Griffin v. Zinn, 74--1032

• Court: Court of Appeal of Florida (US)
• Writing for the Court: McNULTY
• Citation: 318 So.2d 151
• Parties: Zelma M. GRIFFIN, Appellant, v. Miriam ZINN, Appellee.
• Docket Number: No. 74--1032,74--1032
• Decision Date: 08 August 1975

Page 151

318 So.2d 151 Zelma M. GRIFFIN, Appellant,
v.
Miriam ZINN, Appellee. No. 74--1032. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Second District. Aug. 8, 1975.

Page 152

Frank J. Aloia, Adderly, Aloia & Dudley, Cape Coral, for appellant.

Alan S. Kessler, Miami, for appellee.

McNULTY, Chief Judge.

In this interlocutory appeal we review the question of jurisdiction in an action 'quasi in rem' and briefly revisit Pennoyer v. Neff. ¹

Each of the parties hereto is a citizen and resident of Ohio. Plaintiff-appellee obtained an Ohio judgment on a note executed by appellant in Ohio and seeks herein to establish the Ohio judgment in this state and enforce it against certain property here owned by appellant. No attachment or other process issued out of the trial court seizing the property, but defendant-appellant was personally served with process in Ohio, by an Ohio deputy sheriff, pursuant to the Florida 'long arm statute.' ² Apart from irrelevant formalities the complaint itself merely recites that the plaintiff-appellee has obtained a judgment in Ohio against appellant in a sum certain, which remains unpaid; that defendant-appellant owns real estate in Florida, describing it in an attached exhibit; and it prays for 'judgment for damages Against the defendant' (italics ours) in the sum aforesaid. No claim is asserted against the property itself.

Defendant-appellant specially appeared to contest jurisdiction and by this interlocutory appeal seeks review of an adverse ruling. We reverse.

To begin with, we summarily dispose of the precise point upon which the trial judge erroneously based his conclusion. As noted, service of process was made on appellant pursuant to the long arm statute, Supra, which provides in part as follows:

'Acts subjecting Persons to jurisdiction of courts of state:

(1) Any person, whether or not a citizen or resident of this state, who personally or through an agent does any of the acts enumerated in this subsection thereby Submits that person and, if he is a natural person, his personal representative to the Jurisdiction of the courts of this state for any cause of action Arising from the doing of any of the following:

(c) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property within this state.' (Italics ours.)

The trial judge was obviously of the view that he had In personam jurisdiction over the defendant-appellant pursuant to these provisions simply because an affidavit filed by appellee herein reveals that a part of the consideration for her loan to appellant, which was evidenced by the promissory note on which appellee's Ohio judgment was based, was appellant's promise to dispose of her Florida real estate so that the loan might be repaid. The court apparently thought that these circumstances constitute a basis for an action 'arising from' the ownership of real property within the contemplation of the aforequoted section. Not so. The cause of action herein is the Ohio judgment itself, a chose in action, and has nothing to do with the ownership, use or possession of real estate in Florida. The foregoing provision obviously relates only to those cases in which there is a direct affiliation or nexus between the basis of the controversy and the Florida property itself as, for example, when a plaintiff

Page 153

claims damages resulting from the negligent maintenance of Florida property owned by a non-resident. In such case, the cause of action would clearly Arise from the ownership of that property within the contemplation of the foregoing statute. The statute is inapplicable here.

Notwithstanding, however, because the paramount question herein is jurisdiction we are...