Griffin v. State

• Decision Date: 21 January 1988
• Docket Number: No. 86-295,86-295
• Citation: 749 P.2d 246
• Parties: Carol L. GRIFFIN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 246

749 P.2d 246

Carol L. GRIFFIN, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 86-295.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

Jan. 21, 1988.

Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Martin J. McClain (argued), Deputy State Public Defender, Julie D. Naylor, Appellate Counsel, for appellant.

Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., John W. Renneisen, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Asst. Atty. Gen. (argued), for appellee.

Before BROWN, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, URBIGKIT and MACY, JJ.

CARDINE, Justice.

Following a jury trial upon a charge of first-degree murder, appellant Carol Griffin was convicted, for killing her husband, of voluntary manslaughter in violation of § 6-2-105(a)(i), W.S.1977, which provides:

"(a) A person is guilty of manslaughter if he unlawfully kills any human being without malice, expressed or implied, either:

"(i) Voluntarily, upon a sudden heat of passion * * *."

She received a sentence of eight to ten years in the Wyoming Women's Center.

On appeal, she states the issues as:

1. "Was the competent evidence presented to the jury insufficient to sustain the conviction of voluntary manslaughter."

2. "Was the introduction of Appellant's request for an attorney and her subsequent statements reversible error."

3. "Did the trial court improperly limit voir dire."

4. "Was it error for the Court to refuse proffered jury instruction F."

We affirm.

The critical question presented for our review is whether there was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's voluntary manslaughter conviction. Appellant contends she was a battered wife who in self-defense shot and killed her husband. We must abide by our established rule that after conviction, on appeal, we view all the evidence in a light most favorable to the State, drawing all possible, reasonable inferences therefrom to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found, beyond a reasonable doubt, the elements of the crime necessary for conviction. If, after viewing the evidence in this light, there exists sufficient evidence to support a conviction, the jury's verdict of conviction must be affirmed. Capshaw v. State, Wyo., 737 P.2d 740 (1987); Dangel v. State, Wyo., 724 P.2d 1145 (1986).

" 'Stated another way--it is not whether the evidence establishes guilt beyond a reasonable doubt for us, but rather whether it is sufficient to form the basis for a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt to be drawn by the jury when the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the State.' " Grabill v. State, Wyo., 621 P.2d 802, 803 (1980), quoting Harvey v. State, Wyo., 596 P.2d 1386, 1387 (1979). See also Polston v. State, Wyo., 685 P.2d 1 (1984).

It is claimed that appellant is a battered wife, i.e., a woman so physically, emotionally and psychologically destroyed by continuous, severe beatings that she has become an emotional cripple, unable to resist, unable to act, fearful of leaving, believing there is nowhere to turn and no one to help, unable to contemplate divorce or separation, who in utter desperation kills her husband. Thus it is said:

"Battered women have traditionally been reluctant to seek help. If 'seeking help' would not protect her from further physical abuse and if there was no place to go to escape from the assaults, then what was the use of seeking help? For many years this was the plight a battered woman faced. All too often these women have been ashamed of being victims of spouse abuse. They have endured repeated assaults because of an overriding desire to keep the family together, uncertainty over where to get legal aid and social work services, fear of poverty, guilt that they are in some way to blame for the abuse, and fear of intensified physical reprisals if they left home or filed a complaint against the husband." A. Roberts, Sheltering Battered Women, at 7 (1981).

Appellant hardly qualifies for what the literature describes as a battered wife. She was not afraid to contact the police, having done so on five prior occasions. Each time the police came to their residence, there was an argument between the parties over who had done what, who was at fault; and in each instance appellant was enormously drunk. She had pushed Clyde Griffin out of the house on several occasions, fought with him and cut him with a broken bottle and knife, had employed a lawyer and entered into two separation agreements. The parties were separated at the time of the shooting. She had been married four times prior to this marriage to the deceased, three of those marriages ending in divorce. She knew how to get out of her marriage without killing Clyde Griffin. She could hardly have believed it necessary to kill him to terminate the relationship.

FACTS

The appellant, Carol Griffin, married the deceased, Clyde Griffin, on July 1, 1983. It was appellant's fifth marriage and the deceased's first. The marriage, marked by alcohol abuse, separation and acts of violence by both husband and wife, ended with the death of Clyde Griffin on January 26, 1986.

