Griffin v. Cedar Fair, L.P.
| Citation | 817 F.Supp.2d 1152 |
| Decision Date | 07 October 2011 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 11–CV–003148–PSG. |
| Parties | Irving GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. CEDAR FAIR, L.P. dba California's Great America, Defendant. |
| Court | United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. United States District Courts. 9th Circuit. Northern District of California |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Catherine M. Cabalo, Celia Louise McGuinness, Paul Leslie Rein, Law Offices of Paul L. Rein, Oakland, CA, for Plaintiff.
David Vincent Roth, Matthew Patrick Noel, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, San Francisco, CA, for Defendant.
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR MORE DEFINITE STATEMENT
On June 24, 2011, Plaintiff Irving Griffin (“Griffin”) filed a complaint against Defendant Cedar Fair, L.P. dba California's Great America (“Cedar Fair”). Griffin alleges that Cedar Fair violated the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and related California state statutes. On August 5, 2011, Cedar Fair filed a motion for a more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e). Having considered the briefs and the oral argument presented to the court, for the reasons below, the motion for a more definite statement is DENIED.
According to the complaint, Griffin is a quadriplegic and requires the use of a manual wheelchair for mobility. Defendant owns and operates the California's Great America amusement park in Santa Clara, California. On or about July 4, 2009, Griffin visited Great America as a paying customer along with his fiancée and some friends. During this visit, Griffin attempted to use one of the public restrooms on the property, but due to his wheelchair was not able to fit into any of the stalls. He called to his friends, but he “suffered a humiliating bodily functions accident, soiled himself and his clothing, and was forced to leave the Park.” 1 Griffin alleges that the facilities in this bathroom are not adequate to allow him, and other similarly disabled people, to have full and equal use under the ADA.2
The complaint further alleges that the amusement park contains various defects throughout the property which make these sites inaccessible to disabled persons. These other alleged defects include a “lack of proper accessible restrooms, improperly high food court counters, and improper paths of travel.” 3 Griffin further alleges that other barriers include “inaccessible entrance, narrow paths of travel, steep paths of travel without signage indicating accessible routes, lack of proper restaurant seating, and multiple inaccessible features in the men's restrooms.” 4 Griffin also complains of inadequate “parking facilities, food court facilities, directional signage, service counters, and paths of travel.” 5 Griffin seeks injunctive relief, damages, and treble damages as a result of Cedar Fair's alleged refusal to grant full and equal access to disabled persons.
After reviewing Griffin's complaint, Cedar Fair filed the present motion for a more definite statement. Cedar Fair argues that it “cannot frame a responsive pleading to this Complaint because it is uncertain as to which specific areas on defendant's property plaintiff refers to in his Complaint.” 6 Cedar Fair deems Griffin's allegations to be too vague and ambiguous because they do not point to specific areas of the Park, but merely give generalities regarding different facilities on the property.
“If a pleading to which a responsive pleading is permitted is so vague or ambiguous that a party cannot reasonably be required to frame a responsive pleading, the party may move for a more definite statement before interposing a responsive pleading.” 7 “Whether to grant a Rule 12(e) motion is within the discretion of the trial court.” 8 However, “[s]uch motion [is] not favored by the courts since pleadings in federal courts are only required to fairly notify the opposing party of the nature of the claim.” 9 “[The motion] should not be granted unless the defendant cannot frame a responsive pleading.” 10
Cedar Fair challenges Griffin's complaint on two grounds: (1) lack of standing to bring a cause of action against unencountered barriers on the property; and (2) insufficient specificity in the claims to satisfy Rule 8 11 and to allow Cedar Fair to answer the allegations. Although Cedar Fair's challenge of standing may be improper in the context of a motion for a more definite statement, as opposed to a motion to dismiss, the court will address the standing issue at this time because district courts have “both the power and the duty to raise the adequacy of [a plaintiff's] standing sua sponte.” 12 Moreover, the court notes that the analysis of standing to sue over alleged barriers beyond those encountered is not entirely distinct from the issue of whether the plaintiff pleads with sufficient information where and how he encountered the barriers complained of.
