Griffin v. Gesner

Decision Date10 October 1908
Docket Number16,141
Citation97 P. 794,78 Kan. 669
PartiesSAMUEL GRIFFIN v. WILLIAM GESNER et al
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided July, 1908.

Original proceeding in mandamus.

SYLLABUS

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT.

1. ELECTIONS--Nomination by Primary--Contest. Under the provisions of the primary election law enacted at the special session of the legislature held in the year 1908 the nomination of a candidate for member of the house of representatives in a district comprising a single county may be contested before the tribunal created by section 2703 of the General Statutes of 1901.

2. ELECTIONS--Filing Objections--Limitation. In such a case the three days' time allowed for filing objections after the nomination papers have been lodged with the proper officer begins to run from the filing of the certified determination of the state board of canvassers with the secretary of state.

Troutman & Stone, S. I. Field, and D. M. Martin, for plaintiff.

Noble & Tincher, for defendants.

OPINION

BURCH J.:

At the primary election held on August 4, 1908, Samuel Griffin and William Gesner were rival candidates for nomination on the republican ticket for member of the house of representatives from the representative district composed of Barber county. On the face of the returns Gesner was successful. Griffin undertook to institute a contest under section 2703 of the General Statutes of 1901, which provides that objections or questions relating to nominations for officers to be elected by the voters of a county shall be considered by the county clerk, clerk of the district court, and county attorney. The officials named met as a contest court, but declined to investigate the causes for contest, and this proceeding in mandamus was commenced to compel them to do so. The case is finally submitted upon a motion to quash the alternative writ, which raises two questions: Has the contest court, organized as stated, jurisdiction of the controversy? And, if so, was it incumbent upon the contestor to make his objections to the nomination of the contestee within three days following the determination of the result of the election by the county board of canvassers? Section 10 of the new primary election law, which constitutes chapter 54 of the Laws of 1908, reads in part as follows:

"Conduct of primary. (1) The provisions of existing statutes concerning elections and any amendment now or hereafter made thereto, so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this act, shall apply to the primaries provided for in this act, and the following statutes shall apply to the subjects indicated, the intent of this act being to place the primary under the regulations and protection of the laws in force as to elections. . . . As to county canvass of returns, chapter 36, Laws of 1868, being paragraphs 2587, 2588, 2589, 2590, 2591, 2592, General Statutes of 1901; as to state canvass of returns, chapter 36, Laws of 1868, being paragraphs 2593, 2594, 2595, 2596, 2597 and 2598, General Statutes of 1901. . . . As to contests, article 6, chapter 36, and paragraph 830, of the General Statutes of 1901; provided, that all the powers and duties conferred and imposed by the laws of this state upon commissioners of elections, registration officers, judges and clerks of election, canvassing boards and all other public officials in connection with general elections are in every detail and particular conferred and imposed upon each and all such officers in connection with the primary elections conducted under the provisions of this act."

Legislation by reference to other acts sometimes produces decidedly crude statutes and frequently occasions confusion and uncertainty in the law. Such legislation is prohibited by the constitutions of some of the states, but the method is not entirely condemned by the constitution of this state. ( Wichita v. Telephone Co., 70 Kan. 441, 447, 78 P. 886.) When the references are as blind as they are in the primary election law it becomes a very difficult and perplexing thing for the people, for public officials and for the courts to know what the statutory provisions are upon the subjects involved.

In dealing with the subject of contests the statute quoted simply gorges article 6 of chapter 36 of the General Statutes of 1901. The most cursory consideration of this article reveals its general inadaptability to contests arising under the primary election law, but so far as controversies like this are concerned it is absolutely unworkable unless there should be a timely session of the legislature, because it provides that contests relating to membership in the house of representatives are to be tried by that body.

On behalf of the defendants it is urged that, the subject of contests having been covered by an express provision of the primary election law, and that provision being useless, further endeavor toward a contest should cease. The express reference in the statute to contests puts it beyond well-founded contradiction that the legislature intended there should be a statutory remedy of that character. Whether fairness and justice require that there should be an opportunity to test the validity of a primary nomination in this way, and what course the courts themselves might pursue if no statutory procedure were prescribed, need not engage attention. In order that the will of the people may prevail the legislature has clearly indicated its purpose that the formal returns of the result of a primary election which do not correctly exhibit the expression of that will may be overridden by means of a contest. Finding a contest code on the statute-book, the legislature adopted it, but did not stop there. Both before and after the reference in section 10 to article 6 of chapter 36 of the General Statutes of 1901 there are clear statements that all existing laws applicable to the subject of general elections are brought to bear upon the subject of primary elections, so far as they are consistent with the primary election law. These statements are as explicit and as mandatory as those adopting the article just referred to, and the court is bound to search all the statute-books for general election laws which may be adapted to the fulfilment of the uses and purposes of the primary election law.

The matter of bringing upon the official ballot the names of the persons to be voted for is of course a subject of paramount importance under the election laws. The act known as the "Australian ballot law" (Gen. Stat. 1901, ch. 36, art. 9) deals with the subject. The primary election law subjects certain matters to the regulations contained in parts of this article. Other parts govern subjects referred to in the primary election law, and still others concern important matters which must arise and must be disposed of the same as before the primary election law was enacted. None of the provisions of this article is expressly repealed by the primary election law, and under the well-settled canons of construction none of them consistent with that law is impliedly repealed, even if they had not been expressly adopted by and incorporated into that law. Everything is saved that can be utilized in meeting exigencies arising in the accomplishment of the purposes of the primary election law.

The Australian ballot law contains the provision which was invoked by the plaintiff in his effort to contest his opponent's nomination and which reads as follows:

"The certificate of nomination and nomination papers being so filed, and being in apparent conformity with this act, shall be deemed to be valid, unless objection thereto is duly made in writing within three days from the date said papers are filed with the proper officers. Such objections or other questions arising in relation thereto, in the case of nominations of state officers or officers to be elected by the voters of a division less than a state and greater than a county, shall be considered by the secretary of state, auditor of state, and attorney-general, and a decision of a majority of these officers shall be final. Such objections or questions arising in the case of nominations for officers to be elected by the voters of a county or township shall be considered by the county clerk, clerk of the district court, and county attorney; and the decision of a majority of said officers shall be final." (Gen. Stat. 1901, § 2703.)

The adaptability of this section to the plaintiff's needs manifestly depends upon what is meant by a certificate of nomination or nomination papers, and their filing with some proper officer. Primary elections were recognized as lawful methods of nominating candidates for office before the new law became effective. (See Laws 1891, ch. 115; Gen. Stat. 1901, §§ 2743-2750.) The Australian ballot law is framed in accordance with this fact. Omitting portions plainly rendered ineffectual by the new law, sections 2696 and 2697 of the General Statutes of 1901 contain the following provisions pertinent to this controversy:

"All nominations made by political parties shall be known and designated as 'party nominations,' and the certificates by which such nominations are certified shall be known and designated as 'party certificates of nomination.' Party nominations of candidates for public office can be made only by a . . . primary election.

"Any political party having a state or national organization, by means of a . . ....

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    ...Law, 562, 56 Atl. 1; Coffey v. Dem. Gen. Com., 164 N. Y. 335, 58 N. E. 124; Healey et al. v. Wipf (S. D.) 117 N. W. 521; Griffin v. Gesner, 78 Kan. 669, 97 Pac. 794; Walling v. Lansdon, 15 Idaho, 282, 97 Pac. 396; State v. Nichols, 50 Wash. 508, 97 Pac. 728. * * * An examination of many of ......
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