Griffis v. State

• Decision Date: 02 March 1978
• Docket Number: No. 51011,51011
• Citation: Griffis v. State, 356 So.2d 297 (Fla. 1978)
• Parties: Elbert Bryan GRIFFIS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

Page 297

356 So.2d 297

Elbert Bryan GRIFFIS, III, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.

No. 51011.

Supreme Court of Florida.

March 2, 1978.

Kenneth C. Howell of Thompson, Wadsworth, Messer, Turner & Rhodes, Tallahassee, for appellant.

Robert L. Shevin, Atty. Gen. and Patti Englander, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee.

KARL, Justice.

We have for review on direct appeal a final judgment ordering forfeiture to the State of a seized motor vehicle. The final judgment, entered by the Circuit Court in and for Suwannee County, expressly upheld the constitutionality of Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), known as the "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act," thereby vesting jurisdiction in this Court pursuant to Article V, Section 3(b)(1), Florida Constitution.

The appellant and his wife were traveling from Tallahassee to Stuart, Florida, in the appellant's 1973 Dodge pick-up truck when an inspector with the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services pulled the truck over. The inspector told the appellant's wife, who was driving at that time, that she had failed to stop at the Agricultural Inspection Station and would have to return to the Station. The appellant, his wife and the truck were accompanied back to the Agricultural Inspection Station where a search of both the appellant and his truck took place. During the search, a quantity of controlled substances were found on the appellant and in his truck. As a direct result of the search, charges were brought against the appellant for possession of marijuana and cocaine. The appellant pled nolo contendere to possession of marijuana and received a sentence of one year's probation. The cocaine charge was dismissed by the State.

Subsequently, pursuant to Sections 943.44 and 893.12, Florida Statutes (1975), the State instituted proceedings for forfeiture of appellant's truck, alleging that the vehicle had been used by the appellant for the purpose of transporting cannabis and cocaine in violation of Section 893.13, Florida Statutes (1975). The trial judge entered a show cause order directed to appellant to show why his truck should not be forfeited. In his response, the appellant alleged that his truck had not been used as a part of an illegal drug "operation," that he had not been convicted of a crime which would give rise to seizure of his vehicle as contemplated by Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), and that Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), is unconstitutional facially and as applied to the appellant.

In his judgment of forfeiture, the trial judge found that the appellant had been duly convicted of possession of marijuana; that the appellant's conviction was irrelevant as the instant proceeding was civil; that the legality of the seizure was irrelevant since the appellant had pled nolo contendere, not reserving for appeal any question as to the legality of the search; that there was no indication that the appellant's vehicle was being used as part of an illegal drug operation; and that Section 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), is constitutional on its face and as applied to the appellant.

On appeal, the appellant argues that forfeiture pursuant to the "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act" requires a showing that the seized vehicle is involved in an ongoing drug trafficking operation and that any interpretation that would allow a forfeiture without evidence of trafficking would render the statutes void as violative of the due process, equal protection and double jeopardy provisions of the Florida and the United States Constitutions. As an additional ground, the appellant argues that the forfeiture is invalid because it is based entirely on illegally seized evidence.

It is axiomatic that this Court will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute if the case may be effectively disposed of on any other grounds. Singletary v. State, 322 So.2d 551 (Fla.1975). Williston Highlands Development Corp. v. Hogue, 277 So.2d 260 (Fla.1973). Thus, if a particular matter in litigation can be determined by statutory construction, this Court will avoid considering the constitutional questions raised. Green v. State ex rel. Phipps, 166 So.2d 585 (Fla.1964). A fundamental rule of statutory construction is that a statute should be construed in such a manner as to effectuate legislative intent. McKibben v. Mallory, 293 So.2d 48 (Fla.1974).

