Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau

Decision Date10 June 2020
Docket NumberNo. 20180813,20180813
CourtUtah Supreme Court
Parties Ronald E. GRIFFIN, Appellee, v. SNOW CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU, Appellant.

Ronald E. Griffin, Huntington Beach, pro se

Rodney R. Parker, Adam M. Pace, Salt Lake City, for appellant

Justice Petersen authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Durrant, Associate Chief Justice Lee, Justice Pearce, and Judge Harris joined.

Having recused himself, Justice Himonas does not participate herein. Court of Appeals Judge Ryan M. Harris sat.

Justice Petersen, opinion of the Court:

INTRODUCTION

¶1 The question before us is whether a post-judgment motion that plaintiff Ronald E. Griffin filed in the district court was timely. The answer centers on whether the district court's order of dismissal constituted a separate judgment under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A(a), and therefore marked the entry of judgment when it was signed and recorded in the docket. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 58A(e)(2)(A). The district court ruled that the order did not meet the requirements of a separate judgment. Consequently, the court concluded the judgment was not complete and entered until 150 days after the clerk recorded the order of dismissal, see id. 58A(e)(2)(B), and the post-judgment motion was therefore timely. The district court was correct. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 This appeal stems from a legal malpractice claim brought by Ron Griffin against Snow Christensen & Martineau (SCM). Griffin requested multiple extensions of time to serve his complaint on SCM, and he eventually filed an amended complaint on August 28, 2017—the deadline the district court imposed in response to one of Griffin's extension requests. That same day, a process server left the complaint and summons with an administrator at SCM's office.

¶3 SCM moved to quash service and dismiss Griffin's complaint, arguing that Griffin failed to properly and timely serve his complaint. After a hearing, the district court granted the motion orally on the record and signed the minutes. The district court ordered SCM's counsel to submit a proposed order confirming the decision. Counsel did so, and on April 10, 2018 the district court signed the proposed "Order of Dismissal with Prejudice" (April 10 Order).

¶4 On May 9, 2018, Griffin filed a post-judgment motion requesting various forms of relief under rules 52(b), 59(a)(7), and 59(e).1 The deadline for such a motion is "no later than 28 days after entry of judgment." UTAH R. CIV. P. 52(b) ; see also id. 59(b). SCM opposed Griffin's motion, in part, by arguing that the district court lacked jurisdiction because the motion was filed more than twenty-eight days after the April 10 Order and was therefore untimely. SCM further argued that if the district court were to reach the merits of Griffin's motion, it should deny him relief.

¶5 The district court granted Griffin's motion and vacated the April 10 Order. The court rejected SCM's argument that the motion was untimely. It concluded that the April 10 Order was not a separate judgment under rule 58A(a), and therefore it did not start the time to file post-judgment motions. Id. 58A(a), 58A(e)(2). The court then ruled in Griffin's favor on the merits. SCM petitioned for interlocutory appeal, which we granted.

¶6 We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j).

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶7 "We review a district court's interpretation of our rules of civil procedure ... for correctness." Keystone Ins. Agency, LLC v. Inside Ins., LLC , 2019 UT 20, ¶ 12, 445 P.3d 434.

ANALYSIS

¶8 SCM argues that the district court erred in ruling the April 10 Order did not qualify as a separate judgment under rule 58A(a). We disagree. The district court got it right.

¶9 In Central Utah Water Conservancy District v. King this court encountered—not for the first time—confusion regarding precisely when the district court's decision became final, which at that time triggered the appeal (and post-judgment motion) period. 2013 UT 13, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 619 ; see, e.g. , Giusti v. Sterling Wentworth Corp. , 2009 UT 2, ¶¶ 23–38, 201 P.3d 966 ; Code v. Utah Dep't of Health , 2007 UT 43, ¶ 6 n.1, 162 P.3d 1097.

At the time of our decision in Central Utah , rule 7(f)(2) governed the question. It provided that "[u]nless the [district] court approves the proposed order submitted with an initial memorandum, or unless otherwise directed by the court, the prevailing party shall, within fifteen days after the court's decision, serve upon the other parties a proposed order in conformity with the court's decision." Central Utah , 2013 UT 13, ¶ 9, 297 P.3d 619 (quoting UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(f)(2) (2013) (alterations in original)). That rule was designed to "prevent[ ] the confusion that often leads ... to additional litigation when parties are left to divine when a court's decision has triggered the appeal period." Giusti , 2009 UT 2, ¶ 36, 201 P.3d 966.

