Griffin v. State, A99A2028.

• Decision Date: 14 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. A99A2028.,A99A2028.
• Citation: 531 S.E.2d 175,243 Ga. App. 282
• Parties: GRIFFIN v. The STATE.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

531 S.E.2d 175

243 Ga. App. 282

GRIFFIN v. The STATE.

No. A99A2028.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 14, 2000.

Reconsideration Denied March 30, 2000.

Certiorari Denied September 8, 2000.

Robert L. Waller III, Stone Mountain, for appellant.

Daniel J. Porter, District Attorney, John S. Melvin, Assistant District Attorney, for appellee. SMITH, Judge.

Stacey Darnell Griffin was convicted of kidnapping, robbing, and raping two different women within a span of less than thirty-six hours in the same isolated area in Buford. Following the denial of his motion for new trial, Griffin brought this appeal in which he asserts 13 enumerations of error. Having determined no error occurred, we affirm.

Viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence showed that Griffin tricked the first victim, T.S., into giving him a ride to another person's house. Realizing that she had been deceived, T.S. attempted to make a turn, but Griffin screamed at her, grabbed her neck, and began choking her. Griffin then directed T.S. to drive to Cole Road. When she did not comply, he rammed the gearshift into park and told her he was going to kill her. Begging for her life, she offered Griffin the truck and her purse. He rejected those things and told her he would take what he wanted. Griffin removed the victim's shorts and panties and forced her to have sexual intercourse. When Griffin finished raping her, he ordered her out, then sped off in the victim's truck, leaving her stranded wearing only her socks and tennis shoes. The victim ran into a nearby factory, where workers gave her some cloth in which to wrap herself and called 911. Police took the victim to the Gwinnett Rape Crisis Center.

Less than 36 hours later, Griffin managed to obtain a ride from his next victim, C.C., who was driving to Buford accompanied by her ex-boyfriend, Johnny Vickers, to procure drugs. Griffin directed them to an area of Buford which took them toward Cole Road where he had raped the first victim. Griffin suddenly yanked up the emergency brake, forcing the vehicle into a skid. Griffin pushed the victim's head into the steering wheel and threatened to kill her unless Vickers left. When Vickers ran for help, Griffin directed the victim where to drive. After inquiring whether she had ever been raped before, Griffin ordered her to stop the vehicle and strip, then proceeded to rape her on the hood of the car. During the attack, the victim complained that the hood was extremely hot and was burning her skin. Just as he had done the night before, Griffin left the victim stranded without any clothes while he sped away in a stolen car. Screaming, the victim managed to flag down a passing motorist, and police were summoned.

Meanwhile, Vickers described the perpetrator to police. Based on that description, police suspected Griffin. When Vickers was shown a photo lineup, he selected Griffin's photograph. Another photo lineup was created, and the first victim also identified Griffin as the rapist. Three or four days after the first rape, police discovered the missing truck with the victim's clothes and purse inside. The second victim also identified Griffin as her assailant.

Both victims were examined at the Gwinnett Rape Crisis Center, and both had injuries consistent with being raped. Numerous photographs of T.S.'s injuries documented scratches and bruises on her arms and legs and red marks encircling her neck. Two days after this crime spree, after a chase involving the second vehicle, the stolen car crashed into a ravine, but its driver managed to escape. Investigators dusted the hood for fingerprints and lifted prints that matched Griffin's prints.

1. Griffin contends the trial court erred by refusing to grant his motion to sever the counts.

The decision to grant a motion to sever the trial of criminal offenses rests within the sound discretion of the trial court. Williams v. State, 178 Ga.App. 581, 584(1), 344 S.E.2d 247 (1986). After balancing the interests of the State and those of the accused, a trial court may properly deny a motion to sever when:

the crimes alleged were part of a continuous transaction or series of similar transactions conducted over a relatively short time, and from the nature of the entire transaction, it would be difficult to present to a jury evidence of one of the crimes without also referring to or permitting evidence of the other [crimes].

(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Rocha v. State, 234 Ga.App. 48, 53(5), 506 S.E.2d 192 (1998).

Here, the facts surrounding the two rapes are so similar that even if the two cases had been severed, each would have been admissible in the other case as evidence of a similar transaction. Weaver v. State, 206 Ga.App. 560, 561(1), 426 S.E.2d 41 (1992). The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion to sever. Redding v. State, 219 Ga.App. 182, 184(3), 464 S.E.2d 824 (1995); see Cooper v. State, 253 Ga. 736, 737-738(3), 325 S.E.2d 137 (1985).