Sub judice, a determination of the constitutionality vel non of the questioned statutory provisions is not required in view of legislative intent and the appropriate construction to be given them. Because we find it unnecessary to reach the constitutional issues posed, this does not divest us of jurisdiction to determine the appeal. DeJong v. Pallotto, 239 So.2d 252 (Fla.1970). P. C. Lissenden Co. v. Board of County Commissioners, 116 So.2d 632 (Fla.1960). ¹

In construing a statute, this Court is committed to the proposition that a statute should be construed and applied so as to give effect to the evident legislative intent, regardless of whether such construction varies from the statute's literal meaning. Florida Jai Alai, Inc. v. Lake Howell Water and Reclamation District, 274 So.2d 522 (Fla.1973). Deltona Corp. v. Florida Public Service Commission, 220 So.2d 905 (Fla.1969). In Beebe et ux. v. Richardson, 156 Fla. 559, 23 So.2d 718, 719 (1945), this Court explained:

". . . (W)here the context of a statute taken literally conflicts with a plain legislative intent clearly discernible, the context must yield to the legislative purpose, for otherwise the intent of the lawmakers would be defeated. State v. Beardsley, 84 Fla. 109, 94 So. 660; City of West Palm Beach v. Amos, 100 Fla. 891, 130 So. 710; State v. City of Miami, 101 Fla. 292, 134 So. 608."

Although a literal reading of the language contained in Section 943.42, Florida Statutes (1975), would support the trial court's finding that the statute does not require that a vehicle be used in an illegal drug "operation," this literal reading must give way to the legislative intent in enacting the statute which is plainly to the contrary. To effect the legislative intent, we must construe Sections 943.41, et seq., Florida Statutes (1975), as requiring a showing by the State that the seized vehicle is involved in a drug trafficking operation before forfeiture can be ordered, and the facts before us in the instant cause do not support such a finding. In fact, the trial judge's order ordering forfeiture expressly states that there is no indication that the vehicle in question was being used in an illegal drug "operation."

The language of Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), was originally contained in Section 893.12, Florida Statutes (1973), enacted by the Legislature as part of Chapter 73-331, Laws of Florida. Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was entitled the "Florida Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act" and was a substantial adoption of the major provisions of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act approved by the National Conference of Commissioners of Uniform State Laws in 1970. In 1974, the Legislature enacted Chapter 74-385, § 1, Laws of Florida, excising from Section 893.12, Florida Statutes (1973), those provisions which now constitute Sections 943.41 through 943.44, Florida Statutes (1975), and denominating the excised portions as the "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act." The legislative intent in enacting Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, contained in the introductory language to the act, was inter alia, to achieve "uniformity between the laws of Florida and the laws of the United States" which was "necessary and desirable for effective drug abuse prevention and control." The introductory language also expressed the Legislature's intent "that the State of Florida exercise more authority over manufacture and distribution of dangerous drugs." The express intent of the Legislature was that the Florida forfeiture statute be in uniformity with its federal counterpart.

49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, are the current federal forfeiture counterparts to the "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act." The "Florida Uniform Contraband Transportation Act" is substantially identical to 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782. 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, were also the federal forfeiture provisions in effect at the time Chapter 73-331, § 12, Laws of Florida, was enacted, having been enacted by Congress in 1939 and subsequently amended in 1950. The intent of Congress in their 1950 amendment of 49 U.S.C. § 781, § 782, was to authorize forfeiture only when the vehicle was engaged in drug trafficking. The congressional committee report that accompanied the amendment leaves no doubt that the congressional intent was not to permit forfeiture for mere possession of a controlled substance but to authorize forfeiture of those vehicles used in trafficking drugs in violation of the Internal Revenue laws. In its report, the committee stated:

"In recent years there has been an increase in the number of narcotics thefts, robberies, and burglaries from drug stores, physicians' offices, and other places from which narcotic drugs are dispensed. The perpetrators of these crimes rely to a large extent on the use of high-powered automobiles to make their escape from the jurisdiction in which the crime took place. When captured, the narcotic drugs thus stolen often are found to bear the required internal-revenue stamps, and consequently seizure and forfeiture of the vehicles used is difficult to obtain, particularly when the drugs have not been sold by the thieves subsequent to the theft. The proposed legislation would attack this problem by permitting the seizure of vessels, vehicles, and aircraft used in connection with the traffic in stolen drugs, when such drugs are carried or transported in interstate commerce, or within any Territory, possession, or the District of...