Griffin v. Nationwide Moving and Storage Co., Inc.

• Court: Supreme Court of Connecticut
• Citation: 446 A.2d 799,187 Conn. 405
• Decision Date: 22 June 1982
• Parties: , 34 UCC Rep.Serv. 970 Julia V. GRIFFIN v. NATIONWIDE MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY, INC.

Page 799

446 A.2d 799

187 Conn. 405, 34 UCC Rep.Serv. 970

Julia V. GRIFFIN v. NATIONWIDE MOVING AND STORAGE COMPANY, INC.

Supreme Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 2, 1982.

Decided June 22, 1982.

Claudia M. Sklar, Hartford, with whom were Randy A. Kirsch, Hartford, and, on the brief, Louis F. Green, Hartford, for appellant (defendant).

John J. O'Neil, Jr., Hartford, for appellee (plaintiff).

Before PETERS, ARTHUR H. HEALEY, PARSKEY, ARMENTANO and SHEA, JJ.

ARTHUR H. HEALEY, Associate Justice.

This case raises issues arising out of the bailor-bailee relationship of the parties. On October 26, 1953, the plaintiff Julia Griffin delivered certain goods to the defendant Nationwide Moving and Storage Company, Inc. to be stored, for a valuable consideration, in the defendant's warehouse. The defendant placed and kept these goods in its warehouse located on Donald Street in Hartford. ¹ In May 1972, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff stating that it was pleased to announce that "your goods will be safely stored in our new 54,000 square foot warehouse.... The new address will be 100 Peters Road, Bloomfield, Connecticut." ² That letter also informed her that the monthly storage rate was being increased. On or about August 1, 1973, the plaintiff made demand upon the defendant for the return of her property stored with the defendant and was informed that the property had been destroyed in a fire which had also destroyed the Donald Street warehouse. ³ Thereafter, the plaintiff brought this action to recover the value of the goods. From the judgment awarding damages to the plaintiff, the defendant has appealed.

On appeal, the defendant claims that the court erred: (1) in concluding that the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from its failure to deliver the bailed property to the plaintiff upon her demand; (2) in concluding that certain provisions on the warehouse receipt given to the plaintiff did not validly limit the defendant's liability to the plaintiff; and (3) in determining the amount of damages awarded to the plaintiff.

We turn first to the defendant's claim that the trial court erred in concluding that the defendant failed to rebut the presumption of negligence arising from its failure to redeliver the bailed property to the plaintiff upon her demand. The defendant argues that while the court applied the correct law, it applied it to the evidence in a manner that was "not consistent with the established precedent." It also maintains that the presumption of negligence should not have benefited the plaintiff, upon the defendant's proof "of the actual circumstances of the loss, the human conduct, if any, which materially contributed to the loss, and the precautions taken to prevent the loss." See National Broadcasting Co. v. Rose, 153 Conn. 219, 225, 215 A.2d 123 (1965); Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Poppel & Sons Service Station, Inc., 142 Conn. 598, 603, 115 A.2d 655 (1955); Leake & Nelson Co. v. W. J. Megin, Inc., 142 Conn. 99, 102-103, 111 A.2d 559 (1955); Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., 141 Conn. 308, 312, 106 A.2d 162 (1954). We conclude that the trial court correctly applied the law to the evidence. ⁴

It is undisputed that the relationship between the parties is that of bailor and bailee. "The failure of a bailee to return goods delivered to him raises a presumption that their nonproduction is due to his negligence. Dejon v. Smedley Co., 108 Conn. 659, 667, 144 A. 473 [1929]." Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., supra, 141 Conn. at 310, 106 A.2d 162; see Barnett Motor Transportation Co. v. Cummins Diesel Engines of Connecticut, Inc., 162 Conn. 59, 63, 291 A.2d 234 (1971); National Broadcasting Co. v. Rose, supra, 153 Conn. at 225, 215 A.2d 123. " 'This presumption prevails unless and until the bailee proves the actual circumstances involved in the damaging of the property. If those circumstances are proved, then the burden is upon the bailor to satisfy the court that the bailee's conduct in the matter constituted negligence. Murray v. Paramount Petroleum & Products Co., 101 Conn. 238, 242, 125 A. 617 [1924]; O'Dea v. Amodeo, 118 Conn. 58, 63, 170 A. 486 [1934]. The circumstances which the bailee must prove must be something more than those indicating the immediate cause of the damage. The proof must go so far as to establish what, if any, human conduct materially contributed to that immediate cause. Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., [supra, 141 Conn. at 312, 106 A.2d 162].' Leake & Nelson Co. v. W. J. Megin, Inc., [supra, 142 Conn. at 102, 111 A.2d 559]. ' "The isolated fact of destruction by fire or of loss by theft rebuts nothing. The bailee must prove something more if he is to overcome the presumption. He must prove the actual circumstances connected with the origin of the fire or the theft, and these include the precautions taken to prevent the loss." Frissell v. John W. Rogers, Inc., [supra, 141 Conn. at 311, 106 A.2d 162].' Aetna Casualty & Surety Co. v. Poppel & Sons Service Station, Inc., [supra, 142 Conn. at 604, 115 A.2d 655]." National Broadcasting Co. v. Rose, supra, 153 Conn. at 225, 215 A.2d 123. In Barnett Motor Transportation, we held that the presumption in favor of the bailor continues "until the bailee not only produces substantial contravening evidence but proves the actual circumstances involved in the loss of the property." (Emphasis added.) Barnett Motor Transportation Co. v. Cummins Diesel Engines of Connecticut, Inc., supra, 162 Conn. at 64, 291 A.2d 234. Whether the bailee has proved the actual circumstances of the loss and rebutted the presumption of negligence in that the bailee has taken reasonable precautions under the circumstances is a question of fact for the trier. Barnett Motor Transportation Co. v. Cummins Diesel Engines of Connecticut, Inc., supra; Lissie v. Southern New England Telephone Co., 33 Conn.Sup. 540, 545, 359 A.2d 187 (1976). ⁵

