Griffin v. Griffin, Record No. 2849.

Decision Date15 January 1945
Docket NumberRecord No. 2849.
Citation183 Va. 443
CourtVirginia Supreme Court
PartiesEDITH VIRGINIA LIVESAY GRIFFIN v. RANDOLPH WILLIAM GRIFFIN.

1. DIVORCE — Pleadings — Bill Clearly Demurrable — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a suit for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty amounting to constructive desertion, defendant filed a plea of res adjudicata on the ground that a demurrer was sustained to a prior bill of complaint, with leave to file an amended bill, and that complainant failed to file an amended bill and no appeal was sought from the decree. In the first bill of complaint, complainant alleged that defendant had been cruel, abusive and violent, even to the point of beating her on several occasions; that he had failed to provide for her wants; that complainant had been forced to work; that by reason of defendant's treatment of complainant, she had been in great danger of her health and even of her life; and that defendant had endeavored to cause complainant to return to him by threats, and had endeavored to have her discharged from her place of employment.

Held: That the first bill of complaint was clearly demurrable because its allegations were too indefinite and uncertain and did not set forth a good cause of action.

2. DIVORCE — Res Adjudicata — Second Bill of Complaint Setting Forth No New Cause of Action — Case at Bar. — In the instant case, a suit for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty amounting to constructive desertion, defendant filed a plea of res adjudicata on the ground that a demurrer was sustained to a prior bill of complainant, with leave to file an amended bill, and that complainant failed to file an amended bill and no appeal was sought from the decree. In the first bill of complaint, complainant alleged that defendant had been cruel, abusive and violent, even to the point of beating her on several occasions; that he failed to provide for her wants; that complainant had been forced to work; that by reason of defendant's treatment of complainant, she had been in great danger of her health and even of her life; and that defendant had endeavored to cause complainant to return to him by threats, and had endeavored to have her discharged from her place of employment. In her second bill of complaint, complainant alleged that defendant reviled and slapped her in the presence of his mother; that she received such treatment as would not have been accorded a servant, and was frequently subjected to physical punishment; and that on one occasion defendant threw a dish of strawberries in complainant's face and proceeded to whip her in the presence and hearing of another person.

Held: That the allegations in the second bill of complaint did not set forth a new cause of action or one that was substantially different from the original cause of action set forth in the first bill.

3. DEMURRERS — Grounds — Defects or Imperfections in Pleadings — Code Section 6118. — Under section 6118 of the Code of 1942, on demurrer, the court shall not regard any defect or imperfection in the declaration or other pleading unless there be omitted something so essential to the action or defense that judgment according to law and the very right of the case cannot be given.

4. AMENDMENTS — Discretion of Court — Code Section 6104. — Under section 6104 of the Code of 1942, the court may in the furtherance of justice in any suit or action permit any pleading to be amended or material supplemental matter be set forth in an amended or supplemental plea upon such terms as the court may deem just. Defects and errors which do not affect the substantial rights of the parties are disregarded.

5. DEMURRERS — Grounds — Purpose of Code Sections 6104 and 6118. — The purpose of sections 6104 and 6118 of the Code of 1942, is that demurrers challenging pleadings on grounds that are not substantial or material, and which do not go to the very merits of a cause, are no longer allowed.

6. DEMURRERS — Judgment — Judgment Sustaining Is Decision on Merits. — Under sections 6104 and 6118 of the Code of 1942, a demurrer must go to the heart of the cause, and if it is sustained it is a decision on the merits of the cause.

7. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES adjudicata — Particular Judgments — Decision on Demurrer. — A decision of an issue of law on a demurrer is a decision on the merits and constitutes res adjudicata as to any other proceedings where the same parties and the same issues are involved.

8. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA — Matters Concluded — Matters Which Might Have Been Litigated. — When the second suit is between the same parties as the first, and on the same cause of action, the judgment in the former is conclusive of the latter not only as to every question which was decided, but also as to every other matter which the parties might have litigated and had determined, within the issues as they were made or tendered by the pleadings or as incident to or essentially connected with the subject matter of the litigation, whether the same, as a matter of fact, were or were not considered. As to such matters a new suit on the same cause of action cannot be maintained between the same parties.

