Griffin v. Cook Cnty.

• Decision Date: 21 October 1938
• Docket Number: Nos. 24422,24424.,s. 24422
• Citation: 16 N.E.2d 906,369 Ill. 380
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. COOK COUNTY et al. LLOYD v. SAME.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

369 Ill. 380

16 N.E.2d 906

GRIFFIN

v.COOK COUNTY et al.

LLOYD

v.SAME.

Nos. 24422, 24424.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Sept. 21, 1938.

Rehearing Denied Oct. 21, 1938.

Consolidated suits by John J. Griffin and Frank P. Lloyd against Cook County and others to enjoin the county and its officers from making expenditures under a contract entered into by the county for the publication of notices provided by Smith-Hurd Stats. c. 120, § 110.1 et seq. Decree for defendants, and the plaintiffs appeal.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

ORR, JONES, and WILSON, JJ., dissenting.Appeal from Circuit Court, Cook County; Joseph Burke, Judge, presiding.

Deneen & Massena, of Chicago (Roy Massena and Donald N. Schaffer, both of Chicago, of counsel), for appellant John J. Griffin.

Pollock & Latchford, Daniel S. Wentworth, Adelbert Brown, George P. Foster, Charles M. Haft, and H. J. Thal, all of Chicago (Franklin J. Stransky of Chicago, of counsel) for appellant Frank P. Lloyd, et al.

Thomas J. Courtney, Stat's Atty., and Kirkland, Fleming, Green, Martin & Ellis, all of Chicago (Jacob Shamberg, William J. Tuohy, and Marshall V. Kearney all of Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Barnet Hodes, Corp. Counsel, Ernst Buehler, Charles Center Case, George Basta, and Scott, MacLeish & Falk, all of Chicago, amici curiae.

GUNN, Justice.

The General Assembly passed a statute in 1937 applying to municipal corporations and taxing bodies (except the State of Illinois) containing more than 500,000 inhabitants, whereby the validity of the annual tax levy ordinances of such taxing bodies might be determined before the taxes are extended, and making the judgments therein conclusive in any subsequent proceeding based upon said tax levy. Laws of 1937, p. 1019; Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 120, § 110.1 et seq. The two consolidated cases at bar were brought in the circuit court by taxpayers of Cook county, seeking to enjoin the county and its officers from making any expenditures under a contract entered into by the county for the publication of notices provided by the act. Motions to strike the complaints were sustained, and plaintiffs have appealed to this court.

The constitutionality of this statute is assailed by appellants on several grounds.

The principal object of the statute applicable to all municipal and quasi municipal corporations and taxing bodies within its limitations is to confirm the levy of annual taxes before extension, and for such purposes the county courts are given jurisdiction including all powers of courts of equity. Each of the corporations or taxing bodies affected shall within sixty days after passage of its annual appropriation ordinance file with the county clerk a certified copy of its annual tax levy ordinance; within ten days after such latter ordinance is filed, the county clerk shall prepare and file in the county court a petition, to which a copy of the tax levy ordinance shall be attached and made a part, for the confirmation of such tax levy. The petition shall likewise set forth the percentage of loss and cost of collection which the county clerk proposes to add, where no levies for that purpose have been made, and where such addition is permitted by law. And such petition shall designate a return day, which shall be not less than twenty-five nor more than thirty days from the dat of filing. Within five days after the petition is filed the county clerk shall publish a notice in a secular newspaper of general circulation published within the municipal corporation, notifying all taxpayers concerned, and the corporation levying the tax, of the filing of the petition to confirm the levy, the docket number of the cause, the return day fixed, and advising all persons owning or interested in real or personal property which may be affected, that they may file objections in writing on or before the return day. On or before the return day, the taxpayer may file objections in writing, specifying in detail any grounds of illegality against the levy, or the amount proposed to be added by the clerk as percentage of loss and cost of collection, and also, at this time, raise the question as to whether any levy is within or without the tax rate limit.

