Griffin v. State, 580

Citation415 N.E.2d 60,275 Ind. 107
Decision Date27 January 1981
Docket NumberNo. 580,580
PartiesJefferson GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. S 121.
CourtSupreme Court of Indiana

Harriette Bailey Conn, Public Defender of Indiana, David P. Freund, Deputy Public Defender, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., George B. Huff, Jr., Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.

PIVARNIK, Justice.

Defendant-appellant Jefferson Griffin was charged in Jay Circuit Court with Class C burglary, Ind.Code § 35-43-2-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and with being a habitual criminal under § 35-50-2-8. Griffin was tried to a jury and convicted on the burglary charge. In a bifurcated proceeding, he was found to be a habitual criminal. The trial court first sentenced appellant to an eight-year term on the burglary count, and then added the obligatory thirty years for the habitual criminal finding. This appeal followed.

Appellant Griffin raises ten issues for our consideration, concerning: (1) whether the trial court improperly assisted the State in preparing its case; (2) whether the trial court erred in denying Griffin's motion for a psychological evaluation; (3) whether the trial court erred in admitting State's exhibits three and four into evidence; (4) whether the trial court erred in denying Griffin's motion in limine and in overruling his objections to testimony which related to the subject matter of that motion; (5) whether the trial court erred in refusing to grant a mistrial due to the prosecutor's allegedly improper final argument; (6) whether the trial court erred in admitting State's exhibits A through D in the habitual criminal phase; (7) whether the trial court erred in giving final instruction number seventeen in the habitual criminal proceeding, and in ordering counsel not to mention certain matters in arguments to the jury; (8) whether the trial court erred in giving final instructions 6A through 6C in the habitual criminal phase; (9) whether the guilty verdict on the burglary count is supported by sufficient evidence; and (10) whether the eight-year term for the burglary conviction violated appellant's right against double jeopardy.

The record reveals that appellant Jefferson Griffin and his brother, Frank Griffin, were apprehended at approximately 11:30 p. m. inside the Redkey Community Church. Investigating officers had discovered bootprints in the snow leading from a parked car to a door of the church. The door had been pried open to gain entry. The Griffins' footwear matched the impressions in the snow. A screw-driver and flashlight were discovered in Jefferson Griffin's possession, and a crowbar and a flashlight were discovered in Frank Griffin's possession. Police officers discovered several items strewn about the pulpit area, but the minister of the church testified that nothing was taken.

I.

Appellant first argues that the trial court improperly assisted the prosecution in the preparation of its case. Griffin asserts that the trial judge advised the prosecutor at the pretrial conference concerning certain questions of evidence. He contends such counselling constituted a breach of the trial judge's duty to remain impartial.

While we agree with appellant's assertion that the trial judge must refrain from acting with partiality, see Brandon v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 365; Brannum v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 51, 366 N.E.2d 1180, the record here simply does not show improper conduct on the part of the trial court. The only reference in the record to this matter shows the following:

"Also brief discussion is had of the required certified record referring to Trial Rule 44 and Indiana Code § 34-1-17-7, at which point Mr. Ludy objects to the discussion of record keeping standards, indicating that the same amounts to assistance of the court to the State, and the objection is overruled."

Record at 136. It is appellant's obligation to provide us with an adequate record which clearly shows the alleged error of which he complains. See generally Flewallen v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 90, 368 N.E.2d 239. This record plainly does not show that the trial court acted in a prejudicial or otherwise improper manner.

II.

Appellant Griffin next alleges the trial court erred in denying his motion for a psychological evaluation. The record reveals that Griffin filed a motion for a determination of competence to stand trial, pursuant to Ind.Code § 35-5-3.1-1 (Burns 1979 Repl.), and a special plea of insanity, under § 35-5-2-1. In response to the competency issue, the trial court ordered an examination of Griffin by two psychiatrists, see § 35-5-3.1-1, and held an evidentiary hearing on the question of Griffin's ability to understanding the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense. Part of the record of these proceedings are the reports filed by the two examining psychiatrists. Both experts concluded that Griffin understood the charges against him and is not suffering from a metal disease or illness. They also concluded that Griffin has an antisocial personality, but that he was competent to stand trial. Accordingly, the trial court ruled that Griffin had the ability to understand the proceedings and assist in the preparation of his defense.

Thereafter, Griffin, by his new counsel, filed a "Motion for In-Depth Psychological Evaluation" at a State mental health facility. The sole basis for this motion was "the interests of justice." On the following day, the trial court held that the testimony and evaluation made by the two psychiatrists constituted sufficient compliance with § 35-5-2-2, and that Griffin had shown no justification for any further examination and evaluation. The court then denied Griffin's motion. Appellant now claims the court's refusal to order further examination at state expense hampered his preparation of his insanity defense.

