Griffin v. Consolidated Foods Corp.

Citation771 F.2d 826
Decision Date15 July 1985
Docket NumberNo. 84-1799,84-1799
Parties27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 392, 27 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 533 Leslie A. GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. CONSOLIDATED FOODS CORPORATION, t/a Hanes DSD and L'Eggs, Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

Shelley Blum, Charlotte, N.C., (Deborah Blum, Chicago, Ill., on brief) for appellant.

John R. Wester, Charlotte, N.C. (Brent A. Torstrick, Robinson, Bradhsaw & Hinson, Charlotte, N.C., on brief) for appellee.

Before WIDENER and SPROUSE, Circuit Judges, and BOYLE, District Judge, United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, sitting by designation.

PER CURIAM:

Leslie Ann Griffin brought this action against her former employer, Consolidated Foods Corporation (Consolidated), alleging a violation of the overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 201 et seq. Griffin worked as a sales representative for Consolidated from 1973 to 1981, and now seeks money allegedly owed by Consolidated as overtime compensation for work performed in excess of the statutory maximum of 40 hours per week under 29 U.S.C. Sec. 207(a)(1). The district court granted Consolidated's motion for summary judgment, finding that Griffin's employment with Consolidated fell within the motor carrier's exemption of the FLSA, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 213(b)(2), and thus was not subject to the overtime provisions of the Act. We affirm.

When reviewing the granting of summary judgment, we apply the same standard of decision as that employed by the district court under FRCP 56(c). Smith v. University of North Carolina, 632 F.2d 316, 338 (4th Cir.1980). Thus, a motion for summary judgment "should be granted only where it is perfectly clear that no issue of fact is involved and inquiry into the facts is not desirable to clarify the application of the law." Charbonnages De France v. Smith, 597 F.2d 406, 414 (4th Cir.1979). In arriving at this determination, we must review "the record...in the light most favorable to...the party opposing the motion." Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 473, 82 S.Ct. 486, 491, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962).

The facts presented here are not in dispute. Griffin was a route sales representative for L'Eggs panty hose, a division of Consolidated, for over eight years. Griffin seeks overtime payments for her last year of employment. During that period, Griffin serviced retail stores in Mecklenburg and Iredell Counties, North Carolina. As part of her job duties, Griffin was responsible for checking displays in various stores to see if more product was needed, ordering the product from Consolidated's branch warehouse in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, and picking it up in the Charlotte, North Carolina area and transporting the panty hose to the stores, using a van provided by the company. Griffin was also responsible for certain paperwork and maintenance of the van.

In her employment with Consolidated, Griffin was among a group of route sales representatives who serviced the area in North Carolina and South Carolina. Each representative services an assigned route, with the routes determined by store location, servicing time required and geography. Thirty percent of all routes in this area crossed state lines. Route assignments were reviewed semi-annually and adjusted on the basis of sales volume, although reassignments could take place at any time. During her tenure, Griffin had serviced retail stores in both North Carolina and South Carolina.

The panty hose which Griffin delivered were shipped to her from Consolidated's branch warehouse in Winston-Salem. The product was manufactured in North Carolina, South Carolina and New Mexico, and then shipped to Alleo, North Carolina, where it was packaged in containers from Texas and Virginia. The packaged product was then transported to Consolidated's main warehouse in Winston-Salem, at which point it was delivered to branch warehouses across the country, including the one in Winston-Salem.

The sole question on appeal is whether Consolidated was engaged in such interstate commerce as to qualify for the motor carrier exemption of 29 U.S.C. Sec. 213(b)(1), which provides in pertinent part: "[t]he provisions of Section 207 of this title shall not apply with respect to--(1) any employee with respect to whom the Secretary of Transportation has the power to establish qualifications of maximum hours of service pursuant to the provisions of Section 304 of Title 49...."

The relevant statutory provision is now found at 49 U.S.C. Sec. 3102, and gives the Secretary such power over the employees of a "motor private carrier," which is defined in 49 U.S.C. 10102(15). Section 10102(15) conditions the exercise of this power by mandating that the transportation...

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    ...exception, but it was undisputed that the employer was otherwise a common or private motor carrier. See, e.g., Griffin v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 771 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.1985) (stating "the sole question on appeal is whether [defendant] was engaged in such interstate commerce as to qualify ......
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    ...that is, interstate transportation. See, e.g., Griffin v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 587 F.Supp. 921, 922 (W.D.N.C.1984), aff'd, 771 F.2d 826 (4th Cir.1985). The plaintiffs' proffered interpretation would render section 3102(b)(2) Second, the plaintiffs argue that the DOT does not have the p......
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