Griffin v. Nw. Mut. Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 07 March 1930
• Docket Number: No. 19.,19.
• Citation: 229 N.W. 509,250 Mich. 185
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

250 Mich. 185

229 N.W. 509

GRIFFIN

v.NORTHWESTERN MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

No. 19.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 7, 1930.

Error to Circuit Court, Wayne County; Leland W. Carr, Judge.

Action by Ida Griffin against the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error.

Reversed, and new trial granted.

Argued before the Entire Bench, except McDONALD, J.David I. Hubar, of Detroit (Milton M. Maddin, of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.

Joslyn, Joslyn & Joslyn, of Detroit, for appellee.

CLARK, J.

Plaintiff is beneficiary in a policy of life insurance for $10,000 between her husband, the insured, and defendant insurer.

On December 30, 1915, insured in New York wrote to plaintiff at their home in East Liverpool, Ohio, that, to seek employment, he was leaving that evening for Boston by boat. The record warrants the inference he engaged passage on the steamer Providence, Fall River Line, leaving for Boston at 5 p. m., and was assigned a stateroom. The key of the stateroom door was issued. His baggage was placed in the room. It does not appear he was known or recognized by any one on the boat. He was never seen or heard from thereafter. Later, on search of the boat, the key was found inside the stateroom door, the door was unlocked, and his baggage in the room. Extensive search or inquiry was instituted and made by plaintiff, by his relatives and friends, by fraternal societies, by defendant, and others, and nothing was learned of what had befallen him.

He was an electrical engineer, had been manager of a traction company in Ohio, and later receiver for it. His relations with plaintiff seem to have been happy. They had lived rather extravagantly. At the time of his disappearance his finances were at low ebb, even to the extent he had perhaps misused a portion of a trust fund in his hands. His last letter to plaintiff, however, indicates hope of his securing needed employment in Boston. He was a young man in good health, except in his last letter he spoke of having been ‘troubled with my head quite a considerable lately. It is hurting me at present, but believe it will wear off by night.’

The policy lapsed in November, 1916, as plaintiff could not and did not pay further premiums.

The policy is that defendant is to pay upon receipt of due proof of death of the insured. The plaintiff waited seven years until she could have benefit of the statutory presumption of death, section 329, 1 Comp. Laws 1915, and furnished to defendant proofs of death on or about February 23, 1923, and again on November 22, 1923.

Defendant took the position, quoting from its letter to plaintiff's counsel: ‘As stated in our former letter the extended insurance under this policy expired on November 8, 1916. It will consequently be necessary to furnish us with definite proof of the death of Mr. William R. W. Griffin before that date to establish our liability under the policy.’ Having the opinion that plaintiff could not fix the time of death as being within the life of the policy, defendant declined to pay. This suit on the policy followed. Verdict was directed for defendant. Plaintiff brings error.

The purpose of proof of death is to enable the insurer to form an intelligent estimate of its rights and liabilities under the contract. 5 Joyce on Insurance (2d Ed.) § 3277. The proofs here furnished to defendant gave as the date of death, ‘Disappeared December 30, 1915,’ and a cause of death, ‘Disappeared December 30, 1915, enroute from N. Y. to Boston, New England Steamship Co. Steamer Providence. * * *’ Proofs were furnished a little over seven years after the disappearance. Plaintiff made such proof as she could. Following this, defendant wrote a letter to plaintiff's counsel. The letter shows defendant had full appreciation of plaintiff's difficulties and full understanding of the matter in issue. It made no claim plaintiff had not furnished such proof as she could. The proofs of death were here sufficient.

Plaintiff must fix the time of her husband's death within the life of the policy, or she cannot recover. Note L. R. A. 1918B, 93. Her position in pleading and proof is that he died on or about December 30, 1915, to which the defense of the statute of limitations is asserted (section 12323, 3 Comp. Laws 1915) that the suit had not been commenced within six years. If plaintiff had been able to establish both the fact and the time of death without the aid of statutory presumption of death from absence of seven years, she ought not to have awaited the accrual of the presumption, but should have proceeded to collect. John Hancock Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Moore, 34 Mich. 41. At the trial defendant requested directed verdict, and got it on the ground that plaintiff had no evidence of death or of the time thereof, except the presumption, and that she had no evidence of death within the life of the policy. Defendant's position in this regard has been consistent throughout. It is clear, therefore, that plaintiff was within her rights in awaiting the coming of the presumption of death before attempting proofs of death. Her cause of action accrued after the expiration of the seven-year period following the disappearance of the insured. She might bring her action at any time within the statutory period of six years thereafter. McLaughlin v. AEtna Life Insurance Co., 221 Mich. 479, 191 N. W. 224.

In Sovereign Camp, W. O. W., v. Boden, 117 Tex. 229, 1 S.W.(2d) 256, 258, reported in 61 A. L. R. 682, Boden disappeared onJune 24, 1915. Assessments on an insurance certificate in favor of his wife were paid to keep it alive to September 1, 1915, at which time it lapsed. Mrs. Boden awaited the ripening of the presumption from seven years' absence, and treated the cause of action as then accruing, and brought suit on the certificate on June 4, 1924, within the period fixed by the statute of limitations of Texas, four years. In the trial she submitted her evidence respecting time of death to the jury, and it was found that her husband had died before September 1, 1915, and within the life of the certificate. In affirming the judgment in her favor, the court said:

‘The fact of death, after an absence of seven years, is fixed by statute; but the time of death must be determined by the jury. In this case, the jury determined that Boden died prior to September 1, 1915, to which date his insurance was in full force and effect. Limitation would not have begun to run upon this cause of action until seven years after Boden's disappearance, unless plaintiff had chosen to furnish prior to that time whatever proof she had and to demand payment of the policy, and thus voluntarily to assume the risk involved in attempting to establish by presumptions independent of the statute that Boden was then dead. Until such proof was made and delivered to the society, her cause of action did not accrue under the policy. The terms of the policy did not fix any period of time within which she must have presented such proof of Boden's death as was available. Until she did prepare and present such proof, she could not have maintained a suit, and hence limitation did not begin to run until she did present such proof, unless she had delayed presenting same the full seven years. As she did not prepare and present such proof until after the expiration of seven years from the time of Boden's disappearance, limitation did not begin to run on her cause of action until the end of that seven-year period. The plaintiff below was not legally required to present her proof of her husband's disappearance and death until the expiration of such period of seven years. She had a perfect legal right to follow the natural impulse of the human heart to hope that her husband would return during all those seven years. But the law places a limit at that period. Then she must have acted or lost her legal rights by limitation four years later. She has acted within the required time, by presenting proof of Boden's death, and, when refused payment of the policy, has filed this suit within the limitation period after her cause of action accrued. Thus she has lost none of her legal rights, for, as stated, limitation began to run against her cause of action seven years after Boden's disappearance, and not at the date of Boden's death as...