Griffin v. State

Decision Date12 March 2015
Docket NumberNo. SC13–2450.,SC13–2450.
PartiesSteve Lawrence GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
CourtFlorida Supreme Court

Howard L. Dimmig, II, Public Defender, and Karen Mary Kinney, Assistant Public Defender, Tenth Judicial Circuit, Bartow, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Tallahassee, FL, Robert Jay Krauss, Bureau Chief, and Dawn A. Tiffin, Assistant Attorney General, Tampa, FL, for Respondent.

Opinion

LABARGA, C.J.

Steve Lawrence Griffin seeks review of the decision of the Second District Court of Appeal in Griffin v. State, 128 So.3d 88 (Fla. 2d DCA 2013), on the ground that it expressly and directly conflicts with a decision of this Court in State v. Montgomery, 39 So.3d 252 (Fla.2010), and decisions of other district courts on a question of law. We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(3), Fla. Const. The question before us is whether the giving of an erroneous manslaughter by act jury instruction cannot be found to be fundamental error if the defendant's sole defense is misidentification. For the reasons that follow, we quash the Second District's decision in Griffin.

BACKGROUND AND FACTS

Griffin was charged with the January 15, 2011, second-degree murder of Thomas Jamar Mills, who was killed by a shotgun blast while sitting in a Ford Expedition vehicle at “The Purple Store” in Sarasota. The evidence showed that Griffin, Mills, and his girlfriend, Ester Deneus, were friends. Griffin did not deny being in his truck parked on the passenger side of Mills' vehicle at The Purple Store. Deneus testified that after getting out of the passenger side of the Expedition and heading toward the store, she heard Griffin say to Mills, “What's up now, TJ?” She heard Mills respond with something to the effect of “What do you mean, what's up?” and “You want to play with guns now?” Deneus testified that she heard a gunshot and saw Griffin pull what appeared to be a long gun back into the driver's side window of his truck and then speed away very quickly.

The State presented evidence that on the day of the shooting, Griffin and Mills had an argument at the home that Mills and Deneus shared, and that Mills physically picked Griffin up and placed him outside the door. According to Deneus, Griffin's pants fell down and everyone laughed. Griffin testified in his own defense that he was good friends with Mills and that they all frequently teased each other and joked around. He told the jury that he was not mad at Mills that day and that he did not hear any laughter when his pants fell down. Griffin also testified that prior to Mills' death, he had observed Mills carrying large amounts of cash as well as drugs, and that on the morning of the shooting, Mills had asked Griffin to deliver some drugs for him, but Griffin refused. According to Griffin, on the evening that the shooting occurred, he was driving with a friend who wanted to go to The Purple Store to buy single cigarettes, which The Purple Store was reported to sell. Griffin testified that he and his friend were in Griffin's truck at an intersection across from where Mills' vehicle was stopped. Griffin said he made a U-turn to go to The Purple Store but denied he did it to follow Mills. Once he made the U-turn, he said he was behind Mills' vehicle and both vehicles pulled into the parking lot of The Purple Store. Griffin testified that he did park next to the passenger side of Mills' vehicle where Deneus exited, and that he and Mills did speak. Griffin said he then closed his window and listened to the radio with the sound “all the way up.” He testified that when he saw an individual wearing a black jacket walk in front of Mills' SUV, pull out a sawed-off shotgun, and shoot Mills, he got scared and drove away.

At the conclusion of the trial, the judge instructed the jury that to prove the crime of second-degree murder, the State must prove that the killing of Mills was by an act imminently dangerous to another and demonstrating a depraved mind without regard for human life. Pursuant to the standard jury instruction for second-degree murder, the judge defined depraved mind, in pertinent part, to include ill will, hatred, spite, or evil intent. Fla. Std. Jury Instr. (Crim.) 7.4. The judge further instructed the jury that to prove second-degree murder, the State did not need to prove the defendant intended to cause death. As to the lesser included offense of manslaughter, the court instructed the jury, in pertinent part, that the State must prove Steve Griffin intentionally caused the death of Thomas J. Mills.” No objection was lodged to this instruction, even though in 2010 we held that the same instruction was erroneous because intent to cause death was not an element of the crime of manslaughter by act.1 Griffin was convicted of second-degree murder and sentenced to forty-five years in prison, with a twenty-five-year minimum mandatory term.

