Griffith v. Caney Valley Pub. Sch.

• Citation: 157 F.Supp.3d 1159
• Decision Date: 05 January 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 15-CV-273-GKF-FHM
• Parties: Hayden Griffith, Plaintiff, v. Caney Valley Public Schools, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Oklahoma

157 F.Supp.3d 1159

Hayden Griffith, Plaintiff,

v.Caney Valley Public Schools, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 15-CV-273-GKF-FHM

United States District Court, N.D. Oklahoma.

Signed January 5, 2016

Brady Ross Henderson, ACLU of Oklahoma Foundation, Oklahoma City, OK, Daniel Eduardo Gomez, Robert Daniel Carter, Conner & Winters, LLP, Tulsa, OK, Joel West Williams, Native American Rights Fund, Washington, DC, Matthew Campbell, Native American Rights Fund, Boulder, CO, for Plaintiff.

Anthony Thomas Childers, Fred Andrew Fugitt, Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendanst.

OPINION AND ORDER

GREGORY K. FRIZZELL

, CHIEF JUDGE, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Before the court is the Motion to Dismiss [Dkt. # 32] of defendants Caney Valley Public Schools and Rick Peters. This case arises from a dispute over the defendants' policy prohibiting students from wearing decorations on their graduation caps. Pursuant to this policy, the school denied plaintiff Hayden Griffith's request to wear an eagle feather attached to her cap during its May 2015 high school graduation ceremony. In response, Griffith brought this action against the school district and its superintendent, Rick Peters, alleging that the school violated her rights under the First Amendment to the United States Constitution as well as the Oklahoma Religious Freedom Act, 51 O.S. § 251 et seq.

(“ORFA”). Defendants now move to dismiss Griffith's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

I. The Allegations

Griffith is an enrolled member of the Delaware Tribe of Indians and the Cherokee Nation. She has long participated in traditional and cultural practices of her Native American heritage and regularly participates in Native American religious ceremonies. An important part of her religious beliefs is the sacred nature of eagle feathers. In her religion, eagles have a special connection with God and their feathers are considered sacred objects.

Shortly before Griffith's high school graduation, a Delaware tribal elder gave her an eagle feather in recognition of her academic success, graduation from high school, and passage into adulthood. According to Griffith, in her culture, when a person is ceremonially given an eagle feather for a certain occasion, it is often seen as a sign of disrespect or dishonor to not wear the feather for that occasion. Further, according to Griffith's religious beliefs, when an eagle feather is worn, it must be worn on the head and cannot be dominated by another object that is also being worn on the head.

After receiving the eagle feather, Griffith requested permission from her school to wear the feather attached to the top of her cap (along with the traditional tassel) during her graduation ceremony. The school denied Griffith's request, explaining that students were not allowed to wear decorations on their caps at graduation. The school did, however, give Griffith the option of wearing the feather on a necklace, clipped to her hair, or held in her hand.

As a result of the school's decision, Griffith was unable to wear the eagle feather during her graduation ceremony. Although she was given the option of wearing the feather elsewhere, besides her cap, such alternatives violated her religious beliefs. According to Griffith, by not wearing the eagle feather during her graduation, she disrespected the feather, the tribal elder who gifted it to her, and God.

II. Procedural History

Griffith filed the present action on May 15, 2015, six days before her graduation ceremony. As part of her complaint, Griffith alleged that the school's policy violated her rights under the First Amendment and ORFA and requested a preliminary injunction allowing her to wear the eagle feather during her graduation ceremony. The court denied Griffith's request for a preliminary injunction on May 20 (the day before her graduation), concluding that she had failed to show a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. [See Dkt. # 23].

