Griffin v. Warden
Decision Date | 21 March 2016 |
Docket Number | CASE NO. 2:14-CV-00857 |
Parties | CALVIN GRIFFIN, Petitioner, v. WARDEN, NOBLE CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION, Respondent. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Petitioner, a state prisoner, brings the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before the Court on the Petition, Respondent's Return of Writ, Petitioner's Reply, and the exhibits of the parties. For the reasons that follow, the Magistrate Judge RECOMMENDS that the petition for a writ of habeas corpus conditionally be GRANTED on Petitioner's claim that he was denied his right to counsel and that Petitioner be released subject to a re-trial within ninety (90) days. The Magistrate Judge further RECOMMENDS that the remainder of Petitioner's claims be DISMISSED.
Petitioner's request for an evidentiary hearing is DENIED.
The Ohio Tenth District Court of Appeals summarized the facts and procedural history of the case as follows:
State v. Griffin, No. 12AP-798, 2013 WL 6506888, at *1 (Ohio App. 10th Dist. Dec. 10, 2013). On April 23, 2014, the Ohio Supreme Court declined to accept jurisdiction of the appeal. State v. Griffin, 138 Ohio St.3d 1470. Thereafter, Petitioner timely filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He asserts that the trial court improperly refused to appoint new counsel (claim one); that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel because his attorney failed to file a motion to suppress evidence (claim two); and that he wasdenied a fair trial (claim three). It is the position of the Respondent that Petitioner's claims lack merit or are procedurally defaulted.
Petitioner seeks habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA") sets forth standards governing this Court's review of state-court determinations. The United State Supreme Court recently described AEDPA as "a formidable barrier to federal habeas relief for prisoners whose claims have been adjudicated in state court" and emphasized that courts must not "lightly conclude that a State's criminal justice system has experienced the 'extreme malfunction' for which federal habeas relief is the remedy." Burt v. Titlow, — U.S. —, —, 134 S.Ct. 10, 16 (2013) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011)); see also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. 766, 773 (2010) .
The factual findings of the state appellate court are presumed to be correct. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e) (1) provides:
In a proceeding instituted by an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court, a determination of a factual issue made by a State court shall be presumed to be correct. The applicant shall have the burden of rebutting the presumption of correctness by clear and convincing evidence.
"Under AEDPA, a writ of habeas corpus should be denied unless the state court decision was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court, or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented to the state courts." Coley v. Bagley, 706 F.3d 741, 748 (6th Cir. 2013)(citing Slagle v. Bagley, 457 F.3d 501, 513 (6th Cir. 2006)); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) ( ); 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2) ( ). The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit recently explained these standards as follows:
A state court's decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if (1) "the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by Court on a question of law[,]" or (2) "the state court confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives" at a different result. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389 (2000). A state court's decision is an "unreasonable application" under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) if it "identifies the correct governing legal rule from Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the particular . . . case" or either unreasonably extends or unreasonably refuses to extend a legal principle from Supreme Court precedent to a new context. Id. at 407, 529 U.S. 362, 120 S.Ct. 1495, 146 L.Ed.2d 389.
Coley, 706 F.3d at 748-49. The burden of satisfying the standards set forth in § 2254 rests with the petitioner. Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 180 (2011).
"In order for a federal court to find a state court's application of [Supreme Court precedent] unreasonable, . . . [t]he state court's application must have been objectively unreasonable," not merely "incorrect or erroneous." Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 520-21, (2003) (internal quotation marks omitted) ) ; see also Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. at 101 ("A state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as " 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." (quoting Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 664 (2004)). In considering a claim of "unreasonableapplication" under § 2254(d)(1), courts must focus on the reasonableness of the result, not on the reasonableness of the state court's analysis. Holder v. Palmer, 588 F.3d 328, 341 (6th Cir. 2009) ; see also Nicely v. Mills, 521 F. App'x 398, 403 (6th Cir. 2013) ( ). Relatedly, in evaluating the reasonableness of a state court's ultimate legal conclusion under § 2254(d)(1), a court must review the state court's decision based solely on the record that was before it at the time it rendered its decision. Pinholster, 563 U.S. at 180. Put simply, "review under § 2254(d)(1) focuses on what a state court knew and did." Id. at 1399.
In claim one, Petitioner asserts that he was denied his right to counsel of choice and that the trial court improperly refused to conduct a hearing on his request for the appointment of new counsel. The state appellate court rejected Petitioner's claim as follows:
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