Griffin v. Sanders

• Decision Date: 20 January 2022
• Docket Number: 1:19-cv-00637-TWP-DML
• Parties: OSCAR K. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff, v. SANDERS, Ms., CHINNETTE ROWELL, and PARKS, Officer, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

OSCAR K. GRIFFIN, Plaintiff,
v.
SANDERS, Ms., CHINNETTE ROWELL, and PARKS, Officer, Defendants.

No. 1:19-cv-00637-TWP-DML

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division

January 20, 2022

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Hon. Tanya Walton Pratt, Chief Judge.

This matter is before the Court on a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Lela Sanders ("Sanders"), Chinnette Rowell ("Officer Rowell"), and Mary Parks ("Officer Parks") (collectively, "Defendants"). (Dkt. 101.) Plaintiff Oscar Griffin ("Griffin"), an inmate in the Indiana Department of Correction ("IDOC"), initiated this civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Dkt. 12.) Griffin alleges the Defendants, all IDOC employees, discriminated against him and denied him the opportunity to work at the prison because he is blind; and when he was later allowed to work, he was paid less than other inmates and was given fewer work hours. (Dkt. 12 at 2-3.) The Court screened Griffin's Amended Complaint and liberally construed that Griffin asserts an Equal Protection claim pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment. (Dkt. 13 at 2.) For the reasons explained below, the Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD

A motion for summary judgment asks the Court to find that a trial is unnecessary because there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and, instead, the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). On summary judgment, a party must show evidence that would convince a trier of fact to accept its version of the events. Gekas

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v. Vasilades, 814 F.3d 890, 896 (7th Cir. 2016). The moving party is entitled to summary judgment if no reasonable factfinder could return a verdict for the non-moving party. Nelson v. Miller, 570 F.3d 868, 875 (7th Cir. 2009).

To survive a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must set forth specific admissible evidence showing that there is a material issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). The court views the record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draws all reasonable inferences in that party's favor. Skiba v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 884 F.3d 708, 717 (7th Cir. 2018). It cannot weigh evidence or make credibility determinations on summary judgment because those tasks are left to the factfinder. Miller v. Gonzalez, 761 F.3d 822, 827 (7th Cir. 2014). The court need only consider the cited materials, Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(3), and the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has repeatedly assured the district courts that they are not required to "scour every inch of the record" for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion before them. Grant v. Trs. of Ind. Univ., 870 F.3d 562, 573-74 (7th Cir. 2017).

A dispute about a material fact is genuine only "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). If no reasonable jury could find for the non-moving party, then there is no "genuine" dispute. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007). Not every factual dispute between the parties will prevent summary judgment, and the non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986).

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II. MATERIAL FACTS

The following statement of facts are not necessarily objectively true, but as required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, they are presented in the light most favorable to Griffin as the non-moving party. See Zerante v. DeLuca, 555 F.3d 582, 584 (7th Cir. 2009). The facts are considered undisputed except to the extent that disputes of facts are noted.

A. The Parties

At all times relevant, Griffin was an IDOC inmate housed at the Plainfield Correctional Facility ("Plainfield"). (Dkt. 101-1 at 9.) Griffin is completely blind. Id. at 9-10. He does not have a left eye, and he cannot see anything out of his right eye, not even light. Id. at 10. The optical nerve and the nervous system behind Griffin's right eye are severed. (Dkt. 101-7 at 10.)

Griffin arrived at Plainfield in April 0f 2017 and has had a few different housing assignments his arrival. Two of these housing assignments are relevant to the allegations in his Amended Complaint. Upon his arrival to the facility, he was housed in the north dorm. (Dkt. 1011 at 11.) In the north dorm, Griffin worked nighttime sanitation and wanted to continue similar work after he was moved to the P-side of the east dorm. Id. at 17. The east dorm is an honor dorm. The P-side of the honor dorm is for offenders who do not have any conduct reports, and Griffin was placed here with both disabled and some non-disabled offenders. Id. at 12. Griffin was the only blind person on the campus when he was moved to the honor dorm. Id. at 12. He did not require assistance with his daily activities, and he was "quite handy." (Dkt. 101-7 at 10, 18.) Griffin did require assistance from other inmates to review his trust account statement and submit his timesheets for work. (Dkt. 101-1 at 29, 31; Dkt. 101-7 at 17-18.)

At all times relevant Sanders, an IDOC counselor, and IDOC Officers Rowell and Parks were employed at Plainfield. (See Dkt. 20.)

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B. Griffin's Testimony

1. Work History Prior to January 2019

Griffin previously worked dorm detail in the GRIP program^[1], under Officer Parks' supervision. (Dkt. 101-1 at 14-15.) Officer Parks knew all about him because she had been his counselor when he was in the north dorm. Id. After the GRIP program ended, Griffin completed his GED and the literacy program, and then received his culinary arts certificate on December 27, 2018. Id. at 18-19. Shortly after, Griffin was reclassified and was temporarily on "idle"^[2] status, pending a new work assignment. Id. at 19. Griffin was told by another counselor, a non-defendant in this action, that the counselor had put in a request form so that Griffin could work dorm detail. Id.

2. Lela Sanders

On January 10, 2019, Sanders took over the dayroom work assignments, but Griffin was not on the dorm detail assignment list in the honor dorm. Id. That day, Griffin had his first encounter with Sanders when she woke up the inmates in his dorm, telling them that they needed to get up and get to work. Id. at 17-18. At this time, Sanders did not know that Griffin was blind. Id. The work Sanders referred to were custodial jobs in which inmates would clean tables, telephones, and windowsills in the front lobby and front room. Sanders and Griffin exchanged a few words that were not pleasant, and then Sanders retired to her office. After Griffin explained his condition-that he was blind-Sanders made a phone call. She then she told Griffin that he did

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not have to work because he was blind. Id. at 18. Griffin told Sanders "I would like to work, I'm the one that volunteered to work." Id. Sanders responded "how can you work because you [sic] blind, you can't see nothing to make sure nothing is clean." Id. Griffin responded that he wanted to work, that he was doing this same work in the north dorm, and expressed that he was "as capable as everybody else." Id. Sanders made a few more comments and then told Griffin that they were not going to work him, and she "kicked me out of the office." Id.

Griffin is suing Sanders for discrimination against his disability because she denied him the right to work, and that she and the other Defendants locked him in rooms, cussed him out, stopped him from filing grievances, and called him names and verbally assaulted him about his disability. Id. at 12-13.

3. Officer Rowell

Officer Rowell is one of the officers in charge of the dayroom and she told Griffin that she did not want him to work around her. Id. at 13-14. Officer Rowell knew Griffin from his work in the north dorm. Id. at 20. Officer Rowell responded to Griffin's informal grievance. Her written response reads, in its entirety:

Offender Griffin I never was disrespectful to you or your disability. You just mad because I told Mrs. Sanders that you did not need to be on dorm detail because you could not see. And that you didn't clean your own living area. Offender Griffin you was the on[e] disrespectful and cursing at staff that we could not discriminate against your disability. Threatening to sue all of us with the American Disability Act for not letting you work. I never told you that you couldn't have a job you just had to have one more compatible to your disability.

(Dkt. 101-6.) Griffin characterized this response as stating because he is blind, he could not work, and that was the reason why they were "not working" him. Compare id. to Dkt. 101-1 at 13.

4. Officer Parks

Griffin is suing Officer Parks because she locked him in rooms, stood in front of the door and did not allow him to leave (thereby preventing him from working during part of the time period

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in question), and she insulted him about his disability. (Dkt. 101-1 at 14.) Officer Parks knew about him and his condition prior to his reassignment to the honor dorm, as she was familiar with him from his participation in the GRIP program. Id. Officer Parks worked the same shifts as Officer Rowell, though at times she might be on the other side of the dorm. Id. at 16.

5. Work History in March 2019 and After

Eventually, in early March 2019, Griffin received an order directing him to begin the daytime sanitation job he sought. Id. at 26 and 30. Between April and May 2019, Griffin started a new job assignment with Project Echo doing education work in a position that paid more. Id. at 34. At the time of his second deposition, Griffin was working in the kitchen and bakery. (Dkt. 101-7 at 8.)

C. IDOC Offender Work Assignments and Pay Schedule...