Griffin v. State

• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: SAYRE, J.
• Citation: Griffin v. State, 165 Ala. 29, 50 So. 962 (Ala. 1909)
• Decision Date: 30 June 1909
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. STATE.

50 So. 962

165 Ala. 29

GRIFFIN v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 30, 1909

Rehearing Denied Dec. 16, 1909.

Appeal from Circuit Court, Perry County; B. M. Miller, Judge.

John Griffin was convicted of murder, and he appeals. Affirmed.

The facts sufficiently appear in the opinion of the court. The following charges were refused to the defendant:

"(2) In deciding on the guilt or innocence of defendant, if you believe from the evidence that he did not fight willingly and that he was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, and could not retreat without having increased his peril, and come to consider whether the defendant was actually in danger of death or great bodily harm, or whether the circumstances surrounding him were such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man, and did create in the mind of defendant, the honest belief that he was in danger of death or great bodily harm, you should determine what an ordinary and reasonable man might have fairly inferred from all the facts and circumstances by which the evidence showed that the defendant was at the time surrounded, and in so doing must not try him in the light of subsequent developments; nor must they require of him the same cool judgment that the jury can now bring to bear on the occurrence. The jury must put themselves as far as possible in the defendant's place, and then judge whether the danger was apparent, or should have been considered apparent, by a man of ordinary caution and prudence in like conditions. The danger to life or great bodily harm need not have been real, present, or urgent at the very moment of the killing, but only apparently so. The question is, Was the danger apparently so imminently present at the time of the killing that a reasonable man and a prudent man situated as Griffin was would believe that it was necessary to kill in order to avoid the loss of life or to prevent great bodily harm; and if, from all the evidence in the case, the jury have a reasonable doubt whether such was the case when the defendant killed Hughey then if you believe defendant is free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, and did not fight willingly and could not retreat without increasing his peril, you must acquit him.

"(3) There is evidence in the case tending to show that the defendant was in imminent danger, real or apparent, of death or great bodily harm from Hughey at the time he fired; and if you believe from the evidence that he was in such imminent danger, real or apparent, and that he was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, and could not retreat without increasing his peril, and did not fight willingly, you must acquit him.

"(4) If the jury believe from the evidence that the defendant had reasonable apprehension of great personal violence, involving imminent peril to life or limb, then he had a right to protect himself by taking the life of Jeffie Hughey, if such protection could not otherwise be procured, and they must acquit the defendant unless they find that the defendant was not free from fault in bringing on the difficulty.

"(5) If the jury have a reasonable doubt as to whether or not the act was done maliciously, then they must acquit the defendant.

"(6) There is evidence in this case tending to show that the defendant at the time of the shot could not retreat without increasing his peril; and if you believe from the evidence that he could not retreat without increasing his peril, and was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, and was in imminent danger, real or apparent, of death or great bodily harm from Hughey at the time, you must acquit him.

"(7) If you believe from the evidence that the defendant approached the deceased in a peaceable manner, and in a peaceable manner asked him if he knew anything about the letter which has been offered in evidence as the letter shown the deceased by the defendant at the time of the killing, I charge you that this would not put the defendant at fault in bringing on the difficulty.

"(8) I charge you that there is evidence in this case that it was communicated to Griffin before the killing that Hughey had made threats against the defendant's life. This evidence goes to aid you in determining, if you believe it, whether the defendant or the deceased was the aggressor, and whether reasonably entertained the honest belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm; and if you believe that such threats were communicated to the deceased before the killing, and contributed to creating in the mind of the defendant the reasonable and honest belief that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, if he did entertain such belief, and if a reasonable man, situated as the defendant was, would have entertained such belief, it is immaterial whether such threats were so or not.

"(9) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that there is evidence tending to show that the defendant was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty; and if you believe from the evidence that he was free from fault in bringing on the difficulty, and was at the time he shot in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm from Hughey, and could not retreat without increasing his peril, and did not fight willingly then, I charge you, you must acquit the defendant.

"(10) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that there is evidence in this case tending to prove that the defendant acted in self-defense, as I have defined self-defense to you in my general charge; and if, after considering all the evidence in the case, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether the defendant acted in self-defense, as I have defined it to you in my general charge, you must acquit him.

"(11) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that the design, real or apparent, to kill the defendant, or to do him some great personal injury, and the danger, real or apparent, of the execution of such design by the deceased to cause the killing, must be manifest by some overt act, conduct, or behavior of deceased at the time of the killing, indicating to the defendant, situated as he was, such design and danger but what shows such design, real or apparent, or such danger, real or apparent, are not matters of law for the court to decide, but are matters of fact, to be determined by the jury according to all the evidence in the case. No exact definition of an overt act can be given. It may be a motion, a gesture, conduct or demonstration, or anything else which evidences reasonably a present design to take the life of the defendant, or do him great bodily harm. Trifles, light as air when viewed alone, may become fraught with deadly meaning when viewed in connection with all the preceding facts disclosed and with all the evidence in the case.

"(12) I charge you, gentlemen of the jury, that there is no evidence in this case tending to prove the general bad character of John Griffin, and in the absence of such evidence the law presumes that he is a man of general good character, and that the presumption of a good character goes with him to the jury as a matter of evidence, and may be considered by you, in connection with all the other evidence in the case. It may be sufficient to create in your mind a reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt requiring his acquittal.

"(13) If the jury believe from the evidence that on the day of the fatal difficulty the defendant approached the deceased in a peaceable manner for the purpose of adjusting or explaining the previous difficulties, or getting such explanation from the deceased, and for such purpose showed him the letter admitted in evidence in this cause, and thereupon there arose a controversy between the deceased and the defendant, and the defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty, and did not fight willingly, and that the deceased made a demonstration such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man the honest belief that defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm, and that it was necessary to shoot in order to protect himself from such danger, even though such danger was not real, but was apparent only, and there was no reasonable way of escape or retreat without increasing his peril, and it did create such honest belief in the mind of defendant, even though such danger was not real, but only apparent, and that there was no reasonable way of escape or retreat without increasing his peril, and that thereupon under such circumstances the defendant shot and killed the deceased, then the defendant would not be guilty.

"(14) If the jury believe from the evidence that Jeffie Hughey was a man who had the general character in the community in which he lived as that of a quarrelsome, violent, and turbulent man, and as that of a man who went habitually armed, and for two or three years prior to the fatal difficulty he had numerous difficulties with the defendant, and made numerous threats against the defendant to take his life, or to do him great bodily harm, and that such threats and difficulties continued up to a short time before the fatal difficulty, and that on the day of the fatal difficulty the defendant approached the deceased in a peaceable manner for the purpose of adjusting the previous difficulty, or of getting such explanation from the deceased, and for such purpose showed him the letter admitted in evidence in this cause, and that thereupon there arose a controversy between the defendant and the deceased, and that the defendant was without fault in bringing on the difficulty, and did not fight willingly, and that the deceased then and there made a demonstration such as to create in the mind of a reasonable man the honest belief that the defendant was in imminent danger of death or great bodily harm at the hands of...