On appeal to the Second District Court of Appeal, Griffin raised this erroneous manslaughter instruction as fundamental error, citing Montgomery. In Montgomery, we held that use of the erroneous 2006 standard jury instruction as to manslaughter by act, requiring that in order to convict for that lesser offense the jury must find that the defendant intended to cause the death of the victim, was fundamental error where the defendant was convicted of a crime no more than one step removed from manslaughter. Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 259. We also explained in Montgomery:

“fundamental error occurs only when the omission is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict.” Failing to instruct on an element of the crime over which the record reflects there was no dispute is not fundamental error and there must be an objection to preserve the issue for appeal.

Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 258 (quoting State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644–45 (Fla.1991) ).

The Second District agreed that the jury instruction on manslaughter given by the trial court in Griffin's case was erroneous. Griffin, 128 So.3d at 89. However, the district court rejected the claim of fundamental error, explaining:

The State also argues that giving the instruction in this case did not constitute fundamental error because the intent element was not disputed at trial. We agree. The supreme court has “long held that fundamental error occurs in a jury instruction where the instruction pertains to a disputed element of the offense and the error is pertinent or material to what the jury must consider to convict.” Haygood v. State, 109 So.3d 735, 741 (Fla.2013) (citing State v. Delva, 575 So.2d 643, 644–45 (Fla.1991) ). This standard is equally applicable in the context of the Montgomery instruction on manslaughter by act. See Daniels v. State, 121 So.3d 409, 409, 417 (Fla.2013) ; Haygood, 109 So.3d at 742 ; Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 258.
In this case, the State presented eyewitness testimony that Griffin pulled up next to the victim's vehicle in a convenience store parking lot and had words with him through the windows. Then Griffin pulled out a long black gun, put it through the window, and shot the victim in the neck where he sat. Griffin's sole defense was mistaken identity. Griffin admitted that he pulled his vehicle up next to the victim's vehicle and had a conversation with him. He claimed that an unknown individual walked between the vehicles to the victim's window, pulled out a shotgun, pointed it at the victim, and shot him.
Griffin did not argue that the manner of the shooting did not establish the requisite intent; he simply argued that he was not the perpetrator. There is no dispute regarding the elements of an offense when the manner of the crime is conceded and the sole defense is mistaken identity. Battle v. State, 911 So.2d 85, 89 (Fla.2005). Because there was no dispute regarding the element of intent, the erroneous jury instruction on the intent element of the lesser included offense of manslaughter did not constitute fundamental error.

Griffin, 128 So.3d at 90. Thus, the district court rejected the claim of fundamental error in Griffin's case because, it concluded, when Griffin claimed misidentification, he failed to place any of the other elements of the offense in dispute, including the element of intent. The Fourth District Court of Appeal has disagreed with the contention that a defense of misidentification concedes the intent by which the homicide was committed. See Wimberly v. State, ––– So.3d ––––, 39 Fla. L. Weekly D1884 (Fla. 4th DCA Sep. 3, 2014) (We do not agree with the State's argument that the issue of intent was not disputed. Although petitioner argued misidentification at trial, he did not concede the intent with which the shooting was committed.”). We are therefore called upon to decide if the Second District was correct when it held that Griffin's sole defense of misidentification conceded, or failed to place in dispute, the issue of intent.

ANALYSIS

The issue in this case presents a pure question of law; thus, our review is de novo. See, e.g., Puglisi v. State, 112 So.3d 1196, 1204 (Fla.2013) ; D'Angelo v. Fitzmaurice, 863 So.2d 311, 314 (Fla.2003). We begin by reaffirming that our precedent requires that, for an unpreserved error in jury instruction to be found fundamental on appeal, the error must be “pertinent or material to what the jury must consider in order to convict.” Montgomery, 39 So.3d at 258 (quoting Delva, 575 So.2d at 645 ). However, we are constrained to hold that a sole defense of misidentification does not concede or fail to place in dispute intent or any other element of the crime charged except identity when the offense charged is an unlawful homicide. The district court concluded that where identity is the defense, [t]here is no dispute regarding the elements of an offense when the manner of the crime is conceded and the sole defense is mistaken identity.”2 Griffin, 128 So.3d at 90. The district court therefore assumed that the “manner of the crime” in this case included the intent...

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