The act also provides for a hearing on the return day, or on such date as may be fixed by the court. Following the making of proof of notice and the filing of the levy, the case shall be tried in a summary way without further pleadings. After all objections have been heard the court shall enter an order determining which levies of taxes are legal, and which illegal, and directing the county clerk to use the tax levies found to be valid, together with the amount the clerk shall add as loss and cost of collection, in computing the tax rates for the year. And where an issue is raised considering the maximum tax rate the order shall declare also whether the levy in question is within or without the tax rate limit.

The act also provides for an appeal to the Supreme Court. Section 9, Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, c. 120, § 110.9, provides: ‘The order confirming or refusing to confirm tax levies entered pursuant to the provisions of this Act shall be conclusive as to the validity or invalidity of any and all such tax levies, and no tax levy thereby confirmed or in the process of confirmation shall thereafter be questioned in any other suit, action or proceeding whatsoever, or by objections to the County Collector's application for judgment and order of sale against real estate for delinquent taxes.’

Only six taxing bodies in the State contain 500,000 or more inhabitants; the county of Cook, city of Chicago, Board of Education of the city of Chicago, Chicago Park District, Sanitary District of Chicago, and the Forest Preserve District of Cook county.

The time for passing the annual appropriation ordinance and annual tax levy is not the same in all of these six bodies, nor is the territory embraced within the six taxing bodies identical. The Chicago board of education must adopt its annual appropriation ordinance within three months after January 1, and since, under the new act, it is required to file a copy of the levy for school taxes within sixty days after its adoption, it may not filed until June 1. If the clerk's petition for confirmation is filed within ten days, and thirty days' notice is given of the hearing, the latest date fixed for the return day would be approximately July 10. On the other hand, if the board of education should immediately after January 1 adopt its appropriation ordinance, and, substantially, concurrently adopt its tax levy ordinance and immediately file it with the county clerk, the return date could be as early as February 10. Likewise, if the municipality does not see fit to perform its tax-raising functions on the first or last day possible the hearing might legally be expected any time between February 10 and July 10, a period covering five-months' time.

The law requires the Chicago Park District to adopt its annual appropriation ordinance before the beginning of the fiscal year, viz., January 1; the Chicago Sanitary District, within thirty days of January 1; the city of Chicago and the Forest Preserve District of Cook County, within the first ninety days of their fiscal year, commencing January 1, and the county of Cook, within the first quarter of its fiscal year, which begins on the first Monday of December.

It is thus apparent from the provisions of law applying to the six municipalities, the date of making the appropriation may range from the first week in December until the end of March, and the return day upon the county clerk's petition for each taxing body may be as early as April 10 in some cases, and as late as July 10 in others; that the possibility and probability is, that such return dates and the notices for fixing such return dates may be interspersed over a period running from the end of December to the early part of July, as the county clerk is required to file a separate petition, and give a separate notice for the validation of the taxes of each municipality or taxing body.

There is no positive or fixed date provided by statute for any of the acts necessary to comply with the provisions of this law, except the earliest dat upon which a municipality may adopt its appropriation ordinance. From that stage the date of giving notice or the date of hearing depends upon the time required by each individual municipality to prepare and adopt its appropriation ordinance, and to prepare, adopt and certify its tax levy ordinance, and, even after this is done, there is a further uncertainty as to the time a hearing may be expected, inasmuch as the clerk may take as little less than ten days as may be required to file his petition, and can make the time of the notice ranging from twenty-five to thirty days. This statute does not operate independently of the general Revenue Act but as a part of it, in the municipalities affected. The extension and collection of the taxes are governed by the laws now in force; both the general Revenue Act and the law under consideration must be read together to determine its complete scope and effect.

Under the general Revenue Act a judgment cannot be rendered for the sale of real estate unless the notice required by statute (Ill.Rev.Stat.1937, chap. 120, § 170) be complied with. This notice requires a description of the property, the name of the owner, and the amount unpaid, and the application for judgment upon such notice is made to a definite term of the county court, the time of which is definitely fixed by statute. Section 171 of chapter 120, supra, provides the collector may charge real estate with unpaid personal property tax, but that can be done only by giving the notice required by that section. Section 215 of the same chapter authorizes a collector to obtain a personal judgment for the non-payment of personal or real estate taxes in an action of debt where service of the defendant must, of course, be...