Griffin v. Coach
Decision Date | 02 June 1941 |
Docket Number | No. 755,755 |
Citation | 85 L.Ed. 1481,61 S.Ct. 1023,134 A.L.R. 1462,313 U.S. 498 |
Parties | GRIFFIN v. McCOACH |
Court | U.S. Supreme Court |
Messrs. Charles J. Shaeffer and Jos. W. Bailey, Jr., both of Dallas, Tex., for petitioner.
Mr. Carl B. Callaway, of Dallas, Tex., for respondent.
This is an action, begun in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, by the personal representatives substituted for the heirs at law of Colonel Robert D. Gordon, who died a citizen and resident of Texas, against the Prudential Insurance Company of America to collect an insurance policy on the life of the decedent. The Company filed a bill of interpleader, 49 Stat. 1096, 28 U.S.C.A. § 41(26), making the respondent John D. McCoach, Trustee, and other alleged claimants parties and tendering the net amount due under the policy. The interpleader was allowed, the Company discharged from the litigation and the interests of all parties to the suit other than petitioner and respondent disposed of by the decree in a manner to which no one objects here. The controversy still to be decided is as to whether the estate or the Trustee is entitled to certain portions of the insurance. The circumstances giving rise to the issue follow.
Colonel Gordon, the insured, interested seven persons in Texas oil developments, including McCoach, the Trustee, in his individual capacity. They operated as a New York common law association called the Middleton Tex Oil Syndicate. The record here shows that A term insurance policy was taken out by Gordon with the Syndicate named as beneficiary. When the policy was issued, and at all times subsequent until his death, Gordon was a citizen of Texas. The Syndicate originally had physical possession of the policy. Two years after its issuance the Syndicate ceased operations. In 1924 due to financial reverses it ceased to do business and the members formed a new association called the Protection Syndicate. McCoach became and continues as Trustee of the Syndicate. It was organized 'for the sole purpose' of paying the premiums on the policy and receiving and distributing the proceeds among the members. This it did until the insured's death. The beneficiary in the policy was changed to make the members of the Protection Syndicate the beneficiaries. By arrangement between the decedent and the members of the Protection Syndicate in 1934 a further change of beneficiaries was made by which, in consideration of the insured's release of the right to change beneficiaries on presentation of the policy for endorsement, hitherto retained, one-eighth of the disability proceeds of the policy were to be paid the insured and one-eighth of the death proceeds to his wife and the remaining seven-eighths to the Trustee for the members of the Protection Syndicate.
'The application for the policy was signed by Gordon in the State of New York, and forwarded to the home office of th Prudential Insurance Company in the State of New Jersey, and there acted upon, and the policy was delivered in the State of New York.' The later arrangement by which Gordon and his wife became beneficiaries of one-eighth of the proceeds was consummated by certain forms furnished by the Prudential and
Thereafter three of the members of the Protection Syndicate separately assigned their interest in the policy to three individuals not previously interested in the transaction. These assignees paid their proportion of the premiums after the respective assignments.
The District Court decreed that Mrs. Gordon should receive her one-eighth and that the balance of the proceeds should be paid the Trustee for the benefit of the cross-defendants, members of the Protection Syndicate. The decree was based on a finding that the policy was a New York contract and that the subsequent changes were made in New Jersey and delivered in New York. Further the District Court concluded that the relation of debtor and creditor existed between the members of the Syndicate and their assignees upon the one hand and the insured upon the other and that therefore all the cestuis que trustent had an insurable interest in Colonel Gordon's life.
An appeal limited to the 'correctness of the judgment of the trial court concerning the persons entitled to receive the assigned interests' was prosecuted on an agreed statement of the record under Rule 76 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A. following section 723c. In the statement petitioner sets out two points now relied upon for reversal. First: That the assignment and change of beneficiary was governed by the law of Texas; that the Trustee claimed only under the assignment; that beneficiaries must have an insurable interest under Texas law and that the assignees had none. Hence the personal representative was entitled to recover their portions of the policy for the estate. Wilke v. Finn, Tex.Com.App., 39 S.W.2d 836. Second: That if the whole transaction was governed by the law of another state than Texas, in which other state an insurable interest was not required, the United States District Court sitting in Texas was bound by the public policy of Texas which forbids persons without an insurable interest to collect in Texas, as beneficiaries, the proceeds of insurance policies.
The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. 5 Cir., 116 F.2d 261. It held too that the policy was a New York policy, governed by the law of that state, and that as the subsequent changes were made pursuant to agreements contained in the original policy, they did not amount to new contracts or change the governing law. Cf. Aetna Life Insurance Company v. Dunken, 266 U.S. 389, 45 S.Ct. 129, 69 L.Ed. 342. The Court said: (116 F.2d 264.)
As to the violation of the claimed public policy of Texas § against beneficiaries with non-insurable interests, the Court of Appeals decided that the rule could not be applied where, as here, a 'fair and proper insurable interest' existed when the policy was issued. 116 F.2d 261, 264. Certiorari was sought and allowed, 312 U.S. 676, 61 S.Ct. 807, 85 L.Ed. —-, on the ground among others of a conflict between the instant case and Sampson v. Channell, 110 F.2d 754, 759, 762, 128 A.L.R. 394, where the First Circuit held that a United States court must apply the conflict of laws rules of the state where it sits.
For the reasons given in Klaxon Company v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Company, 313 U.S. 487, 61 S.Ct. 1020, 85 L.Ed. —-, decided today, we are of the view that the federal courts in diversity of citizenship cases are governed by the conflict of laws rules of the courts of the states in which they sit. In deciding that the changes made in the insurance contract left its governing law unaffected1 and that the laws of Texas could not be applied to a foreign contract in Texas courts,2 the federal courts were applying rules of law in a way which may or may not have been consistent with Texas decisions. Likewise it is for Texas to say whether its public policy permits a beneficiary of an insurance policy on the life of a Texas citizen to recover where no insurable interest in the decedent exists in the beneficiary. The opinion does not rest its conclusions upon its appraisal of Texas law or Texas decisions but upon decisions of this Court inapplicable to this situation in the light of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188, 114 A.L.R. 1487, and Ruhlin v. New York Life Insurance Company, 304 U.S. 202, 205, 58 S.Ct. 860, 861, 82 L.Ed. 1290.3 The statement in the opinion 'that it is im- material, in so far as the decision of this case is concerned, whether the law of Texas or the law of New York be applied' we understand, from a reading of the whole opinion, to mean that while an insurable interest is required in Texas and not in New York, the lack of insurable interest is immaterial in this case even in Texas because ...
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