Griffin v. Commissioner of Correction, No. 18287.

• Citation: 973 A.2d 1271,292 Conn. 591
• Decision Date: 21 July 2009
• Docket Number: No. 18287.
• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Parties: Timothy GRIFFIN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

973 A.2d 1271

292 Conn. 591

Timothy GRIFFIN v. COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION.

No. 18287.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 21, 2009.

Decided July 21, 2009.

Temmy Ann Pieszak, public defender, for the appellant (petitioner).

Susann E. Gill, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Jonathan C. Benedict, state's attorney, and Gerard P. Eisenman, senior assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

ROGERS, C.J., and NORCOTT, VERTEFEUILLE, ZARELLA and McLACHLAN, Js.

PER CURIAM.

The petitioner, Timothy Griffin, appeals¹ from the judgment of the habeas court denying in part, his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The petitioner claims on appeal that the habeas court: (1) violated his right to due process by failing to find that the respondent, the commissioner of correction, had admitted certain allegations in the petitioner's second amended petition; and (2) failed to find that the petitioner's guilty pleas were not knowing, intelligent and voluntary. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

The record reveals the following facts and procedural history. On April 15, 1999, the petitioner, who was fifteen years old at the time, pleaded guilty to one count each of felony murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54c and conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree in violation of General Statutes §§ 53a-134(a)(2) and 53a-48(a), in connection with the December 12, 1997 shooting of a grocery store owner in Bridgeport. The petitioner did not negotiate a specific sentence, but, rather, entered "open" pleas, which left the trial court to determine the petitioner's sentence.² On June 18, 1999, the trial court imposed a total effective sentence of forty years.³

On August 31, 2006, the petitioner filed a three count amended petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The respondent filed a return to the amended petition, in which she responded to each paragraph set forth in the amended petition. On January 10, 2007, after the pleadings had been closed, the petitioner filed a request for leave to amend his petition, which indicated that "[t]he amendment sought eliminates the first count [of the first amended petition] .... The proposed amendment contains no new allegations...." (Emphasis added.) The habeas court granted the petitioner's request to file a second amended petition, which became the operative pleading.

In his second amended petition, the petitioner alleged, in count one, that he did not knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily enter his guilty pleas and, in count two, that his trial counsel had rendered ineffective assistance by failing to advise him of his right to sentence review pursuant to General Statutes § 51-195.⁴ The respondent's return to the second amended petition failed to respond to five paragraphs in count one of the second amended petition, namely, paragraphs 10(e) through 10(i). In the return to the first amended petition, however, the respondent had denied the allegations in those five paragraphs, which formerly had been part of the second count of the first amended petition.

Following a hearing on the petitioner's second amended petition, during the petitioner's rebuttal to the respondent's closing argument, the petitioner, for the first time, argued that paragraphs 10(e) through 10(i) of the first count of the second amended petition should be deemed admitted by the respondent pursuant to Practice Book § 10-19.⁵ The habeas court, in an oral decision, denied the petitioner's request. In a subsequent articulation of that decision, the habeas court reasoned that, despite the respondent's failure to respond in the return to paragraphs 10(e) through 10(i) of the first count of the second amended petition, the respondent nonetheless had denied those allegations in a timely fashion.⁶

The habeas court thereafter found that the trial court properly had canvassed the petitioner on his guilty pleas and that any misunderstanding from which the petitioner suffered with respect to the effect of his guilty pleas was unreasonable. The habeas court therefore concluded that the petitioner's plea was knowing, intelligent and voluntary and denied count one of the petitioner's second amended petition.⁷ The habeas court, however, found that the petitioner had not been advised properly of his right to sentence review and granted the second count of the second amended petition reinstating the petitioner's right to sentence review.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that the habeas court violated his right to due process by failing to find that the respondent impliedly had admitted paragraphs 10(e) through 10(i) of the first count of the second amended petition. He further claims that the habeas court improperly found that the petitioner had failed to prove that his pleas had not been entered knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily.

After examining the record on appeal and fully considering the briefs and arguments of the parties, we conclude that the habeas court's thoughtful and comprehensive decision; see footnote 7 of this opinion; and articulation of that decision; see footnote 6 of this opinion; properly resolved the issues in this appeal and, therefore, that the judgment of the habeas court should be affirmed. Further discussion by this court would serve no useful purpose. See Socha v. Bordeau, 289 Conn. 358, 362, 956 A.2d 1174 (2008).

The judgment is affirmed.

1. The habeas court granted the petitioner's petition for certification to appeal. See General Statutes § 52-470(b). The petitioner thereafter appealed from the judgment of the habeas court to the Appellate Court, and we transferred the appeal to this court pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199(c) and Practice Book § 65-1.

2. When the court asked defense counsel, "Is there an agreement for disposition here or is this an open plea," defense counsel responded, "It's an open plea." The prosecutor then indicated that the state was "going to ask the court to impose a substantial sentence at the time of sentencing."

3. The court imposed a sentence of forty years for the count of felony murder and twenty years, concurrent to the felony murder sentence, for the count of conspiracy to commit robbery in the first degree.

4. General Statutes § 51-195 provides: "Any person sentenced on one or more counts of an information to a term of imprisonment for which the total sentence of all such counts amounts to confinement for three years or more, may, within thirty days from the date such sentence was imposed or if the offender received a suspended sentence with a maximum confinement of three years or more, within thirty days of revocation of such suspended sentence, except in any case in which a different sentence could not have been imposed or in any case in which the sentence or commitment imposed resulted from the court's acceptance of a plea agreement or in any case in which the sentence imposed was for a lesser term than was proposed in a plea agreement, file with the clerk of the court for the judicial district in which the judgment was rendered an application for review of the sentence by the review division. Upon imposition of sentence or at the time of revocation of such suspended sentence, the clerk shall give written notice to the person sentenced of his right to make such a request. Such notice shall include a statement that review of the sentence may result in decrease or increase of the term within the limits fixed by law. A form for making such application shall accompany the notice. The clerk shall forthwith transmit such application to the review division and shall notify the judge who imposed the sentence. Such judge may transmit to the review division a statement of his reasons for imposing the sentence, and shall transmit such a statement within seven days if requested to do so by the review division. The filing of an application for review shall not stay the execution of the sentence."

5. Practice Book § 10-19 provides: "Every material allegation in any pleading which is not denied by the adverse party shall be deemed to be admitted, unless such party avers that he or she has not any knowledge or information thereof sufficient to form a belief."

6. The habeas court's articulation provides in relevant part: "This court treated the return...