Griffin v. Guy

• Decision Date: 25 May 1937
• Docket Number: 22.
• Citation: 192 A. 359,172 Md. 510
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. GUY.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

192 A. 359

172 Md. 510

GRIFFIN v. GUY.

No. 22.

Court of Appeals of Maryland

May 25, 1937

Appeal from Circuit Court, Charles County; Walter J. Mitchell Judge.

Suit by R. Clement Griffin against Harry Guy. A preliminary injunction was issued, and, from a decree dissolving the preliminary injunction, plaintiff appeals.

Reversed and remanded, with directions.

Argued before BOND, C.J., and URNER, OFFUTT, PARKE, SLOAN, SHEHAN and JOHNSON, JJ.

F DeSales Mudd, of La Plata, for appellant.

Rudolph G. Carrico, of La Plata, for appellee.

SHEHAN Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree of the circuit court for Charles county dissolving a preliminary injunction restraining Harry Guy, the appellee, from engaging in the barbering business within the corporate limits of the town of La Plata, because of an alleged violation of an agreement between him and R Clement Griffin, the appellant.

These parties had for some time been engaged in separate barbering businesses in the town of La Plata. On the 30th day of March, 1936, they entered into an agreement, in which, after reciting facts relating to the occupation of the parties, their respective businesses, and their desire to combine their efforts, Harry Guy agreed, upon the payment of $30 to Frank Vacchiano by the appellant, to remove from the barbershop upon the premises of Vacchiano and engage in the barbering business in the establishment conducted by the appellant, which business was to be controlled by Griffin. Harry Guy was to receive 60 per cent. of his earnings as a barber, and Griffin was to receive 40 per cent., and Griffin agreed to pay all of the expenses incident to the conduct of the said business. There was arrears in rent by Guy amounting to some $30, and it is alleged that his property had been distrained. This was denied, but, nevertheless, it is beyond dispute that Guy was in financial difficulties with respect to his rent, because the appellant agreed to advance or pay Guy's landlord the above sum and, in consideration thereof, and the employment or business arrangement above indicated, Guy made the following agreement as a part of the said contract: "It is further agreed that the barbering equipment of the said Harry Guy shall, during the term of this agreement, be stored in the establishment of the said R. Clement Griffin and to be released by the said R. Clement Griffin to the said Harry Guy upon the expiration of the terms of this Agreement only upon the payment by the said Harry Guy to the said R. Clement Griffin of the sum of Thirty ($30.00) Dollars advanced the said Harry Guy, and paid the said Frank Vacchiano as hereinbefore referred to, and upon the further condition that the said Harry Guy shall not hereafter use said equipment in any barbering business engaged in by him anywhere within the corporate limits of the town of La Platta; the said Harry Guy hereby agreeing that he will not at any time hereafter conduct or engage in any barbering business in the said town of La Platta other than under the control and management of the said R. Clement Griffin."

There was an additional stipulation in the contract for the continuation of the barbering enterprise, after the ending of the three months' period, upon such terms and conditions as may be mutually agreeable to the parties. Under the terms of this agreement, the appellee moved into the shop of the appellant and took up his trade. After the expiration of the three months' period provided in the contract, he continued there until the 24th of December, when that employment ceased. He then paid to Griffin the $30 that had been advanced, took possession of his equipment, and resumed his occupation at his former place of business. The appellant notified him to cease operations and demanded compliance with the terms of the contract. Guy having refused to do so, he filed his bill in equity, reciting the facts above stated, and further alleged that he had performed all of the requirements of said agreement on his part to be performed, and that the appellant was suffering irreparable loss and damage to his business, which was not susceptible of adequate compensation in the ordinary course of law.

The court, on the 7th day of January, 1937, ordered a writ of injunction to be issued, as prayed in the bill, with liberty to the defendant to move for the rescinding of the order and for a dissolution of the injunction at any time after filing his answer to the bill on giving the plaintiff five days notice of such motion. On the 14th day of January a combination answer and demurrer was filed, and on the 18th of January, 1937, a motion to dissolve the injunction was filed. On this state of the record a hearing was had, and the court ordered and decreed that the injunction be dissolved, with costs to the defendant, and, from this decree, this appeal is taken.

The facts alleged in the bill for the purpose of the demurrer are to be taken as true. The construction of the above contract is here presented. It is obvious that this agreement is in restraint of trade, and the rules applicable to such contracts must be applied in the construction of it. In the case of Guerand v. Dandelet, 32 Md. 561, 565, 3 Am.Rep. 164, Judge Alvey has laid down the general rules governing such contracts, and this case has been cited with approval since that time down to and including the case of Tolman Laundry, Inc., v. Walker...