Griffith v. Department of Public Works
| Decision Date | 06 November 1959 |
| Citation | 345 P.2d 469,52 Cal.2d 848 |
| Court | California Supreme Court |
| Parties | Van M. GRIFFITH, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS of the State of California, et al., Respondents. L. A. 25250. |
Arthur E. Briggs, Los Angeles, for appellant.
George C. Hadley, George W. Miley, Charles E. Spencer, Jr., Roger Arnebergh, City Atty., Bourke Jones, Asst. City Atty., and Claude E. Hilker, Deputy City Atty., Los Angeles, for respondents.
Plaintiff appeals from a summary judgment for defendants 1 in an action filed by plaintiff in April, 1955, in his capacity as a resident, citizen and taxpayer of the city of Los Angeles, and as the owner of a contingent remainder interest in real property known as 'Griffith Park.' Part of Griffith Park was granted to the city of Los Angeles by plaintiff's parents for use as a public park only, and part of it was acquired by the city by purchase from the estate of such parents 'for park and playground purposes.' Plaintiff by his complaint sought in his first cause of action to enjoin defendants from constructing a freeway through Griffith Park, and in his second cause of action asked declaratory relief. We have concluded that the trial court was correct in its determination that defendants' motions for summary judgment should be granted, and that such judgment should be affirmed.
Following filing of plaintiff's action, demurrers to the complaint were sustained without leave to amend, but the resulting judgment for defendants was reversed in Griffith v. Department of Public Works (1956), 141 Cal.App.2d 376, 296 P.2d 838. Defendants then answered and moved for a summary judgment. Uncontradicted affidavits filed in support of the motion show that the interests of both the city of Los Angeles and plaintiff Griffith in the park lands in question were being condemned by the State of California in a separate action commenced subsequent to the instant action, that the state was let into immediate possession, and that the freeway, 'entirely a project of the State of California, being * * * financed solely by the State,' was virtually completed at the time the affidavits were filed (May, 1957). The trial court concluded that the prayed for injunction against constructing the freeway would now be useless and in August, 1957, granted the State defendants' motion for summary judgment on both causes of action, and also granted the City defendants' motion as to the first cause. With respect to the second cause of action the court ordered the motions denied as to the City defendants if the plaintiff within fifteen days filed an amended and supplemental complaint for declaratory relief, but granted if plaintiff failed to file such complaint within the time allowed. Plaintiff did not so file, and judgment was entered 'that the plaintiff's complaint is without merit and that the said complaint be dismissed. * * *' This appeal by plaintiff followed.
The complaint alleges, among other things, that plaintiff is a resident and taxpayer of defendant city of Los Angeles and that he is the son of Griffith Jenkins Griffith and Mary Christiana Griffith, both now deceased, who conveyed certain lands to defendant city in trust to be used as a public park; that the conveyance was made upon the condition that the lands be used by defendant city and its successors in interest exclusively as a public park and provided that whenever the lands or any part thereof 'shall cease to be used as a park * * * then the lands hereby conveyed shall immediately * * * revert to (the grantors) * * * or their heirs'; that defendant city accepted the gift and dedicated the lands as a public park.
The complaint also alleges that defendant city purchased an additional adjoining 350 acres from the estate of plaintiff's parents and that such additional land was also dedicated for park purposes; that the lands acquired by the city from plaintiff's parents are known as Griffith Park.
The complaint then alleges that 'the defendants all working in conjunction with each other intend to and will unless restrained' divert a portion of the above mentioned lands from the dedicated use for use as a freeway; that the use of the park lands for a freeway 'will violate the trust upon which said property is held by the City of Los Angeles.' The complaint also alleges that, under section 170 of the city charter (Stats.1947, p. 3536), the park lands are under the management and control of the Board of recretation and Park Commissioners of the city of Los Angeles and may not be used for non-park purposes without the authorization of that board; that the board has objected to the proposed diversion of the park lands for use as a freeway and that the proposed diversion would therefore be in violation of the city charter and 'an illegal waste of and injury to the property of the City of Los Angeles.'
As a second cause of action the complaint further alleges that 'an actual controversy has arisen and now exists between the parties to this action concerning the right of defendants to construct a freeway (through Griffith Park) * * * in that the defendants contend that they have a right to devote a portion of Griffith Park to a public freeway regardless (of the limitations contained in the deed from plaintiff's parents) * * * and * * * without the consent * * * of the Board of Recreation and Park Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, (whereas) the plaintiff contends (to the contrary) * * *.'
The prayer is for an injunction 'restraining and enjoining the defendants, and each of them, from building and constructing the freeway upon the Griffith Park land,' and that the court 'find and determine that the land granted to the City of Los Angeles by (plaintiff's parents) * * * may not be used as a public freeway and that other park lands may not be used for a freeway without the consent of the Board of Recreation and Park Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles.'
As indicated above, demurrers to the complaint were sustained without leave to amend but the ensuing judgment for defendants was reversed in Griffith v. Department of Public Works (1956), supra, 141 Cal.App.2d 376, 296 P.2d 838, the court stating (at page 381(1b) of 141 Cal.App.2d, at page 842 of 296 P.2d) that 'If the plaintiff can establish the truth of the allegations made, which amount to charges of collusion and conspiracy on the part of city and state officers to divert dedicated park property to freeway use, in violation of the original grant and of the city charter, and the other allegations, a case has been made out which would seem to justify the relief prayed for.'
Upon remand defendants answered and filed motions for summary judgment. Numerous affidavits were filed in support of and in opposition to the motions and in August, 1957, the trial court filed the following order: 'The motions for summary judgment of (the State) defendants, * * * are granted.
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