2. Griffin claims the trial court erred by striking a juror for cause. We disagree.

Before a juror can be disqualified for cause, it must be shown that an opinion held by the potential juror is so fixed and definite that the juror will be unable to set the opinion aside and decide the case based upon the evidence or the court's charge upon the evidence. [Cits.]

Johnson v. State, 262 Ga. 652, 653(2), 424 S.E.2d 271 (1993).

On the morning of the second day of voir dire, a venireman, who was a retired police officer, gave a note to the bailiff. In this note, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the way the judge was handling the case and voiced his prejudice against the judge. After counsel and the judge met in chambers with him, the trial court observed that this prospective juror believed that due to the court's refusal to allow defense counsel to pose hypothetical questions about a defendant's right not to testify, Griffin "was not going to get a fair trial." The juror conceded that this feeling would carry through the trial and affect his ability to be fair and impartial. Upon further examination by counsel, he confirmed that he did not think the defendant had been treated fairly by the court. He asked to be excused from the case and acknowledged that his feelings would affect his impartiality. In light of this juror's apparently fixed opinion that the judge had not been fair to the defendant, we cannot agree that it was error to excuse this juror for cause. Garland v. State, 263 Ga. 495, 496(1), 435 S.E.2d 431 (1993) (decision to strike a juror for cause rests within the sound discretion of the trial court).

3. Griffin contends the trial court erred in refusing to excuse three prospective jurors for cause. We disagree. Absent proof of a manifest abuse of discretion, a trial court's refusal to strike a juror for cause will not be disturbed. Scott v. State, 193 Ga.App. 577, 578(2), 388 S.E.2d 416 (1989). Moreover, "[t]he fact that a potential juror may have some doubt as to his impartiality, or complete freedom from all bias, does not demand, as a matter of law[,] that the juror be excused for cause." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Wilson v. State, 220 Ga. App. 487, 488(1), 469 S.E.2d 516 (1996). See McClain v. State, 267 Ga. 378, 380-381(1)(a), 477 S.E.2d 814 (1996).

First, Griffin contends the court should have excused for cause a civilian employee of the City of Lilburn Police Department, because she exhibited a hostile attitude toward defense counsel and himself. The transcript, however, indicates that this juror expressly denied that her job would affect her ability to be fair and impartial. Next, Griffin claims the trial court erred in refusing to excuse for cause a registered nurse who stated that as the mother of two daughters similar in age to the victims' ages, she would probably be more sympathetic to the victims. But this juror also stated that she thought she would be fair as a juror and could base her decision solely on the evidence. Finally, Griffin asserts the trial court erred in refusing to excuse for cause a juror who expressed concern about having to listen to graphic details of sexual crimes. While this juror did initially voice some doubt about her ability to be fair and impartial in a sexual violence case, she later testified that she could put aside her feelings of aversion and decide the case based on the evidence. The trial court did not manifestly abuse its discretion in refusing to excuse for cause any of these three jurors. Scott, supra.

4. Griffin contends the trial court erred in admitting his videotaped statement into evidence because it improperly placed his character in issue. Griffin claims that although State's Exhibit 34 "was severely edited by the district attorney with the approval of the judge," the tape was objectionable in any form. In arguing for the exclusion of this evidence, Griffin does not contest the voluntariness of his statement, only that it impermissibly injected his character into the trial. OCGA § 24-2-2.

As a general rule, the admission of evidence is a matter resting within the sound discretion of the trial court, and unless an abuse of that discretion is shown, the court's decision will not be disturbed. Cook v. State, 221 Ga.App. 831, 833(3), 472 S.E.2d 686 (1996). See OCGA § 24-2-2. When portions of the statement being challenged form an integral part of a confession, such incriminating remarks are not rendered inadmissible because a defendant admitted to the commission of another or separate offense. Walker v. State, 264 Ga. 79, 80(3), 440 S.E.2d 637 (1994). Nor does material evidence become inadmissible simply because it incidentally places a defendant's character in issue. Greer v. State, 199 Ga. App. 106, 107(1), 403 S.E.2d 825 (1991). The heavily edited videotape documented a custodial interview conducted after Griffin was arrested on an unrelated battery charge.¹ After being fully apprised of his right against...