evidence to show (and no evidence was offered to contradict it) that the land flowed was cleared up soon after 1831, had been mowed every year afterwards down to the year 1868, and cranberries had been picked every year down to the year 1868, and that it had not been flowed down to that time during the summer months and September and October, but that since 1868 the plaintiff had not been able to mow said meadow, nor pick any cranberries upon it, except a few in a boat in the fall of 1868; and the evidence tended to show that the cranberry vines had all been killed, and also the trees upon that part of the meadow claimed to be flowed, and that it had been covered with water substantially the

whole season. The defendant claimed that having proved that the land had been flowed prior to 1831 by the dam, of which he had exercised control since 1868, the right of the defendant to continue the flowage is to be presumed, and that the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the defendant's right to flow the land had been lost or modified, or that the plaintiff has acquired a right to hold the land free of the water; but the court charged the jury that there is nothing in the fact that the title of the defendant is older than the title of the plaintiff, but the defendant must still make out his right to flow the land by proving twenty years' adverse use in the manner complained of; to which the defendant excepted. The defendant showed title to an undivided half of the land upon which the dam and saw-mill stood; but there was no evidence of any right in the defendant to flow the plaintiff's land, except such as had been gained by prescription. The defendant requested the court to instruct the jury (1) that the extent of the defendant's right to flow the shores of Jenness pond will be the height to which a dam of the same height as that which the dam he has sustained more than twenty years would flow, although some part of the time, by leaking and want of repair, the dam has not kept the water to its original height; and that the owner of such a dam may repair it and thereby keep the water up uniformly; [(2) and that if the jury find that the defendant, or the persons from whom he derives his title, did, more than twenty years before the date of the writ, build or maintain a dam calculated and intended to raise the water as high as the top of the same, and did from time to time repair and tighten said dam so that the same did so raise the water, the right to keep the water as high as the top of the dam is not lost by the dam becoming leaky and out of repair, but the owner might at his pleasure repair and tighten the dam;] (3) and that the existence thereof, with mills in actual use, and the frequent flowage of water to the height of the dam, was notice to the plaintiff of the claim and right of the defendant to maintain, repair, and tighten the dam, and that the right of the defendant was maintained, notwithstanding the dam from time to time became leaky and insufficient to keep up the water long at a time; (4) also, that a mill-owner may adopt improved machinery in his mill, which takes less water to carry it than that in use before, although the effect of this may be to keep a higher state of water in his pond; and that this defendant had the right to substitute other machinery, and that which would use less water or use it less rapidly, for the old saw-mill, provided he did not raise the water above the top of his ancient dam; (5) also, that under the present declaration the plaintiff cannot recover for damages caused, not simply by the maintenance of the defendant's dam, but by the improper use of it at certain seasons of the year, or by the omission to withdraw the water so rapidly or so early in the season as the defendant ought. The defendant excepted, because the court did not give these instructions, except the portion enclosed in brackets, and because the court added thereto the following: "that is to say, if he had once gained the right he would not lose it by letting the dam get leaky and,

out of repair for a period of less than twenty years." There was no evidence that the defendant had introduced any improved machinery into his mill, or made any change in his mill except the addition of a grist-mill. The court instructed...

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13 cases
  • Whitcher v. State
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 5 Noviembre 1935
    ...and their successors in title, the plaintiff has by prescription a right of flowage for the benefit of his dominant tenement. Griffin v. Bartlett, 55 N. H. 119. But no such prescription can be claimed by the plaintiff as against the public rights of fishing, fowling, flotation, bathing, or ......
  • Haigh v. Lenfesty
    • United States
    • Illinois Supreme Court
    • 9 Abril 1909
    ...constructed under said grant. Our attention has been called to Powell v. Lash, 64 N. C. 456,Morris v. Commander, 25 N. C. 510,Griffin v. Bartlett, 55 N. H. 119,Stiles v. Hooker, 7 Cow. (N. Y.) 266, Mertz v. Dorney, 25 Pa. 519,Brown v. Bush, 45 Pa. 61,Turner v. Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 38 N. W. 8......
  • Wason v. Nashua
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 25 Junio 1931
    ...regard to his consent. Gilford v. Lake Co., 52 N. H. 262, 266, 267; Bailey v. Carleton, 12 N. H. 9, 16, 18, 37 Am. Dec. 190; Griffin v. Bartlett, 55 N. H. 119, 124; Vandegrift v. Burke, 98 Md. 230, 56 A. In so far as the members of the public who used the premises here were patrons of the p......
  • Goddard v. Berlin Mills Co.
    • United States
    • New Hampshire Supreme Court
    • 5 Enero 1926
    ...continuous holding or merely a seasonal one. For that reason the request was properly denied. Burnham v. Kempton, 44 N. H. 90; Griffin v. Bartlett. 55 N. H. 119; Gilford v. Company, 52 N. H. Exceptions overruled. All concurred. ...
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