Griffin v. State, 15809.

• Decision Date: 19 April 1933
• Docket Number: No. 15809.,15809.
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. STATE.
• Court: Texas Court of Criminal Appeals

61 S.W.2d 509

GRIFFIN v. STATE.

No. 15809.

Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas.

April 19, 1933.

Rehearing Denied June 21, 1933.

Appeal from District Court, Coleman County; E. J. Miller, Judge.

Hale Griffin was convicted of selling intoxicating liquor, and he appeals.

Affirmed.

Baker & Baker, of Coleman, for appellant.

Lloyd W. Davidson, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.

HAWKINS, Judge.

Conviction is for selling intoxicating liquor; punishment, one year in the penitentiary.

This is the second appeal. Result of the first is reported in 119 Tex. Cr. R. 235, 45 S.W.(2d) 617, in which the facts are detailed at some length, and will not be repeated unless it is desirable in discussing some of the bills of exception. The state's evidence makes out a case. The defense was an alibi; it being claimed that appellant was sick at home and not present at the time and place of the alleged crime.

In bill of exception No. 1 appellant complains that he was not permitted to have an answer from Mayes, the alleged purchaser of the liquor, to the following question: "You got up of your own free will and came and did not expect anything?" which he expected the witness to answer in the affirmative. The court sustained the state's objection that the question called for repetition. The qualification to the bill refers us to the statement of facts for cross-examination of the witness Mayes. This shows he testified that at the time of the alleged purchase he was a state ranger; that at the time of the trial he was living at Melvin, Ark., and came from there to Coleman, Tex., to testify. We quote a part of his testimony on the point to which the bill relates: "I have been a State Ranger since 1923. As such officer I knew there was no way to force me to come from Arkansas to the State of Texas to testify. Sure I knew that. I came of my own free will; sure I did. I came of my own free will and accord. Nobody promised to pay me anything to come; I did not expect anything. Nobody has intimated or promised to pay me anything for my trouble in coming over here. I do not expect to get anything for it and I do not want anything for it."

The court properly sustained the state's objection. It was merely a repetition appellant was asking for.

The records on this and the former appeal show that Mayes claimed to have bought the liquor in question from some one at the Hambright Filling Station, and that the seller said his name was Will Hambright, that an indictment was returned against Hambright and upon the trial of that case Mayes was confused as to the name of the alleged seller but not as to the identity, and that when he was asked by the district attorney if the defendant then on trial, Will Hambright, was the party who sold him the whisky, he promptly answered, "No," and said the party who had sold him the whisky had been in the courtroom and identified Griffin, this appellant, as the man from whom he had actually purchased the whisky. Bills of exception 2, 3, 4, and 5 all relate to examination of the witness Mayes with reference to his testimony given in the Hambright Case, or to his identification of appellant as the actual seller of the liquor. It is unnecessary to discuss the bills in detail, as it would extend this opinion to unreasonable lengths. Under the circumstances stated we discover no error in the ruling of the court in the matter complained of in any of said bills.

On cross-examination of Mayes appellant had sought to put him in the position of a voluntary witness who had come from the state of Arkansas to Coleman, Tex., to testify against appellant. Bill of exception 6 shows complaint because the state developed from the witness that he was under process in the case and had never been discharged. Bill of exception 7 relates to the same subject, and shows objection to the witness testifying that the district attorney had written him two letters, and to the further statement of the witness that his work had caused him to be shifting about and moving a good deal. We see nothing objectionable in the matters disclosed by either of the bills.

Appellant complains in bill of exception 8 because the district attorney proved by the prosecuting witness that at the time of the alleged offense he was working for the sheriff of Coleman county and at the time held a commission as a state ranger. We see nothing objectionable in this testimony; the same thing was testified to by the sheriff without objection.

The matter proposed to be proved by the prosecuting witness on cross-examination as shown in bill of exception 9 had already been sworn to by him, as shown by the statement of facts. Having testified to the fact once, there was no necessity of having him repeat it.

Dr. Anders testified that he was appellant's physician, and that on the date of the alleged sale he knew appellant was sick in bed and did not think he was able to go from his home to the Hambright...