Griffin v. Clark

• Decision Date: 11 March 1935
• Docket Number: 6079
• Citation: 55 Idaho 364,42 P.2d 297
• Parties: FRANCIS D. GRIFFIN, and IVEL GRIFFIN, Plaintiffs and Respondents; v. EARL CLARK and ESTHER MAY CLARK, Defendants and Appellants MARIE WILLIAMS, Cross-Complainant and Respondent,
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

42 P.2d 297

55 Idaho 364

FRANCIS D. GRIFFIN, and IVEL GRIFFIN, Plaintiffs and Respondents;

MARIE WILLIAMS, Cross-Complainant and Respondent, v. EARL CLARK and ESTHER MAY CLARK, Defendants and Appellants

No. 6079

Supreme Court of Idaho

March 11, 1935

AUTOMOBILES-INJURY TO GUEST-ACTION FOR DAMAGES-JOINT ENTERPRISE-PROXIMATE CAUSE-QUESTIONS FOR JURY-FALSE IMPRISONMENT, ELEMENTS OF-PARTIES LIABLE-INSTRUCTIONS-NONSUIT-DIRECTED VERDICT.

1. In action for injury in automobile collision brought by guest against other occupants, whether guest's personal liberty was unlawfully restrained or violated by conduct of defendants and driver in guest's removal from train to automobile before accident held for jury.

2. To constitute "unlawful restraint" or "false imprisonment," essential thing is restraint of person (I. C. A., sec. 17-1215).

3. True test of false imprisonment is not extent of restraint, nor means by which it is accomplished, but lawfulness thereof (I C. A., sec. 17-1215).

4. To constitute false imprisonment, there need be no actual force threats, nor injury to person, character or reputation, nor is it necessary that wrongful act be committed with malice or wrongful intention, nor that act be under color of any legal or judicial proceeding, but all that is necessary is that individual be restrained of liberty against his will (I. C A., sec. 17-1215).

5. To constitute joint enterprise between occupants and driver with relation to operation of automobile, there must be joint interest or community of interest in purpose of undertaking and equal right, express or implied, to exercise some control over conduct of each other in respect thereto.

6. In action for injury in automobile collision brought by guest against other occupants of automobile, whether joint enterprise existed betwees driver and defendants with relation to operation of automobile in furtherance of common undertaking held for jury.

7. General rule is that where several persons unite in act which constitutes wrong to another, intending at time to commit it, or doing it under circumstances which fairly charge them with intending consequences which follow, each must assume and bear responsibility of misconduct of all.

8. All those who directly participate in unlawful detention are joint tort-feasors.

9. In action for injury in automobile collision brought by guest against other occupants of automobile, instruction that if driver and defendants, or either of defendants, unlawfully restrained guest, and while so restrained she was required to enter and ride in automobile and while riding was injured through negligence of driver or defendants, guest could recover from defendants for injury; held not erroneous when considered with other instructions.

10. In action for injury in automobile collision brought by guest against other occupants of automobile, proximate cause of injury and natural and probable consequences that could reasonably be expected to follow any unlawful restraint of guest held for jury.

11. Instruction directing verdict in effect instructs jury that there is no evidence to support claim of party against whom verdict is directed, and is proper only when there is no fact question for jury.

12. Plaintiff should not be nonsuited unless it appears that evidence in his behalf, on most favorable construction jury would be at liberty to give it, would not warrant verdict for him.

APPEAL from the District Court of the Seventh Judicial District, for Payette County. Hon. A. O. Sutton, Judge.

Action for damages for personal injury. Judgment for respondent Marie Williams. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed. Costs awarded to respondent.

Elam & Burke, Robert E. Leitch and Wm. Healy, for Appellants.

To establish a joint enterprise plaintiffs must prove not only a community interest in the objects or purposes of the undertaking, but also must prove an equal right to direct and control the operation of the car and the conduct of the driver; upon failure of proof of all these elements, the question of joint enterprise must not be submitted to the jury. (Bryant v. Pacific Electric Ry. Co., 74 Cal. 737, 164 P. 385; Meyers v. Southern Pacific R. R. Co., 63 Cal.App. 164, 218 P. 284; Kelley v. Hodge Transportation System, 197 Cal. 598, 242 P. 76.)

To establish unlawful restraint, cross-complainant must establish actual force, reasonably apprehended force or apparent legal authority. (Sec. 17-1215, I. C. A.; Calif. Pol. Code, sec. 236; 12 Cal. Jur. 438, 439; Hebrew v. Pulis, 73 N.J.L. 621, 64 A. 121, 118 Am. St. 716, 7 L. R. A., N. S., 580; 25 C. J. 542.)

