Griffin v. State

• Decision Date: 11 September 2014
• Docket Number: No. 71A03–1311–CR–458.,71A03–1311–CR–458.
• Citation: 16 N.E.3d 997
• Parties: Lee Travis GRIFFIN, Appellant–Defendant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.
• Court: Indiana Appellate Court

16 N.E.3d 997

Lee Travis GRIFFIN, Appellant–Defendant

v.STATE of Indiana, Appellee–Plaintiff.

No. 71A03–1311–CR–458.

Court of Appeals of Indiana.

Sept. 11, 2014.

Stanley F. Wruble III, South Bend, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Gregory F. Zoeller, Attorney General of Indiana, Michael Gene Worden, Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee.

OPINION

NAJAM

, Judge.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Lee Travis Griffin appeals his convictions for robbery, as a Class A felony; burglary, as a Class A felony; and felony murder, following a jury trial. Griffin presents three issues for review:

1. Whether the State presented sufficient evidence to support his conviction for robbery.

2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing the State to present autopsy photographs.

3. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to give a proffered jury instruction.

We affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On the night of December 27, 2012, Tyler Jordan, Autumn Jordan, and Christine Jordan gathered at the home of Kent and Sandra Price (“the home”), who are relatives of the Jordans. Also present at the home was Kent's daughter, Klarisa, and a few of her friends.

At approximately 9:30 p.m., Tyler made his way from the home's second-floor bedroom to the home's first floor kitchen, located at the rear of the home. While there, Tyler heard a knock on the back door, which entered into the kitchen. When Tyler pulled back the door's curtains to see outside, Walter Neely forced open the door and entered the home. Neely grabbed a knife from the kitchen butcher block and cut Tyler's hands before pushing him to the floor. Four other men, including Griffin, then entered the home wearing ski or surgical masks.¹

After the men entered, one of the men climbed on top of Tyler, placed his hand over Tyler's mouth, and instructed him “to shut up, to be quiet.” Tr. at 126 (Sept. 10–11, 2013) (hereinafter “Sept. 10 Tr.”).² While some of the other men went upstairs, this man, armed with a revolver, took Tyler to the basement. Tyler blacked out for a time soon thereafter and, while he could not specifically recall, he subsequently reported that he believed his attacker had knocked him unconscious.

When Tyler regained consciousness, he “didn't look up” but heard the man searching the basement. Id. at 128. The man noticed that Tyler was awake and asked Tyler whether he or his uncle knew the codes to the Prices' safes. The man then went upstairs, but, before doing so, he pointed his gun at Tyler, cocked it, and commanded him, “[D]on't move or I'll kill you.” Id. Tyler could hear screaming and stomping emanating from the home's upper levels.

Thereafter, at least two men—Neely and the man with the gun—“busted through the door” to a second-floor bedroom where everyone but Klarisa and her friends had gathered. Id. at 167. The two men stormed into the room. Kent was knocked down, and Christine, who jumped onto Neely, was “slung” to the ground. Id. Neely swung at both Kent and Christine with the knife. The second man pointed the gun at Christine, threatened her life, and ordered her to the bathroom. He also threatened to kill Sandra.

The men demanded money, jewelry, guns, and the home's safes, and they ransacked the bedroom. Meanwhile, a third intruder, also armed with a knife, made his way to the third-floor bedroom where Klarisa and her friends were located. The man searched the room for valuables, taking several items, but did not locate Klarisa or her friends, who hid when they heard the commotion below.

At some point, Klarisa and her friends were able to call 9–1–1. Christine had also managed to call 9–1–1. Officers with the South Bend Police Department responded to the calls and surrounded the home. As the intruders attempted to flee the home, the police apprehended them. Griffin was among those apprehended, and he was still inside the house when the police ordered him out. Griffin, accompanied by another intruder, exited through the home's rear entrance. When officers arrested him, Griffin wore black clothes and a surgical mask but was unarmed.

When the officers entered the home, they discovered Kent and Sandra had sustained serious injuries from knife wounds

from Neely's attack. Sandra subsequently died from her injuries, which included a wound to her neck. The officers also found several items of property collected at the rear door of the home and a black duffel bag full of the Prices' property in the dining room.

