Griffin v. Berghuis

• Decision Date: 06 January 2004
• Docket Number: No. 00-10496-BC.,00-10496-BC.
• Citation: 298 F.Supp.2d 663
• Parties: Darryl GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. Mary BERGHUIS, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

298 F.Supp.2d 663

Darryl GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. Mary BERGHUIS, Respondent.

No. 00-10496-BC.

United States District Court, E.D. Michigan, Northern Division.

January 6, 2004.

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Robert R. Elsey, Grosse Pointe Park, MI, for petitioner.

Debra M. Gagliardi, Vincent J. Leone, Michigan Department of Attorney General, Habeas Corpus Division, Lansing, MI, for respondent.

ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION OF THE MAGISTRATE JUDGE AND DENYING THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

LAWSON, District Judge.

Petitioner Darryl Griffin filed through counsel this application for the writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254, alleging that he is incarcerated by the Michigan Department of Corrections in violation of the Constitution of the United States. The matter was referred to Magistrate Judge Charles E. Binder for general case management, and the magistrate judge filed his report on September 9, 2002 recommending that the petition be denied. The petitioner timely submitted objections and the matter is now before the Court for de novo review. Having analyzed the report, the petitioner's objections thereto, and the other materials on file, the Court concludes that although it disagrees with the magistrate judge's finding that certain claims are procedurally defaulted, the claims in the petition nonetheless lack merit and are not worthy of habeas relief. Accordingly, the Court will adopt the report in part, adopt the recommendation, and deny the petition.

I.

The magistrate judge based his summation of the facts, to which neither party has objected, on the following recitation of the record by the Michigan Court of Appeals:

After a lengthy period of investigation and surveillance, the police conducted a search and seizure at 732 Bethany in Saginaw on the morning of August 22, 1996. Defendant was in the house at the time, having slept there the night before. On a dresser in the bedroom where defendant said that he had spent that night, the police found a quantity of cocaine in plain view alongside some personal items of defendant. According to expert testimony at trial, the amounts of cocaine and particular drug paraphernalia that the police found at the house indicated that the premises were used as a locus for drug trafficking. During the course of the investigation, an informant, operating under police supervision, purchased cocaine from defendant on April 18 and 29, and August 26, 1996, and on June 11 that year viewed defendant with some cocaine that defendant was offering for sale, each of these events occurring at the house at 732 Bethany.

This house was the residence of Tonja Simpson (Simpson), her and defendant's minor son, and Simpson's father, who was renting the house from his ex-wife. Simpson was arrested and charged along with defendant. Her case was eventually severed from defendant's, and she testified at defendant's trial pursuant to a plea agreement.

The jury found defendant guilty as charged. The trial court sentenced defendant to one to two years' imprisonment for maintaining a drug house, that sentence to run concurrently with sentences of three to forty years' imprisonment for each of the remaining five convictions, the latter all to run consecutively to each other and to a sentence for an earlier conviction.

People v. Griffin, 235 Mich.App. 27, 30-31, 597 N.W.2d 176, 180 (1999). The petitioner was convicted of delivery of less than 50 grams of cocaine, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7201(2)(a)(iv); possession with intent to deliver cocaine less than 50 grams, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7401(2)(a)(4); conspiracy, Mich. Comp. Laws § 750.157(a); and maintaining a drug house, Mich. Comp. Laws § 333.7405(1)(d).

The petitioner challenged his convictions in the Michigan Court of Appeals, which rejected his claims in a published opinion. Griffin, 235 Mich.App. at 30, 597 N.W.2d at 180. The Michigan Supreme Court denied review. People v. Griffin, 461 Mich. 919, 605 N.W.2d 316 (1999) (Table). The instant petition was filed through counsel on November 27, 2000 asserting the six grounds for relief summarized by the magistrate judge on pages 6-7 of his report. The respondent answered the petition, contending that the claims asserted lacked merit, were not cognizable on habeas review, or are procedurally defaulted.

II.

As the magistrate judge correctly observed, the petitioner's claims are reviewed against the standards established by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub.L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA). This Act "circumscribe[d]" the standard of review federal courts must apply when considering applications for a writ of habeas corpus raising the question of effective assistance of counsel, as well as other constitutional claims. See Wiggins v. Smith, ___ U.S. ___, ___, 123 S.Ct. 2527, 2534, 156 L.Ed.2d 471 (2003). The AEDPA applies to all habeas petitions filed after the effective date of the Act, April 24, 1996. Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 336, 117 S.Ct. 2059, 138 L.Ed.2d 481 (1997). Because the petitioner's application was filed after that date, the provisions of the AEDPA, including the amended standard of review, apply to this case.

As amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim—

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). Therefore, federal courts are bound by a state court's adjudication of a petitioner's claims unless the state court's decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Franklin v. Francis, 144 F.3d 429, 433 (6th Cir. 1998). Mere error by the state court will not justify issuance of the writ; rather, the state court's application of federal law "must have been objectively unreasonable." Wiggins, 123 S.Ct. at 2535 (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000); internal quotes omitted). Additionally, this Court must presume the correctness of state court factual determinations. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1) ("In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct."); see also Cremeans v. Chapleau, 62 F.3d 167, 169 (6th Cir.1995) ("We give complete deference to state court findings unless they are clearly erroneous.").

The United States Supreme Court has explained the proper application of the "contrary to" clause as follows:

A state-court decision will certainly be contrary to [the Supreme Court's] clearly established precedent if the state court applies a rule that contradicts the governing law set forth in our cases.... A state-court decision will also be contrary to this Court's clearly established precedent if the state court confronts a set of facts that are materially indistinguishable from a decision of this Court and nevertheless arrives at a result different from [the Court's] precedent.

Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000).

The Supreme Court held that a federal court should analyze a claim for habeas corpus relief under the "unreasonable application" clause of § 2254(d)(1) "when a state-court decision unreasonably applies the law of this Court to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409, 120 S.Ct. 1495. The Court defined "unreasonable application" as follows:

[A] federal habeas court making the "unreasonable application" inquiry should ask whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law was objectively unreasonable.... [A]n unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect application of federal law.... Under § 2254(d)(1)'s "unreasonable application" clause, then, a federal habeas court may not issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must also be unreasonable.

Id. at 409, 410-11, 120 S.Ct. 1495. See also McAdoo v. Elo, 346 F.3d 159, 165-66 (6th Cir.2003); Rockwell v. Yukins, 341 F.3d 507, 512 (6th Cir.2003) (en banc); Lewis v. Wilkinson, 307 F.3d 413, 418 (6th Cir.2002).

A.

The petitioner's first claim is that evidence offered at trial was not constitutionally sufficient to support his conviction of maintaining a drug house. The petitioner argues that because he was "just visiting" Ms. Simpson at the time police searched her home and did not live there, no rational jury could have so convicted him.

There is no question that "the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S.Ct. 1068, 25 L.Ed.2d 368 (1970). But the critical inquiry on review of the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction is "whether the record evidence could reasonably support a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979).

[T]his inquiry does not require a court to "ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." Instead, the relevant question is...