The events leading to the killing began when David Lopez, Jeanette Alphin, Charles Kellogg and appellant met the evening of January 25, 1986, at appellant's mobile home in Cowley, Wyoming, to celebrate the birthday of Lopez. Everyone except Kellogg had been drinking before they moved the celebration to Powell, Wyoming. They returned to Cowley about midnight, and the party continued at Kellogg's mobile home until about 2:45 a.m. Sunday. Appellant remained at Kellogg's home until about 6:00 a.m. She and Kellogg then went to the appellant's home where, at 6:38 a.m., she telephoned Clyde at the ranch house near Byron where he was staying during the couple's separation. Ten or fifteen minutes later, Clyde called back to ask for help in getting a vehicle out of a ditch. Appellant and Kellogg traveled to the ranch bringing appellant's gun with them.

Appellant, Clyde and Kellogg practiced shooting the gun. It was the first time appellant had fired the gun. Kellogg and appellant then returned to appellant's home about 9:30 a.m. Kellogg cleaned the gun, reloaded it and placed it on a coffee table in appellant's living room.

At about 10:00 a.m., a neighbor, Melvin Buck, drove Clyde to appellant's home. Buck found Clyde to be friendly and calm. Clyde entered the trailer house, accused Kellogg of "bird dogging" his wife, and ordered Kellogg out of the mobile home. Kellogg started to leave when the appellant fired the gun, its bullet hitting a closet. Kellogg heard Clyde say: "[Y]ou are not going to shoot me, are you, Carol?" and before he reached the bottom of the steps, the appellant fired a second shot, striking and killing Clyde.

Appellant called the Big Horn County Sheriff's office in Lovell and informed the dispatcher that she had just shot her husband. Two deputies arrived at the mobile home five minutes later to find Clyde slumped against a wall, dead. While traveling to the sheriff's office in Lovell, appellant stated she would like to speak to an attorney and was advised that an attorney would be provided. At the sheriff's office, she waived her Miranda rights after they were read to her and was left in the custody of a Lovell police officer until transportation to the Big Horn County jail in Basin could be arranged. Although the officer asked no questions about the shooting incident, appellant started talking about it. When appellant asked if she should lie and say someone else shot Clyde, the officer suggested she say no more until she consulted with an attorney. A blood alcohol test showed her blood alcohol level to be .23 percent some three hours later.

Appellant's trial on the first-degree murder charge began on April 28, 1986. The jury rejected appellant's self-defense justification for the shooting and, on May 7, 1986, found her guilty of the lesser-included offense of voluntary manslaughter under § 6-2-105(a)(i), supra.

SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE

The State's evidence was directed to proof of premeditation, motive and malice necessary to establish murder in the first degree. Thus, witnesses testified that appellant would drink daily in bars, make advances to other men, and other men would come on to her. The deceased's employer, Peterson, testified that "he [Clyde] was upset by her association with other fellows"; that "[h]e handled it much better than I would have," and one morning when Mr. Peterson gave appellant a ride as they drove past Kellogg's trailer, appellant said,

"Carol's down to Kellogg's, and he got out and walked down to the trailer. That was about 8:30.

"Q. In the morning?

"A. In the morning, yes.

"Q. Was--

"A. He was aware that she was staying down there at nights and this bothered him to some extent."

Sandra Folkerts testified:

"Q. Now then, did Clyde ever mention to you the relationship between his wife and Mr. Kellogg?

"A. Yes.

"Q. Was that causing him any concern?

"A. It was causing him a lot of grief, heartache.

* * *

* * *

"A. He came to my house one night and he said that he had been over to Cowley and that Carol was at Chuck's house and he asked her for the checkbook and credit cards, he felt if she was going to have a relationship with Chuck he was not going to continue to support her, I guess, I don't know."

Mr. Garrett testified:

"Q. And did he ever mention any suspicions or fears he may have had about Mr. Kellogg?

"A. He said he felt Mr. Kellogg and Mrs. Griffin were having an affair."

There was also the testimony set forth in the dissent concerning a customer in a bar playing with appellant's breasts. There was not a single objection to any of this testimony. It is not surprising there was no objection, for such evidence is clearly relevant to motive, malice and plan to kill.

Doctor Welch, who saw appellant after their fights, testified: "She was under the influence of alcohol each time," and stated further: "[M]y impression was that she was a pusher, Carol was a pusher. When she would get drunk she would...