Griffin v. State, 18A02-9609-CR-602

• Decision Date: 30 April 1998
• Docket Number: No. 18A02-9609-CR-602,18A02-9609-CR-602
• Citation: 694 N.E.2d 304
• Parties: Eddie GRIFFIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

Page 304

694 N.E.2d 304

Eddie GRIFFIN, Appellant-Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Plaintiff.

No. 18A02-9609-CR-602.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

April 30, 1998.

Geoffrey A. Rivers, Muncie, for Appellant-Defendant.

Jeffrey A. Modisett, Attorney General, Preston W. Black, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, for Appellee-Plaintiff.

OPINION ON REHEARING

KIRSCH, Judge.

In a published decision issued February 10, 1998, we held that principles of double jeopardy did not preclude Griffin's retrial for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery following his earlier acquittal of felony murder. Griffin v. State, 692 N.E.2d 468 (1998). We also declined to consider Griffin's collateral estoppel claim based upon our belief that Griffin did not present the issue to the trial court. Griffin seeks rehearing, claiming that he properly presented the collateral estoppel claim to the trial court and that our double jeopardy holding is erroneous. We grant rehearing to decide the merits of Griffin's collateral estoppel claim and deny rehearing on the double jeopardy issue.

Griffin claims that the State was collaterally estopped from retrying him for robbery and conspiracy to commit robbery following his acquittal of felony murder. Even though, as we have determined, the offenses are not the same for double jeopardy purposes, the State may still be collaterally estopped from prosecuting them. See Segovia v. State, 666 N.E.2d 105, 107 (Ind.Ct.App.1996). This court has explained the collateral estoppel doctrine as follows:

"Collateral estoppel is not the same as double jeopardy, but rather it is embodied within the protection against double jeopardy. The traditional bar of jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of the crime itself, whereas collateral estoppel, in a more modest fashion, simply forbids the government from relitigating certain facts in order to establish the fact of the crime. In order to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel, the court must engage in a two step analysis: (1) determine what the first judgment decided; and (2) examine how that determination bears on the second case. Determining what the first judgment decided involves an examination of the record of the prior proceedings including the pleadings, evidence, charge and any other relevant matters. The court must then decide whether a reasonable jury could have based its verdict upon any factor other than the factor of which the defendant seeks to foreclose consideration. If the jury could have based its decision on another factor, then collateral estoppel does not bar relitigation."

Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Griffin contends that his acquittal of felony murder necessarily includes a determination that he "did not kill David Turner during the course of a robbery resulting in serious bodily injury to Mr. Turner, nor did he aid, induce or cause another person to do so." Appellant's Brief at 15. Griffin further contends that the State is "estopped from attempting to prove Eddie Griffin was involved in Mr. Turner's death or that he was involved in a robbery resulting in serious bodily injury." ...