Griffin v. State

Decision Date22 January 2013
Docket NumberNos. S12A1945,S12A1946.,s. S12A1945
Citation292 Ga. 321,737 S.E.2d 682
PartiesGRIFFIN v. The STATE. Boyd v. The State.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court


Herbert Adams, Jr., The Adams Law Group, P.C., Jonesboro, for appellant, Desmond Martin Griffin.

Brittany Nicole Jones, Asst. Atty. Gen., Paula Khristian Smith, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Samuel S. Olens, Atty. Gen., Department of Law, Lynda S. Caldwell, Asst. Dist. Atty., Peter J. Skandalakis, Dist. Atty., Office of the District Attorney, for the State.

Jamie Thiel Roberts, Troup County Public Defender, for Charlie Lee Boyd, Jr.

THOMPSON, Presiding Justice.

After a jury trial, appellants Desmond Griffin and Charlie Boyd were found guilty of the felony murder of James Clark based on the underlying felony of aggravated assault. Griffin was also found guilty of separate charges of aggravated assault against Ronald Rosson and the simple battery of Clark. 1 Appellants' motions for new trial were denied, and they appealed to this Court. Finding no reversible error, we affirm.

1. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the jury was authorized to find that in April 2006 Griffin and another man went to Clark's home to collect on a drug debt. When Clark refused to pay, Griffin and Rosson, who was visiting Clark, began arguing. Griffin, with a razor blade in his hand, threatened to cut Rosson and made a forward movement toward Rosson. Griffin later told witnesses he hit Rosson and showed them how he held the razor between his fingers as he did so. Two months later, Clark approached Griffin on the street in an effort to purchase drugs. After speaking for a moment, Clark walked away. Griffin also walked away, then turned around and struck Clark in the back of the head, causing him to fall to the asphalt face first. Boyd, who had been standing some distance away, joined Griffin and the two men brutally kicked Clark in the head and torso, telling Clark, who appeared unconscious, to “go back to sleep.” The force of the blows were such that one witness said she could hear the bones in Clark's face being crushed. Appellants left Clark beside the road for several hours, then returned to show others what they had done. Clark was discovered by police the following morning, still alive but unable to respond to officers' questions. He died three weeks later as a result of the blunt force trauma to his head and blows to his torso, never having regained consciousness.

The evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find appellants guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of all of the crimes for which they were convicted. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979). Although Griffin argues his admission that he hit Clark was insufficient to convict him of felony murder based on an aggravated assault, there was evidence from which the jury was authorized to determine that he either directly participated in or was a party to a crime of aggravated assault which caused the death of another. See Skaggs v. State, 278 Ga. 19(1), 596 S.E.2d 159 (2004) (evidence of blows to victim's head causing him to fall and suffer serious bodily injury sufficient to support charge of felony murder based on aggravated assault with a deadly weapon).


2. We find no error in the trial court's denial of Griffin's motions for directed verdict on the charge of aggravated assault against Rosson. As stated above, the evidence showed Griffin threatened to cut Rosson and hit him with a razor blade in his hand. This evidence was sufficient for a rational trier of fact to find Griffin guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of the crime of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See Smith v. State, 290 Ga. 428(1), 721 S.E.2d 892 (2012) (when reviewing trial court's denial of motion for directed verdict, appellate court applies sufficiency of the evidence test); OCGA § 16–5–21(a)(2). It was within the province of the jury, not this Court, to assess witness credibility and to resolve any evidentiary conflicts or inconsistencies. Jones v. State, 280 Ga. 205(1), 625 S.E.2d 1 (2005); Givens v. State, 273 Ga. 818, 819(1), 546 S.E.2d 509 (2001).

3. Griffin argues the trial court erred by denying his motion to sever the charge of aggravated assault committed against Rosson in April 2006 from the crimes committed in June 2006. Whenever two or more offenses are joined for trial solely because they are of the same or similar character, a defendant has an absolute right to sever. Stewart v. State, 277 Ga. 138, 139, 587 S.E.2d 602 (2003). If offenses are not joined solely because of their same or similar character, a trial court must decide whether severance would promote a just determination of guilt or innocence as to each offense. Id. Relevant factors in making this determination include whether, considering the number and complexity of the offenses charged, the “ trier of fact can parse the evidence and apply the law with regard to each charge,” and whether evidence of one offense would be admissible in a trial of another offense. Id.