Shortly thereafter, Griffith filed an amended complaint, alleging the same causes of action, but requesting only declaratory judgment and nominal damages. [Dkt. # 31]. As previously stated, defendants now move to dismiss Griffith's amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

III. Discussion

“To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must contain ‘enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Schrock v. Wyeth, Inc. , 727 F.3d 1273, 1280 (10th Cir.2013)

(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007) ). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). When applying this standard, a court must accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations and then ask whether those facts state a plausible claim for relief. See

id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Allegations that state “legal conclusions” or “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action” “are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

Here, Griffith alleges that the defendants violated her rights under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment as well as her rights under ORFA. In response, defendants submit that Griffith fails to state a claim under any of the legal theories proposed. The court considers these issues in turn.

A. Free Speech

The court starts with Griffith's free speech claim. “The First Amendment, which applies to the States through the Fourteenth, prohibits laws ‘abridging the freedom of speech....’ ” Mills v. Alabama , 384 U.S. 214, 218, 86 S.Ct. 1434, 16 L.Ed.2d 484 (1966)

. Although students retain significant First Amendment rights in the public school context, see

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. , 393 U.S. 503, 509, 89 S.Ct. 733, 21 L.Ed.2d 731 (1969), their rights “are not automatically coextensive with [those] of adults in other settings, and must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment,” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier , 484 U.S. 260, 266, 108 S.Ct. 562, 98 L.Ed.2d 592 (1988) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

“Restrictions on student speech in public schools are analyzed under one of two standards. Tinker

governs private student speech; Hazelwood governs school-sponsored speech.” Taylor v. Roswell Indep. Sch. Dist. , 713 F.3d 25, 35–36 (10th Cir.2013) (citation omitted). Under Tinker, a school may restrict “private student speech”—i.e., “student expression that is unconnected to any school-sponsored activity,” id. at 36 —only if it reasonably concludes that such expression will “substantially interfere with the work of the school or impinge upon the rights of other students,” Tinker , 393 U.S. at 509, 89 S.Ct. 733. In contrast, under Hazelwood, a school may “control...the style and content of student speech in school-sponsored expressive activities so long as [its] actions are reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.” Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 273, 108 S.Ct. 562. “School-sponsored speech is student speech that a school affirmatively promotes, as opposed to speech that it tolerates.” Fleming v. Jefferson Cty. Sch. Dist. R

–

1 , 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir.2002), as amended on denial of reh'g and reh'g en banc (Aug. 16, 2002) (alterations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). It includes “expressive activities that students, parents, and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the school.” Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 271, 108 S.Ct. 562.

Here, the school contends that a student's graduation attire is school-sponsored speech and that its policy prohibiting decorations on graduation caps is reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns. In particular, the school submits that the policy allows it to “convey[ ] one last message of unity, academic achievement, discipline, and respect for authority” to its students. [Dkt. # 32, p. 7].

In response, Griffith asserts that the school has created a limited public forum for student expression in their graduation attire and, consequently, that her wearing of an eagle feather is private student speech. She points to the fact that the school permits students to wear sashes and stoles during graduation in recognition of school-related achievements and activities (such as the National Honor Society and the National FFA Organization), and contends that her desired form of expression (the eagle feather) conveys the same message of success and achievement. She thus submits that the school's refusal to allow to her to wear the eagle feather on her cap at graduation constitutes impermissible viewpoint discrimination.

Griffith's contentions are unpersuasive. “[S]chool facilities may be deemed to be public forums only if school authorities have by policy or by practice opened those facilities for indiscriminate use by the general public, or by some segment of the public, such as student organizations.” Hazelwood , 484 U.S. at 267, 108 S.Ct. 562

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the school has not created a forum (of any kind) for student expression on their graduation caps. Indeed, as Griffith herself acknowledges, the school does not allow students any form of personal expression on their graduation caps during the commencement ceremony. The fact that students are allowed to wear sashes and stoles in recognition of certain school-related achievements and activities does not alter this conclusion. Such items are allowed only for academic achievement or participation in school-sponsored activities and, crucially, are not worn over or affixed to the graduation cap. In sum, the facts alleged fail to show that the school created a limited public forum for Griffith's desired form...