There must be active participation on the part of a person before he is liable for unlawful restraint. (Klemm v. Adair, 189 Iowa 896, 179 N.W. 51; Grab v. Lucas, 156 Wis. 504, 146 N.W. 504.)

George Donart and Herman Welker for Respondent Griffin.

D. L. Carter and Frank C. McColloch, for Respondent Williams.

Ed North, the deceased, and defendants Clark were engaged in a joint enterprise, i. e., a community of interest in removing cross-complainant, Marie Williams, from the train at Weiser; each of them at some time during the course of the enterprise exercised the right to direct and govern the movements and conduct of the others and each exercised some species of control and management of the undertaking--thus meeting all of the requirements necessary to establish the joint enterprise. (Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., supra; Pope v. Halpern, 193 Cal. 168, 223 P. 470; Robison v. Oregon-Washington R. R. & Nav. Co., 90 Ore. 490, 176 P. 594.)

The wrong which is variously called "false imprisonment" and "unlawful restraint" may be committed by words alone or by merely operating adversely to the will of the party; physical contact of any kind is not required; there need be no malice or ill will, or even the slightest wrongful intent; nor need the act be under color of judicial proceedings--all that is necessary is that the individual be restrained of his freedom of locomotion without legal cause. (Comer v. Knowles, 17 Kan. 436; Miller v. Turner, 49 Cal.App. 653, 194 P. 66; Turney v. Rhodes, 42 Ga.App. 104, 155 S.E. 112; Woodland v. Portneuf-Marsh Valley Irr. Co., 26 Idaho 789, 146 P. 1106; Harkness v. Hyde, 31 Idaho 784, 176 P. 885, and cases cited.)

BUDGE, J. Givens, C. J., Morgan and Holden, JJ., and Koelsch, D. J., concur.

OPINION

BUDGE, J.

On the evening of September 25, 1932, on the highway between Payette and Weiser, a collision occurred between the car of the Griffins and the car of one Ed North, in which Ed North, respondent Marie Williams, and appellants Clark were riding. Ed North was killed in the collision. Thereafter this action was commenced by the Griffins against appellants and Marie Williams for the recovery of damages sustained. Eventually respondent Marie Williams became a cross-complainant, seeking recovery against her co-defendants, the appellants. The cause was tried to the court and a jury and resulted in verdicts in favor of the Griffins against appellants and in favor of respondent Marie Williams against appellants, upon which verdicts judgments were entered. Appeals were perfected by appellants from both judgments and thereafter the following stipulation was filed in this court:

"IT IS HEREBY STIPULATED that the claim and judgment of plaintiffs, Francis D. Griffin and Ivel Griffin, have been settled and satisfied, and that the Supreme Court need not consider the issues of the appeal herein so far as said Francis D. Griffin and Ivel Griffin are concerned."

The cause is before this court upon the appeal from the judgment in favor of respondent Marie Williams.

With relation to respondent the facts are substantially as follows: On Saturday evening respondent arrived in Payette from Baker to visit appellants. Upon arrival she first saw Ed North, who was acquainted with appellants, and respondent asked him where appellants lived, whereupon he offered to, and did, drive her past appellants' home, but seeing no light North took her to Ontario, where she remained the night. In the morning North called for, and drove, respondent to appellants' home in Payette. The record discloses respondent had to be at work in Baker the following morning and that North offered to take her there in his car, which proposal respondent refused. About 5 o'clock respondent called and inquired about train and bus times and learned the train left Payette about 6 in the evening and the bus about 1 o'clock in the morning. It appears that Mrs. Clark "seemed to hesitate" when respondent asked her to take her to the train and that North offered to and took her to the depot about 6. A few minutes thereafter, "probably five minutes," North returned to appellants' residence and said: "Grab or take your coats and we will go to Weiser and take Marie off the train." Appellants, without argument, immediately acquiesced and North and appellants proceeded at once to Weiser, arriving about the same time as the Portland Rose train on which respondent was riding. It appears that while respondent was looking out the window North boarded the train, grabbed respondent's bag, started to leave the train and said, "I do not want you to go home on this train." The record then discloses the following from the testimony of respondent:

"For a moment I did not know what to do; and then, he had my bag so I went after it."

"He got off the coach and I could not catch up with him until he got half way around the station, and then I caught up with him and asked for my handbag as I wanted to go on to Baker."

North said: "We will take you."

"He kept on going and when I got around the station I saw the Clarks in the car there."

One of the occupants of the car (Mr. or Mrs. Clark) took the bag from Mr. North and ...