Officers transported Griffin to the South Bend Police Department. En route, without being prompted or questioned, Griffin repeatedly expressed that he knew he had acted wrongfully and stated that “he messed up, he messed up, he even drug his brothers into this.” Id. at 55. While awaiting formal questioning at the station, Griffin talked to himself, and he expressed his belief that no confession would be needed because he and his confederates had been caught, would tell the same story, and he would go to prison.

The following day, the State charged Griffin with two counts of robbery and two counts of burglary, all as Class A felonies. After Sandra died, the State amended its information and charged Griffin with two counts of felony murder, which corresponded to the State's allegations that Griffin had committed robbery and burglary against Sandra. The State's allegations of robbery were based on a theory of accomplice liability.

The court held Griffin's jury trial on September 10 through September 12, 2013. At trial, the State called Dr. Joseph Prahlow, a forensic pathologist, to testify regarding Sandra's cause of death. During the examination, the State offered Exhibits 42, 43, and 44, which were autopsy photographs that depicted the knife wounds

to Sandra's face and neck. Griffin objected to the admission of these photographs on the basis that they were gruesome and showed medically-altered wounds. The trial court admitted the photographs over Griffin's objection.

At the close of trial, Griffin proffered to the trial court his Jury Instruction No. 1, which read:

In determining whether the guilt of the accused is proven beyond a reasonable doubt, you should require that the proof be so conclusive as to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.

Appellant's App. at 117. The trial court concluded that Griffin's proposed Jury Instruction No. 1 required a prior finding “that the only evidence on the actus reus of the offense was circumstantial,” which the court did not consider appropriate. Tr. at 4

–5 (Sept. 12, 2013) (hereinafter “Sept. 12 Tr.”). Thus, the court refused to give Griffin's proposed instruction.

The jury convicted Griffin on all counts. The trial court entered its judgment of conviction on Count II (robbery of Kent), Count IV (burglary with injury to Tyler), and Count V (felony murder, with the underlying felony being the robbery of Sandra).

On October 11, 2013, the court ordered Griffin to serve thirty years on Count II, thirty years on Count IV, and fifty-five years on Count V, which were to be served consecutively for a total aggregate term of 115 years. This appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

Issue One: Sufficiency of the Evidence

Griffin first contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to support his robbery conviction. In essence, Griffin maintains that the evidence shows only that: (1) at best, he was merely present at entry and on the first floor of the home and was not a direct participant in the robberies, which occurred on other floors of the home; and (2) for the same reason, he had no knowledge that the robberies were being perpetrated. Our standard of review for sufficiency of the evidence claims is well-settled. Tobar v. State, 740 N.E.2d 109, 111 (Ind.2000)

.

In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we examine only the probative evidence and reasonable inferences that support the verdict. We do not assess witness credibility, nor do we reweigh the evidence to determine if it was sufficient to support a conviction. Under our appellate system, those roles are reserved for the finder of fact. Instead, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the trial court ruling and affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.

Pillow v. State, 986 N.E.2d 343, 344 (Ind.Ct.App.2013)

(citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In order to prove robbery, as a Class A felony, the State was required to show that Griffin knowingly or intentionally took property from another person, or from the presence of another person, by force or threat of force on any person or by putting any person in fear, which resulted in serious bodily injury to someone other than Griffin. Ind.Code § 35–42–5–1

. The State charged Griffin as an accomplice, and “[a] person who knowingly or intentionally aids, induces, or causes another person to commit an offense commits that offense....” Ind.Code § 35–41–2–4. Therefore, “[i]t is not necessary that the evidence show the accomplice personally participated in the commission of each element of the offense.” Wilson v. State, 455 N.E.2d 1120, 1123 (Ind.1983). “[T]he acts of one accomplice are imputed to all.” Collier v. State, 470 N.E.2d 1340, 1342 (Ind.1984). So long as the State shows that one participated in the commission of an offense as an accomplice, the accomplice “is criminally responsible for everything which follows incidentally in the execution of the common design, as one of its natural and probable consequences, even though it was not intended as part of the original design or common plan....” Johnson v. State, 605 N.E.2d 762, 765 (Ind.Ct.App.1992) (citations and quotations omitted), trans. denied.

“The particular facts and circumstances of each case must be considered in determining whether a person participated in the commission of an offense as an accomplice.” Peterson v. State, 699 N.E.2d 701, 706 (Ind.Ct.App.1998)

. For Griffin's conviction to stand, “there must be evidence...