9. DEMURRERS — Special Demurrers — Abolished in Virginia. — Special demurrers are abolished in Virginia, and only matters of substance can be grounds for demurrer.

10. DIVORCE — Pleadings — Plea of Res Adjudicata. — With the exceptions noted in section 5106 of the Code of 1942, a divorce suit is conducted as other equity suits, and when warranted by the facts, a plea of res adjudicata may be filed in such a suit. That plea does not constitute one of the statutory exceptions.

11. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA — Matters Concluded — Matters in Existence at Time of Judgment or Decree. — The doctrine of res adjudicata applies as to all matters which existed at the time of giving the judgment or rendering the decree and which the plaintiff had the opportunity of bringing before the court.

12. DIVORCE — Res Adjudicata — Second Suit after Demurrer Sustained to BillCase at Bar. — In the instant case, a suit for divorce on the ground of extreme cruelty amounting to constructive desertion, defendant filed a plea of res adjudicata on the ground that a demurrer was sustained to a prior bill of complaint, with leave to file an amended bill, and that complainant failed to file an amended bill and no appeal was sought from the decree. It was conceded that no new grounds for divorce were set up in the second bill of complaint, and that all of the allegations in that bill could have been set up in an amended bill. There was no change in the status of the parties between the time of the filing of the first bill and of the filing of the second bill, and every fact alleged in the second bill existed at the time of the filing of the first.

Held: That the second suit was clearly barred by the decree in the first, for all of the facts alleged in the second suit existed when the first bill of complaint was filed, and that the final decree in the first cause, rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction on the merits, necessarily barred appellant from conducting a subsequent suit involving the same cause of action.

13. FORMER ADJUDICATION OR RES ADJUDICATA — Basis of Doctrine. — The doctrine of res adjudicata is a rule of expediency, justice and public tranquillity. It rests upon the ground that the party to be affected, or some other with whom he is in privity, has litigated, or had an opportunity to litigate, the same matter in a former action in a court of competent jurisdiction, and should not be permitted to litigate it again to the harassment and vexation of his opponent. The doctrine of res judicata not only puts an end to strife, but produces certainty as to individual rights and gives dignity and respect to judicial proceedings.

Appeal from a decree of the Circuit Court of Southampton county. Hon. John K. Hutton, judge presiding.

The opinion states the case.

W. A. Hall, Jr., and Thomas L. Woodward, for the appellant.

Crumpler & Crumpler and James G. Martin & Son, for the appellee.

GREGORY, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

On January 4, 1940, the appellant, Edith Virginia Livesay Griffin, filed her bill of complaint against Randolph William Griffin, asking that she be granted a divorce a mensa et thoro from him upon the ground of extreme cruelty amounting to constructive desertion.

The defendant filed a demurrer to the bill, in which he stated as grounds, that the bill of complaint did not state a cause of action, and that the allegations were indefinite, uncertain, obscure, ambiguous, and argumentative. The demurrer was sustained with leave to the complainant to file an amended bill within sixty days. A decree to this effect was entered. From it no appeal was sought.

The complainant failed to file the amended bill within the sixty-day period which was granted, but on February 8, 1941, she filed a second original bill praying that she be granted a divorce a mensa et thoro from the defendant on the same ground, extreme cruelty amounting to constructive desertion.

On April 19, 1941, the defendant filed a plea of res adjudicata to the second bill of complaint, in which plea it was set forth that the issues had been finally adjudicated in the prior divorce proceeding. A part of the said plea reads as follows:

"Said Edith brought suit for divorce in this court against said Randolph and filed her bill, to which he demurred and there was joinder in the demurrer, and the demurrer was argued before this court and sustained, to-wit, on the 20th day of July, 1940, as duly appears by the decree entered that day by this court, and that decree granted her leave to file an amended bill within sixty days, which amended bill she never filed, and said decree sustaining the demurrer became absolutely final and never was appealed from and remains in full force, and the parties to said...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT