Griffin v. Sec'y
Decision Date | 21 September 2016 |
Docket Number | Case No. 8:13-cv-2025-T-36TBM |
Parties | RICHARD LEE GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Petitioner Richard Lee Griffin, a state of Florida inmate proceeding pro se, initiated this action by filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). He challenges his convictions entered by the Circuit Court for the Tenth Judicial Circuit, Polk County, in 2011. Respondent filed a response (Dkt. 6), in which it raises no challenge to the petition's timeliness. Griffin filed a reply (Dkt. 8). Upon review, the petition must be denied.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Griffin was charged with three counts of sexual activity with a child 12 years of age or older but less than 18 years of age while he was in a position of familial or custodial authority over the victim. (Dkt. 7, Ex. A1.) A jury convicted Griffin of counts one and two, and found him not guilty of count three. (Dkt. 7, Ex. A2.) Griffin was sentenced to thirty years in prison on count one. (Dkt. 7, Ex. A3.) On count two, he received a consecutive term of fifteen years in prison, followed by fifteen years of probation. (Id.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed Griffin's judgments and sentences. (Dkt. 7, Ex. B3.)
Griffin subsequently filed a motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850 and memorandum of law in support. (Dkt. 7, Exs. C1, C2.) The state court summarily denied numerous claims and allowed Griffin an opportunity to amend two claims that it dismissed as insufficiently pleaded. (Dkt. 7, Ex. C3.) Griffin filed an amended postconviction motion and memorandum of law. (Dkt. 7, Exs. C4, C5.) The court denied one of Griffin's claims and directed the State to respond to the last remaining claim. (Dkt. 7, Ex. C6.) After the State filed its response, the state court entered a final order denying Griffin's postconviction motion. (Dkt. 7, Exs. C7, C8.) The state appellate court per curiam affirmed the rejection of Griffin's claims. (Dkt. 7, Ex. E1.) Griffin also filed a state habeas petition alleging ineffective assistance of appellate counsel. (Dkt. 7, Ex. F1.) The state appellate court denied his petition. (Dkt. 7, Ex. F3.)
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA") governs this proceeding. Wilcox v. Florida Dep't of Corr., 158 F.3d 1209, 1210 (11th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 840 (2000). Habeas relief can only be granted if a petitioner is in custody "in violation of the Constitution or laws or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). Section 2254(d), which sets forth a highly deferential standard for federal court review of a state court adjudication, states:
In Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13 (2000), the Supreme Court interpreted this deferential standard:
In sum, § 2254(d)(1) places a new constraint on the power of a federal habeas court to grant a state prisoner's application for a writ of habeas corpus with respect to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. Under § 2254(d)(1), the writ may issue only if one of the following two conditions is satisfied-the state-court adjudication resulted in a decision that (1) "was contrary to . . . clearly established Federal Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States" or (2) "involved an unreasonable application of . . . clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States." Under the "contrary to" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by this Court on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than this Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Under the "unreasonable application" clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from this Court's decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner's case.
"The focus . . . is on whether the state court's application of clearly established federal law is objectively unreasonable . . . an unreasonable application is different from an incorrect one." Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 694 (2002). "As a condition for obtaining habeas corpus from a federal court, a state prisoner must show that the state court's ruling on the claim being presented in federal court was so lacking in justification that there was an error well understood and comprehended in existing law beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement." Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011). Accord Brown v. Head, 272 F.3d 1308, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (). The phrase "clearly established Federal law" encompasses only the holdings of the UnitedStates Supreme Court "as of the time of the relevant state-court decision." Williams, 529 U.S. at 412.
The purpose of federal review is not to re-try the case. "The [AEDPA] modified a federal habeas court's role in reviewing state prisoner applications in order to prevent federal habeas 'retrials' and to ensure that state-court convictions are given effect to the extent possible under law." Cone, 535 U.S. at 693. In other words, "AEDPA prevents defendants-and federal courts-from using federal habeas corpus review as a vehicle to second-guess the reasonable decisions of state courts." Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 779 (2010). See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011) ( )(citations omitted).
In per curiam decisions without written opinions, the state appellate court affirmed Griffin's judgments and sentences, and the rejection of Griffin's postconviction motion. Additionally, the state appellate court denied Griffin's state habeas petition without comment. These decisions warrant deference under § 2254(d)(1) because "the summary nature of a state court's decision does not lessen the deference that it is due." Wright v. Moore, 278 F.3d 1245, 1254 (11th Cir.), reh'g and reh'g en banc denied, 278 F.3d 1245 (2002), cert. denied sub nom. Wright v. Crosby, 538 U.S. 906 (2003). See also Richter, 562 U.S. at 99 (). Review of the state court decision is limited to the record that was before the state court.Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1398.
Griffin bears the burden of overcoming by clear and convincing evidence a state court factual determination. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
EXHAUSTION OF STATE REMEDIES; PROCEDURAL DEFAULT
Before a district court can grant habeas relief to a state prisoner under § 2254, the petitioner must exhaust all state court remedies that are available for challenging his conviction, either on direct appeal or in a state postconviction motion. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A); O'Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999) (). See also Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 891 (11th Cir. 2003) () (citations omitted). A state prisoner "'must give the state courts one full opportunity to resolve any constitutional issues by invoking one complete round of the State's established appellate review process,' including review by the state's court of last resort, even if review in that court is discretionary." Pruitt v. Jones, 348 F.3d 1355, 1358-59 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting O'Sullivan, 526 U.S. at 845).
To exhaust a claim, a petitioner must make the state court aware of both the legal and factual bases for his claim. See Snowden v. Singletary, 135 F.3d 732, 735 (11th Cir. 1998) () (quoting Duncan v. Henry, 513 U.S. 364, 365 (1995)). A federal habeas petitioner "shall not be deemed to have exhausted the remedies available in the courts of the State . . . if he has the right under the law of the State to raise, by any available procedure, the question presented." Pruitt, 348 F.3d at 1358. The prohibition against raising an unexhausted claim in federal court extends to both the broad legal theory of relief and the specific factual contention that supports relief. Kelley v. Sec'y, Dep't of Corr., 377 F.3d 1317, 1344 (...
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