Here, the trial court concluded the charges were not joined solely because of their similar character. The court recognized that both incidents involved a continuing dispute over a drug debt owed by Clark to Griffin and occurred in close physical and temporal proximity to each other. Moreover, the trial court correctly determined that evidence of the offenses occurring in April 2006 would be admissible in the trial of the offenses committed in June 2006 to establish motive for the subsequent crimes and found no evidence that trying the offenses together would have confused or misled the jury. See Heard v. State, 287 Ga. 554(4), 697 S.E.2d 811 (2010) (evidence of crimes committed on one date admissible in trial of those perpetrated on another date); Vaughns v. State, 274 Ga. 13(2), 549 S.E.2d 86 (2001) (evidence of defendant's involvement in prior crime admissible to show motive). Based on these facts, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for severance.

4. Consistent with the State's theory in this case, the prosecutor presented evidence that Griffin was angry with Clark because Clark had failed to pay Griffin for drugs and started buying drugs from another supplier. This evidence was relevant to the issue of Griffin's motive for the crimes and was not rendered inadmissible by the fact that it may have incidentally placed his character at issue. We find no error in the admission of this evidence. See Jones, supra, 280 Ga. 205(2)(a), 625 S.E.2d 1;Collins v. State, 273 Ga. 30, 32(2), 538 S.E.2d 34 (2000). It follows that Griffin's counsel was not ineffective by failing to object to this evidence at trial, since any objection would have been fruitless. Id.

5. During trial, Griffin's counsel asked an officer who investigated the April 2006 incident whether he spoke with Rosson about what happened and then elicited testimony from the officer that based on Rosson's statements he did not arrest Griffin for aggravated assault. On re-direct examination, the court allowed the officer to testify regarding what Rosson told him. Because defense counsel's questions about why Griffin was not arrested for aggravated assault placed the officer's conduct in issue and Rosson's statements tended to explain the officer'sconduct, Rosson's statements to police were admissible original evidence under OCGA § 24–3–2. See Reeves v. State, 288 Ga. 545(3), 705 S.E.2d 159 (2011).

Griffin's argument on appeal that his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation was violated by the admission of the officer's testimony was not the basis for his objection at trial, and therefore, he is procedurally barred from raising this issue on appeal. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 40, 124 S.Ct. 1354, 158 L.Ed.2d 177 (2004); Character v. State, 285 Ga. 112(3), 674 S.E.2d 280 (2009). Even assuming, arguendo, that it was error to admit Rosson's statements to the officer because Griffin was not able to confront Rosson, the error in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. State, 291 Ga. 22(2), 727 S.E.2d 106 (2012) (applying harmless error analysis). Rosson's statements to police were cumulative of other properly admitted evidence, including Griffin's own statements to others, establishing that Griffin and Rosson argued over Clark's failure to pay a drug debt and that Griffin beat or punched Rosson with a razor between his fingers.

6. Griffin contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance on several grounds. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984). In order to prevail on his claim of ineffective assistance, Griffin must show deficient performance on the part of counsel and prejudice to his defense resulting from that deficient performance. Id. Moreover, he must overcome the strong presumption that trial counsel's conduct falls within the broad range of reasonable professional conduct. Cross v. State, 271 Ga. 427, 430, 520 S.E.2d 457 (1999). On appeal, this Court accepts the trial court's findings of fact, unless they are clearly erroneous. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. King v. State, 282 Ga. 505, 506(2), 651 S.E.2d 711 (2007).

(a) Griffin contends counsel performed deficiently by failing to adequately prepare for trial and failing to investigate potential witnesses. At the motion for new trial hearing, defense counsel testified he met with Griffin, discussed the theory of Griffin's defense, and talked about potential defense witnesses. Counsel stated he or his investigator interviewed all potential witnesses whose names were supplied by Griffin. Two of the witnesses Griffin specifically suggests should have been interviewed testified at trial and were cross-examined by counsel but did not provide the testimony Griffin hoped they would provide. A third potential witness was interviewed by Griffin's counsel prior to trial, after which it was...

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  • Nwakanma v. Francis
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • 20 Enero 2015
    ...the court provided separate verdict forms for each defendant in order to avoid the potential for confusion. See Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321, 326(7), 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013).Francis also argues that he was prejudiced by the admission of similar transaction evidence against his co-defendants.......
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    ...on these facts, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion in denying Keller's motion to sever. See Griffin v. State , 292 Ga. 321, 323 (3), 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013).8. Keller asserts that the trial court erred in allowing evidence of his argument with Ashley over his treatment of Pow......
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • 21 Noviembre 2014
    ...clearly erroneous. The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed de novo.(Citations and punctuation omitted.) Griffin v. State, 292 Ga. 321, 324(6), 737 S.E.2d 682 (2013). “[A]n insufficient showing on either of [the Strickland] prongs relieves the reviewing court of the need to address ......
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    • Georgia Court of Appeals
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