Griffin v. Bendick

Decision Date04 August 1983
Docket NumberNo. 80-26-A,80-26-A
Citation463 A.2d 1340
PartiesJulia Eliza GRIFFIN v. Robert BENDICK, Director of the Department of Environmental Management, and W. Edward Wood, Director of the Department of Transportation. ppeal.
CourtRhode Island Supreme Court
OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

The roots of this dispute lie in the now decades-old condemnation of certain lands owned by the plaintiff, Julia Eliza Griffin (Griffin). The parcels, located along the shoreline of the town of Narragansett, were taken and compensated for by the state in a series of condemnation proceedings that took place in the years 1946 and 1962. Griffin's land was condemned for the ostensible purpose of developing a state port facility. Sometime in 1972 Griffin concluded that she had been aggrieved by these condemnations, and she subsequently filed this Superior Court civil action on January 9, 1973. In her prayers for declaratory relief, Griffin requested the court to award her damages, to reinvest her with title to the properties, and to account for all rentals and fees collected.

Following trial before a justice sitting without a jury, both parties took appeals to this court. Upon a review of the record, we are of the opinion that this controversy raises salient constitutional issues that should be addressed at this time, although the case might be dismissed on other grounds as discussed below. Given the course of action we have chosen to pursue, we find it necessary to indulge in an extensive review of the facts before discussing the merits of the arguments before us.

The land involved in this litigation, along with much of the surrounding property, was originally owned by Griffin's father and referred to as the Griffin Marsh Land. On August 2, 1934, a fifty-foot strip of land running north to south across the Griffin Marsh Land was deeded to the state for the purpose of constructing a public highway; this strip is now Great Island Road. The state was also given littoral rights to build bulkheads along the waterfront, to deposit any spoils from dredging work, and to construct State Pier No. 3. These projects were completed by 1936 just after the father's death, at which time his daughter, plaintiff in this suit, took possession of the land. A decade later, with the long-range goal of developing a port facility, the state, acting through its Department of Public Works, Division of Harbors and Rivers, condemned three parcels of the Griffin Marsh Land. Two of the parcels were located in Narragansett in the village of Galilee and the third was situated in that section of Narragansett known as Jerusalem.

More specifically, on March 5, 1946, the state took 17.7 acres of land east of Great Island Road in Galilee and 14,500 square feet of land north of the landing for State Pier No. 3 between the bulkhead and Great Island Road. Shortly thereafter, on May 23, 1946, the remainder of Griffin's Galilee waterfront land was taken. This parcel comprises an area that runs northerly from the Champlin's Fish Market building to the United States Coast Guard Station and then onto State Pier No. 3. Finally, on August 22, 1946, the state condemned 1.09 acres of waterfront land owned by Griffin in Jerusalem on the west side of Point Judith Pond. Upon completion of the condemnation proceedings, the state assumed all leases existing between Griffin and her tenants at the time.

In response to the condemnations, Griffin, through her then attorney, the late James O. Watts, brought three separate actions in Superior Court for the assessment of damages against the state. One action was reached for trial in May of 1947 and resulted in a judgment for Griffin in the amount of $27,475. The state filed a motion for a new trial, after which Griffin instructed her attorney to negotiate a full settlement of her claims regarding all three parcels. Following an extended negotiation period, on March 30, 1948, the state agreed to pay Griffin $80,100 for her land in exchange for a general release and quitclaim deed, which read in pertinent part as follows.

DEED

"I, J. ELIZA GRIFFIN, of the Town of South Kingstown, County of Washington, State of Rhode Island, for consideration paid, grant to the STATE OF RHODE ISLAND AND PROVIDENCE PLANTATIONS with Quit-Claim Covenants

"All my right, title and interest in and to any and all land wheresoever located within the limits of condemnation, * * *."

RELEASE

"NOW, THEREFORE, I, J. Eliza Griffin, in consideration of eighty thousand one hundred and 00/100 ($80,100.00) dollars to be paid by the State of Rhode Island, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, * * * do hereby remise, release and forever quit claim unto the State of Rhode Island all and all manner of actions, causes of actions, debts, dues, claims and demands, both in law and equity, and without limiting the generality of the foregoing, especially for the value of the land taken as aforesaid and any and all damages incident or related to said taking, which against said Department of Public Works on behalf of the State of Rhode Island, or the said State of Rhode Island ever had now have or ought to have, for or by reason of any matter or thing from the beginning of the world to the day of the date of these presents."

Griffin and the state then went their separate ways until August 19, 1962, when in response to a growing demand for dock space, the state took the last parcel of land involved in this litigation. This parcel, situated on Little Comfort Island, was designated as lots numbered 6 and 7 on the land plat maps of Narragansett.