The defendant's proof of the mere fact of destruction of the plaintiff's goods by fire rebutted nothing. See National Broadcasting Co. v. Rose, supra, 153 Conn. at 225, 215 A.2d 123. The facts, as found by the court, demonstrate that the defendant did not prove the actual circumstances of the fire which destroyed the warehouse in which the plaintiff's goods were stored. The court found that the defendant kept the plaintiff's goods in a warehouse which had been the scene of previous fires and which was located in an area that had been experiencing considerable civil unrest for more than a year after it notified the plaintiff that her goods would be moved to a new warehouse in Bloomfield. ⁶ At best, the defendant's evidence about the cause of the fire which destroyed the plaintiff's goods was vague. ⁷ The defendant's vice president testified that the Donald Street warehouse was destroyed by fire. He was then asked by his attorney when it was so destroyed and he answered: "Well, I shouldn't say destroyed by fire. We had fires and robberies in the Donald Street warehouse up until the day we physically moved out. Then it was completely destroyed after we left, which was a vacant building." ⁸ The defendant's evidence on this issue, even if credited, hardly proved the actual circumstances of the loss so as to rebut the presumption of negligence under our cases. Having recognized the safety problem in the Hartford location by arranging for a new warehouse in Bloomfield, the defendant did not take the precaution of actually moving the plaintiff's goods to that location.

The defendant next claims that the trial court erred in concluding that certain provisions on the warehouse receipt given to the plaintiff at the time of the bailment did not validly limit its liability to her. Specifically, it argues that the work order and the warehouse receipt, both of which the plaintiff received, ⁹ contained language which limited its liability for loss or damage of the goods stored. ¹⁰ The defendant claims that the trial court erred in finding that because the plaintiff was unaware of the limitation of liability clauses on the work order and the warehouse receipt, these provisions did not become part of the bailment contract between the parties. It further claims that, under the circumstances, the plaintiff should have been deemed to have assented to the limitation of liability provisions which were part of the bailment contract.

The law does not favor contract provisions which relieve a person from his own negligence. See generally 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 195, comment b; 17 Am.Jur.2d, Contracts §§ 188, 189; 78 Am.Jur.2d, Warehouses § 232; 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailments §§ 139-141. Such provisions, however, have been upheld under proper circumstances. See, e.g., Malone v. Santora, 135 Conn. 286, 293, 64 A.2d 51 (1949); Willard Van Dyke Productions, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 12 N.Y.2d 301, 304, 239 N.Y.S.2d 337, 189 N.E.2d 693 (1963) (involving contract clause limiting liability in processing film); Neece v. Richmond Greyhound Lines, Inc., 246 N.C. 547, 99 S.E.2d 756 (1957); see also 68 A.L.R.2d 1341. Parties to a bailment may generally provide by their contract of bailment for relief from liability of the bailee for loss or damages. ¹¹ Samelson v. Harper's Furs, Inc., 144 Conn. 368, 373, 131 A.2d 827 (1957); see Malone v. Santora, supra; Carter v. Reichlin Furriers, 34 Conn.Sup. 661, 664-65, 386 A.2d 647 (1977); 8 Am.Jur.2d, Bailments §§ 139, 142; 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 262. We have held that the right of a bailee to limit his liability by special contract does not extend to relieve him wholly against his own negligence, for to do so would be against public policy. Malone v. Santora, supra; see also New England Fruit & Produce Co. v. Hines, 97 Conn. 225, 234, 116 A. 243 (1922).

Whether a particular provision forms part of a contract is ordinarily a factual question for the trier. Carter v. Reichlin Furriers, supra, 34 Conn.Sup. at 665, 386 A.2d 647. The assent of both parties is necessary...