Griffin v. Knisely

Citation75 Ill. 411,1874 WL 9264
PartiesJOHN GRIFFINv.ABRAHAM J. KNISELY.
Decision Date30 September 1874
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. HENRY BOOTH, Judge, presiding.

This was assumpsit, by appellee against appellant, for the use and occupation of a dock belonging to appellee, situated upon Magazine slip and Halsted street, in the city of Chicago, from May 1, 1871, to May 1, 1872. The dock was 261 7/12 feet front on Halsted street. The same premises were rented the previous year--from May 1, 1870, to May 1, 1871,--to A. E. Chamberlain & Co. and appellant, and by them divided into separate parts and occupied to suit their convenience. Appellant occupied the south part of the premises and Chamberlain & Co. the north part--and each party received a separate lease from appellee for the part he occupied, and paid in quarterly payments therefor, at the rate of $1,307.92 per annum. In the latter part of March, 1871, appellant applied to appellee to rent the premises then occupied by him for another year, from the 1st of May, 1871, to May 1, 1872. Appellee agreed to let him have them at the same rent he was then paying. On the 16th of April following, appellee made out a written lease for the premises to appellant, in duplicate, one of which, unsigned by himself, he sent by his agent to appellant for his signature, the other he signed himself and also placed in the hands of his agent, with instructions when appellant signed and returned him the other, to deliver it to appellant. The agent handed the unsigned duplicate to appellant and requested him to sign it, but he declined, for the reason that he wanted to see appellee first to make some arrangement about a shed, etc. The agent left the unsigned duplicate with him and returned the other to appellee. On the 27th of April, 1871, appellant not yet having signed and returned the duplicate left with him, appellee tore his name from the one he had signed, and which had not been delivered to appellant, and addressed a letter to appellant informing him that he then withdrew any and all offers he had made for renting the dock to him. This letter was handed appellant by appellee's agent on the same day, and shortly after it was written.

Appellant, upon receiving the letter, immediately signed the duplicate in his possession, carried it to appellee, tendered it to him, and demanded a lease for the property. Appellee declined to execute it, informing him that he must then rent the entire dock and premises, or none. This, appellant refused to do. Appellee thereupon notified him that if he continued to occupy the premises after the 1st of May, 1871, he should charge him with the rent of the entire premises, at the rate of $12 per foot front, estimating the frontage on Halsted street.

Appellant continued to occupy the premises, without any further agreement with appellee, from May 1, 1871, to May 1, 1872. Payments were made by appellant during the year, which appellee received -- not as in discharge of the rent, but on account -- amounting to $981.40. He also paid into court, while the suit was pending, $326.98. The verdict of the jury was for $1,200, which it is conceded was the amount due, if appellant was liable for the rent of the entire property, at the same rate it was rented to Chamberlain & Co. and appellant, for the year, from May 1, 1870, to May 1, 1871. If, however, appellant was liable to pay at the rate of $12 per foot front on Halsted street for the entire property, the verdict is too small by $629.62.

Appellant claims that he is only liable for the rent of the part which appellee agreed to rent him, and consequently that the verdict should have been only for $326.98, the amount which he paid into court.

The other facts, material to an understanding of the case, will appear in the opinion of the court.

Messrs. DICKEY & CAULFIELD, and Mr. ROBERT H. PATTEN for the appellant.

Mr. S. K. Dow, for the appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE SCHOLFIELD delivered the opinion of the Court:

The first question presented on this record is, whether the agreement between the parties made in the latter part of March, 1871, for the renting of the premises from May 1, 1871, to May 1, 1872, was a present letting. Appellant insists that it was, and cites numerous authorities, which he claims sustain his position. We think the authorities are inapplicable to the case as made by the evidence. In determining whether an instrument is a lease, or only an agreement for a lease, the question is said to be one of construction, to be determined according to what appears to be the paramount intention of the parties, as such intention may be collected from the whole tenor and effect of the instrument. Taylor on Landlord and Tenant, § 38. The rule must equally obtain where the agreement has not been reduced to writing, as where it has been, that is, the intention of the parties, as ascertained from the words of the agreement, must, in such cases, as well as where there is written evidence of the contract, control. When this agreement was made, appellant was in possession of the premises under a prior lease, the term of which did not expire for more than a month. That lease was not canceled, nor does it appear that it was desired it should be canceled. Appellant's possession during the continuance of that term, could, therefore, be only under and by virtue of that lease. The term about which the parties agreed, was not to commence until the term then running had expired, which was on the 1st of May, 1871; and it was expressly understood between them, that a formal lease for the premises was to be executed. Before the expiration of the existing term, and the commencement of the new term, namely, on the 27th of April, 1871, appellee withdrew his proposition to let appellant have the premises from May 1, 1871, to May 1, 1872, so there was no period of time between the making of the agreement and...

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22 cases
  • St. Louis Smelting & Refining Co. v. Hoban
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • March 8, 1948
    ...tenants. 1 Addison on Contracts (8th Ed.), p. 54; Bockman v. Davis, 172 Ill.App. 505; Sheriff v. Kromer, 232 Ill.App. 589; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411; Higgins v. Haligan, 46 Ill. 173; Rader Hoffman, 125 Ill.App. 554. (6) Reliance upon the Illinois law relating to hold-over tenants must......
  • Bowley v. Fuller
    • United States
    • Maine Supreme Court
    • December 14, 1921
    ... ... Hunt v. Bailey, 39 Mo. 257; Higgins v. Halligan, 46 Ill. 173; Griffin v. Knisely, 75 Ill. 411; Reithman v. Brandenburg, 7 Colo. 480, 4 Pac. 788; Despard v. Walbridge, 15 N. Y. 374; Stees v ... 115 A. 468 ... Bergmeier, ... ...
  • Feeley v. Michigan Ave. Nat. Bank
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • February 13, 1986
    ...to formally execute a contract in the future for exclusive possession of lands or tenements for a determinate period. (See Griffin v. Knisely (1874), 75 Ill. 411.) A lease is generally defined as a contract for exclusive possession of lands, tenements or hereditaments for life, for a term o......
  • Kimball v. the Corn Exch. Nat'l Bank.
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 30, 1878
  • Request a trial to view additional results

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