Griffin v. State
| Decision Date | 08 December 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 3-480A102,3-480A102 |
| Citation | 413 N.E.2d 293 |
| Parties | Robert A. GRIFFIN a/k/a Paul Griffin, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Charles F. Leonard, Deputy Public Defender, Fort Wayne, for appellant.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Wesley T. Wilson, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
The defendant was convicted of arson, a class B felony, and now challenges the sufficiency of the evidence, specifically alleging that (1) the State failed to prove the fire was caused by arson and (2) the evidence did not prove that the defendant was, in any way, responsible for the fire. On appeal, this Court must consider the evidence most favorable to the State and the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. If, from that point of view, there is substantial evidence of probative value from which the trier of fact could reasonably infer that the appellant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime for which he was convicted, then the judgment of the trier of fact will be affirmed. Robinson v. State (1974), 262 Ind. 463, 317 N.E.2d 850.
In this case, the evidence clearly shows that a fire occurred at R-V World on July 11, 1978, resulting in a pecuniary loss in excess of $20,000. The cause of that fire was greatly disputed at trial. The structure destroyed in the fire was a recreational vehicle dealership. The front portion of the building contained a showroom and offices, and, in the rear, were two service areas. The State contended that the fire was started in the manager's office by using gasoline as an accelerant. The defense presented evidence of numerous electrical problems throughout the building and alleged the fire was accidentally caused by an electrical failure. Two expert witnesses testified on behalf of the prosecution on this issue. The first, an electrical engineer, stated that "no electrical fire started in the area of this manager's office." However, on cross-examination, this witness said he could not rule out electrical fault elsewhere in the building as the cause of the fire. The second witness, a chemist, determined that, based on the burn patterns in the office and a rainbow effect which was created when the floor was washed with water, the fire was a result of arson. In contrast, the defense presented a chemist as an expert witness who stated that the site samples used in the State's chemical analysis were contaminated and, therefore, invalid. He also explained that the rainbow effect and the burn patterns resulted from the many petroleum products which were used in the service area and had been stored in the area of the manager's office. In addition, numerous employees of R-V World testified concerning many electrical defects which existed in the building prior to the fire.
The cause of the fire is a factual question which was decided by the jury adversely to the defendant. On appeal, this Court may not reweigh the evidence or determine the credibility of witnesses. The law of Indiana presumes that a fire accidentally resulted from some providential cause, rather than from a criminal cause, unless the evidence proves otherwise. Fox v. State (1979), Ind.App., 384 N.E.2d 1159, at 1166. The detection of arson following a fire is a difficult scientific examination. Because the jury's conclusion on this issue is supported by adequate evidence from the State's expert chemical and electrical witnesses, this Court will not disturb that decision.
The second aspect of the defendant's challenge centers on his involvement with the fire. The only direct evidence offered by the prosecution proved that the defendant was at R-V World at the time the fire occurred. The defendant presented the following explanation of his presence. The defendant was the general manager of R-V World and a sign by the front door of the building gave his telephone number as the number to be called in case of emergency. Shortly after 11:00 P.M. on July 11, 1978, the defendant received a telephone call informing him that the lights at the dealership were blinking on and off. He had given his keys to another employee earlier in the evening and thus, could not get into the building to correct the problem. He called Mr. Morris, the service manager at R-V World, and drove over to his home to borrow his keys. The defendant then went...
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...he intended only to assert what he viewed as a constitutional right. Motive is not an essential element of a crime. Griffin v. State (1980), Ind.App., 413 N.E.2d 293, 295. Although evidence of motive has been found admissible and probative, Biggerstaff v. State (1982), Ind., 432 N.E.2d 34, ......
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