¶10 In Central Utah , we noted that our rules did not ensure judicial efficiency and finality in all circumstances. 2013 UT 13, ¶ 26, 297 P.3d 619. We observed that "when the prevailing party neglects its obligations under the rule, ‘the appeal rights of the nonprevailing party will extend indefinitely. " Id. (quoting Code , 2007 UT 43, ¶ 6 n.1, 162 P.3d 1097 ). This potential for an indefinite extension of the nonprevailing party's appeal rights led us to request that our advisory committee review rule 7(f)(2) and address the possibility of "endlessly hanging appeals." Id. ¶¶ 26–27. We referenced as examples federal procedural rules that addressed this issue. Id. ¶ 27 (referencing federal rule of appellate procedure 4(a)(7) and federal rule of civil procedure 58(c) ).

¶11 The result was the 2015 amendments to Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 58A. Rule 58A(a) now states, "Every judgment and amended judgment must be set out in a separate document ordinarily titled ‘Judgment’—or, as appropriate, ‘Decree.’ " The rule does not require a separate document for orders disposing of post-judgment motions.2 UTAH R. CIV. P. 58A(b).

¶12 Importantly, the rule makes explicit the time of "[e ]ntry of judgment ." Id. 58A(e) (emphasis added). It states:

(e)(2) If a separate document is required, a judgment is complete and is entered at the earlier of these events:
(e)(2)(A) the judgment is set out in a separate document signed by the judge and recorded in the docket; or
(e)(2)(B) 150 days have run from the clerk recording the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment.

Id. 58A(e)(2)(A)(B).

¶13 The deadlines to file post-judgment motions and notices of appeal correspond to the language in this rule, i.e., they are triggered by the entry of judgment . For example, rule 52(b) states, "Upon motion of a party filed no later than 28 days after entry of judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the judgment accordingly." (Emphasis added.) Similarly, rule 59(b) states, "A motion for a new trial must be filed no later than 28 days after entry of the judgment ." (Emphasis added.) And notices of appeal must be filed "within 30 days after the date of entry of the judgment or order appealed from." UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a) (emphasis added).

¶14 These amendments resolved the "endlessly hanging appeals" problem we identified in Central Utah . See UTAH R. CIV. P. 58A(e)(2)(b). And the amendments went further, addressing the primary issue before us in that case: confusion as to what event starts the time to file post-judgment motions and notices of appeal at the end of a case. The new rule established a bright-line answer to this question. The time to file post-judgment motions and notices of appeal begins upon the "entry of judgment," when the separate document required by rule 58A(a) is signed and docketed by the judge. Id. 58A(a), (e)(2)(a) ; see also id. 52(b); id. 59(b); UTAH R. APP. P. 4(a).

¶15 This is a departure from Utah's procedural practice at the time of Central Utah . Under former rule 7(f)(2), the time to appeal or file post-judgment motions began to run when the decision on a dispositive motion—a decision that adjudicated all claims involving all parties—became final. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(f)(2) (2013). But this practice generated questions as to when a particular decision was final. See Central Utah , 2013 UT 13, ¶ 26, 297 P.3d 619 ; Giusti , 2009 UT 2, ¶¶ 23–38, 201 P.3d 966 ; Code , 2007 UT 43, ¶ 6 n.1, 162 P.3d 1097. And it presumed that all parties knew that a particular decision adjudicated all claims involving all parties. While this is generally a safe assumption, it may not always be clear, especially in cases involving numerous claims for relief, numerous parties, or both.

¶16 After the 2015 amendments, rule 7 still governs when a decision on a particular motion is final. See UTAH R. CIV. P. 7(j)(1). However, it no longer governs when the time to file a notice of appeal or post-judgment motion begins to run at the end of a case.

¶17 That is now regulated by rule 58A(a) and (e), working in concert with 54(a). As explained in rule 54(a), a judgment must "adjudicate[ ] all claims and the rights and liabilities of all parties."3 Additionally, except for orders on post-judgment motions, it must be set out in a separate document that is prepared by the prevailing party and signed and docketed by the court. Id. 58A(a), (e)(2)(a). When properly implemented, the separate judgment signals clearly that the case is over and the appeal and post-judgment motion clock has started to run. But when the prevailing party fails to prepare a separate judgment, rule 58A(e)(2)(b) creates a backstop by establishing that the "entry of judgment" occurs once "150 days have run from the clerk recording the decision, however designated, that provides the basis for the entry of judgment."

¶18 Unlike former rule 7(f)(2), which operated at the decision level, rule 58A(a) operates at the case level, establishing a self-contained, distinct judgment that is separate from the...

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    ...This provision "makes explicit the time of entry of judgment" and resolves the problem of "endlessly hanging appeals." Griffin v. Snow Christensen & Martineau , 2020 UT 33, ¶¶ 12, 14, 467 P.3d 833 (cleaned up).¶12 The parties agree that "a separate document" was required in this case, so th......
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