From 1948 the state has utilized the Griffin property condemned in 1946, along with adjacent lands, to develop a port facility. According to the evidence adduced before the trial justice, this development is an ongoing project costing millions of dollars. Among other things, the project has resulted in the construction and repair of bulkheads, breakwaters, piers, roads, parking lots, and a sewer system; the dredging and redredging of the harbor; development of a sandy state beach; and the repair and replacement of docks, riprap, and breachway. Additionally, the land in the port area has been used for deposits of spoils from dredging and redredging operations, for the operation of fish-processing plants, and for the provision of auxiliary services to the commercial fishing fleet, charter-boat fleet, pleasure craft, and ferry to Block Island. Furthermore, the University of Rhode Island makes use of the port facility for its nurseries and its various shell and fish studies, and the Division of Fish and Wildlife maintains a fisheries laboratory on the site.

The auxiliary services alluded to above include not only direct support for the marine industry, such as a boat-engine-repair shop, storage facilities, and net-drying areas, but also retail businesses such as restaurants, markets, and a hotel (the Dutch Inn) to serve the boat crews, employees of local industries, and tourists. Because of the improvements made to the port, it has been successful in attracting several major fishing tournaments, including the Atlantic Tuna Tournament, the Swordfish Tournament, and the Striped Bass Tournament. These and other events have drawn thousands of tourists to the area who are in turn served by the local retail establishments.

Future expansion and development of the port will be guided by a plan prepared by the Coastal Resources Management Council. Improvements will include, among others, the extension of piers, the establishment of additional fish-processing plants, the construction of additional facilities to accommodate an expanded commercial fishing fleet, and the possible development of a University of Rhode Island fishing school and fish-industry museum. Ultimately, as funds become available, the Galilee facilities will be made completely available to the commercial fleet, and the area condemned on Little Comfort Island in 1962 will be developed as a marina for pleasure craft.

In explaining the commencement of this suit some twenty-seven years subsequent to the original condemnations, Griffin testified that she only just became aware of a possible "constitutional right of preemption" in her properties in 1972 when she met her present counsel. In 1973 Griffin filed an action against the Director of the Department of Transportation; in 1974 she filed a similar action against the Director of the Department of Natural Resources, now the Department of Environmental Management. Griffin joined both directors as parties because of an apparent overlap of functions between the two departments. In G.L. 1956 (1977 Reenactment) § 42-17.1-2 (1982 Cum.Supp.), the Director of Environmental Management is authorized to exercise all the functions and duties previously vested in the former Division of Harbors and Rivers of the Department of Public Works. Likewise, enumerated among the powers granted to the Director of the Transportation Department in § 42-13-1 (1982 Cum.Supp.) is the implementation of programs for port and waterways facilities and the management of port properties and state piers. Consequently, these actions were consolidated for trial and heard before the trial justice in December 1978.

Our attention now shifts to selected issues raised by Griffin and the conclusions of law reached by the trial justice. However, before discussing the merits of the substantive issues before us, we shall first dispose of Griffin's contention that the trial justice erred in vacating a default judgment entered against defendant on February 2, 1973. 1 Chronologically, the following sequence of events occurred. Griffin instituted the instant action by a summons and sworn complaint dated January 9, 1973, and served upon the then Director of Transportation, Robert J. Rahill. No entry of appearance was filed on behalf of Rahill, nor...

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29 cases
  • Healey v. Bendick, Civ. A. No. 85-0341-S.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island
    • February 12, 1986
    ...chief legal officer in order to permit the plaintiff to test the constitutionality of the statutory scheme. See, e.g., Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340, 1344 (R.I.1983) (interpreting R.I.Gen. Laws § 9-30-11 to require presence of Attorney General as an indispensable party in actions challe......
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    • United States
    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
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    ...he is "questioning the constitutionality of the very statute that [he] previously invoked to exact h[is] remedy." Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340, 1345 (R.I. 1983) (noting parenthetically that the plaintiff's action challenging the constitutionality of a decades-old condemnation of lands ......
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    • Superior Court of Rhode Island
    • December 5, 2019
    ...he is "questioning the constitutionality of the very statute that [he] previously invoked to exact h[is] remedy." Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340, 1345 (R.I. 1983) (noting parenthetically that the plaintiff's action challenging the constitutionality of a decades-old condemnation of lands ......
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    • December 5, 2019
    ...he is "questioning the constitutionality of the very statute that [he] previously invoked to exact h[is] remedy." Griffin v. Bendick, 463 A.2d 1340, 1345 (R.I. 1983) (noting parenthetically that the plaintiff's action challenging the constitutionality of a decades-old condemnation of lands ......
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