Cedar Fair argues that Griffin does not have standing to bring claims regarding the other barriers he did not encounter on the June 24 visit. Cedar Fair contends that Griffin “has not properly alleged facts sufficient in his Complaint to establish that he has standing to proceed with his causes of action.” 13 Cedar Fair argues that “Plaintiff has failed to identify any specific areas on defendant's property where he suffered his alleged injuries.” 14 Cedar Fair relies heavily on Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.), Inc.15 and Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co.16 to argue that Griffin only has standing to assert a cause of action concerning the restroom referred to in the complaint.
Cedar Fair incorrectly interprets Chapman. The Chapman court held that “when an ADA plaintiff has suffered an injury-in-fact by encountering a barrier that deprives him of full and equal enjoyment of the facility due to his particular disability, he has standing to sue for injunctive relief as to that barrier and other barriers related to his disability.” 17 It is clear from the Complaint, and not disputed in Defendant's motion or reply brief, that Griffin suffered an injury-in-fact when he could not access the necessary stall in the men's restroom. Once “an ADA plaintiff [ ] establishes standing as to encountered barriers [he] may also sue for injunctive relief as to unencountered barriers related to his disability.18 Other recent Ninth Circuit decisions mirror Chapman's holding concerning this issue. 19
Cedar Fair also misreads Oliver in arguing that Griffin's complaint is “jurisdictionally defective.” 20 With regard to standing, the Oliver court simply reiterates the Chapman holding.21 In sum, Cedar Fair misinterprets the relevant case law regarding standing for unencountered barriers in an ADA claim. Griffin has alleged an injury-in-fact based on his inability to access Cedar Fair's restroom stall. Accordingly, Griffin has standing to complain of other barriers on the property that relate to his disability.
Cedar Fair's primary contention, and the substantive motion pending before the court, is that Griffin's complaint is vague and ambiguous under Rule 12(e) and does not allow it to form an appropriate response. Specifically, Cedar Fair argues that it “cannot frame a responsive pleading to this Complaint because it is uncertain as to which specific areas on defendant's property plaintiff refers to in his Complaint.” 22 Cedar Fair contends that because “plaintiff has basically placed all of defendant's property at issue,” this court should grant the motion for a more definite statement.23
Rule 12(e) motions are “disfavored and rarely granted.” 24 “The rule is aimed at unintelligibility rather than lack of detail and is only appropriate when the defendants cannot understand the substance of the claim asserted.” 25 Although Griffin's complaint does not specifically address each individual possible defect on the property, the complaint is not unintelligible with respect to Rule 12(e). As stated above, Griffin has standing to complain of other barriers that he is likely to encounter on return visits. It is apparent from Cedar Fair's motion and reply brief that it understands the issues at hand. “If the detail sought by a motion for more definite statement is obtainable through discovery, the motion should be denied.” 26
Under these circumstances, where Cedar Fair understands the complaint and where the more specific details it seeks are obtainable through discovery, an order for more definite statement under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(e) is not appropriate.
Cedar Fair also challenges the sufficiency of the complaint pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2). Cedar Fair contends that it has not received fair notice of Griffin's claim because “plaintiff failed to allege with any particularity whatsoever as to the location where he claimed to be injured on defendant's property.” 27 Cedar Fair again directs the court to the recent, published decision from the Ninth Circuit in Oliver v. Ralphs Grocery Co., in which the court discusses Rule 8 in relation to complaints under the ADA. Cedar Fair argues that in order for “the complaint to provide fair notice to the defendant, each barrier must be alleged in the complaint.” 28
Griffin responds that “the Complaint is as specific as it can be” since “plaintiff's access to the property” is limited.29 Because Cedar Fair first challenged the sufficiency of the pleading under Rule 8 in its reply brief, Griffin does not directly respond, but instead frames his argument around the standing analysis in Doran v. 7–Eleven, Inc.30 The Doran court states that “where a disabled person has Article III standing to bring a claim for injunctive relief under the ADA because of at least one alleged statutory violation, ... he or she may conduct discovery to determine what if any other barriers affecting his or her disability existed at the time he or she brought the claim.” 31
Although the Chapman and Doran opinions are instructive on the standing...
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