Generally, the appointment of experts to assist in the preparation of the defense is a matter committed to the trial court's discretion. To show reversible error, appellant must show that the trial court's decision on this question constituted an abuse of discretion. Roberts v. State, (1978) 268 Ind. 127, 373 N.E.2d 1103. See Norris v. State, (1979) Ind., 394 N.E.2d 144; Owen v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 376; Murphy v. State, (1976) 256 Ind. 116, 352 N.E.2d 479. In the case before us, the trial court appointed two psychiatrists to examine Griffin to determine his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the commission of this offense. Both concluded that he was legally sane. Appellant has not shown that the psychiatrists' evaluations were improper or inadequate, nor has he shown how additional examinations by additional court-appointed experts would have changed matters in any way. A boilerplate assertion that the additional examinations were required "in the interests of justice" is not sufficient to show an abuse of discretion by the trial court in failing to order additional examinations at state expense. Roberts v. State, supra. See Norton v. State, (1980) Ind., 408 N.E.2d 514, 525; Bell v. State, (1977) 267 Ind. 1, 6-7, 366 N.E.2d 1156, 1159. This issue is without merit.

III.

Griffin contends certain items of physical evidence were erroneously admitted into evidence by the trial court. State's exhibits three and four, a flashlight and a pry bar, were admitted into evidence after testimony established that these items were found in the possession of appellant's companion at the scene of the crime. Appellant now asserts that, because these exhibits were not shown to have been in his possession they should not have been admitted as evidence against him.

We hold the trial court did not err in admitting these exhibits. These items were clearly relevant to show the commission of a burglary. See Hill v. State, (1979) Ind., 395 N.E.2d 132. Their possession by Griffin's companion does not diminish their relevance to prove his guilt. The acts of the defendant's partner were fully attributable to the defendant. E. g., Irons v. State, (1979) Ind., 397 N.E.2d 603; Proctor v. State, (1979) Ind., 397 N.E.2d 980; Rogers v. State, (1979) Ind., 396 N.E.2d 348; Barnes v. State, (1978) 269 Ind. 76, 378 N.E.2d 839. Thus, the possession and use of the pry bar and the flashlight by Griffin's cohort and, hence, the items themselves were probative on the question of Griffin's participation in the burglary. These exhibits were properly admitted.

IV.

Appellant argues the trial court erred in denying his motion in limine and overruling his objections to questions asked of him on cross-examination. Griffin requested in his motion in limine that the State be ordered not to cross-examine him for impeachment purposes concerning the prior convictions which were alleged in the habitual criminal information. This motion was overruled. During the trial on the burglary charge, Griffin took the witness stand on his own behalf. He testified that he had no memory of the crime in question. On cross-examination, the prosecutor asked Griffin if he had been convicted of burglary on April 9, 1976, in Shelby County, Indiana. After defense counsel's objection was overruled, Griffin answered affirmatively. The prosecutor then asked Griffin if he had been convicted of possession of stolen property on June 7, 1974, in Rush County, Indiana. Counsel's objection was again overruled, and Griffin again answered affirmatively. In the bifurcated habitual offender proceeding, documentary evidence of these convictions was admitted to show that Griffin was a habitual criminal.

Appellant contends the State should not have been allowed to force him to admit under oath that he had committed the crimes which were alleged in the habitual criminal count. He asserts that permitting this question placed him in the position of either not taking the witness stand in his own defense, or taking the witness stand and, in effect, helping the State prove the essential elements of the habitual criminal...

To continue reading

Request your trial
61 cases
  • Lowery v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • June 4, 1985
    ...Indiana, appointment of experts to assist the defense is a matter reversed only on a showing of abuse of discretion. Griffin v. State, (1981) 275 Ind. 107, 415 N.E.2d 60; Owen v. State, (1979) 272 Ind. 122, 396 N.E.2d 376. The same standard is applicable to capital cases wherein the accused......
  • State v. Costello
    • United States
    • West Virginia Supreme Court
    • April 2, 2021
    ...jury. Other courts, however, have considered this question. The Supreme Court of Indiana examined this issue in Griffin v. State , 275 Ind. 107, 118-19, 415 N.E.2d 60, 67 (1981) and provided the following rationale:Permitting the jury to determine whether Griffin's prior convictions, for th......
  • State v. Olin
    • United States
    • Idaho Supreme Court
    • July 9, 1982
    ...must be provided by the state. Such a review necessarily involves the exercise of the sound discretion of the trial court. Griffin v. State, 415 N.E.2d 60 (Ind.1981); State v. Burnett, 222 Kan. 162, 563 P.2d 451, 454 (1977); see Annot., 34 A.L.R.3d 1256, 1269-72 (1970); cf. State v. Kerriga......
  • Underhill v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • December 3, 1981
    ...may be made by the deputy of the caretaker of the documents. Ind.R.Tr.P. 44(A)(1). There was no reversible error here. Griffin v. State, (1981) Ind., 415 N.E.2d 60; Eldridge v. State, (1977) 266 Ind. 134, 361 N.E.2d Defendant's assertion that the documents did not establish he was "convicte......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT