Griffith v. Sitgreaves

• Citation: 90 Pa. 161
• Parties: Griffith et al. <I>versus</I> Sitgreaves.
• Decision Date: 07 May 1879
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Pennsylvania

Page 161

90 Pa. 161

Griffith et al. versus Sitgreaves.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

April 4, 1879.

May 7, 1879.

April 4th 1879.

Before SHARSWOOD, C. J., MERCUR, GORDON, PAXSON, WOODWARD, TRUNKEY and STERRETT, JJ.

Error to the Court of Common Pleas of Northampton county: Of January Term 1879. No. 232.

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W. W. Schuyler, for plaintiffs in error.—Does the evidence make out a case of duress? The court below found as a question of fact that the notes in suit were obtained from Pyle by duress. We are aware of the decision of this court in Jamison v. Collins, 2 Norris 359, to the effect that this court "will not go behind the findings of facts" of the court below; but submit that the question as to whether the notes were given under the pressure of duress or not, is a question of law upon the facts proved.

If this case had been tried before a jury it would have been competent for the plaintiffs to put a point to the court that the evidence did not make out a case of duress, and a mistake on the part of the court in its answer to the point would undoubtedly have been error. We propose to argue this branch of the case as if the question of duress had been raised in that form, for a change of tribunal certainly makes no change in the character of the question to be decided.

Sitgreaves cannot take advantage of Pyle's alleged duress: Huscombe v. Standing, Cro. Jac. 187; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cushing 55; Mantell v. Gibbs, 1 Brownlow 64; McClintick v. Cummings, 3 McLean 158; Thompson v. Lockwood, 15 Johns. 256; Steuben Co. Bank v. Mathewson, 5 Hill 249. In the cases of Osborne v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365; Strong v. Grannis & Brown 26 Barb. 122, and Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252, relied upon by the court below, the instruments sued upon were void and would have been so held without invoking the principle of duress. In the present case the note was barred upon a valid consideration.

H. Green, for defendant in error.—The question of duress was merely a question of fact, and the finding of the court will not here be disturbed. The action being upon an endorsement of Pyle's note, if that note was void on account of the duress of Pyle, the note itself being destroyed as the obligation of Pyle in the hands of these plaintiffs, there can be no liability on the part of Sitgreaves to pay it to them. It is certainly not reconcilable with reason or law that in a case like the present, where the instrument sued on, being a promissory note endorsed by the defendant, was obtained by duress of the maker, and endorsed by the defendant in good faith without any knowledge of the duress that the payee, who was guilty of the duress, and is therefore not an innocent party, can recover against the endorser.

The contract of the principal debt or is void — the instrument as to him is a nullity. In the hands of these plaintiffs it is absolutely discharged as to him. Yet we are told these same plaintiffs may nevertheless compel the innocent endorser to pay this void obligation. Thus the instrument being void as to the principal by the act of the holders, the surety or endorser after he has been compelled by the law to pay it, is unable to recover his money from the principal. And if the law, out of regard to an ancient dogma, that the defence of duress is only available by him on whom the duress is practised should hold, in this enlightened day, that a recovery may be had in such circumstances, then it will result that if a band of cut-throats can capture the person of a citizen, and compel him through fear of his life to write a note and send it by mail to a friend and procure his endorsement of it, a recovery may be had on such endorsement by the criminal to whom it was given.

The cases cited by plaintiffs in error are clearly distinguishable from this, and on the mere question of authority we append the following: Strong v. Grannis, supra; Osborn v. Robbins, supra; Fisher v. Shattuck, supra; Parsons on Bills and Notes 244; Brandt on Suretyship and Guarantyship 172.

Mr. Justice PAXSON delivered the opinion of the court May 7th 1879.

In Jamison v. Collins, 2 Norris 359, and in one or two subsequent cases not yet reported, it was held that in a writ of error under the Reference Law of April 22d 1874, Purd. Dig. 1939, Pamph. L. 109, this court can hear and determine only questions of law arising upon bills of exceptions to the rulings of the judge relating to the evidence or the law of the case. It will not go behind his findings of fact except where in a common-law trial before a jury the assignments of error are such as can be heard and determined before this court.

In the case in hand, a trial by jury was dispensed with by agreement under the Act of 1874. The court found the fact that the notes in controversy were signed and delivered by Pyle, the maker, to the plaintiffs, while the said Pyle was under duress of imprisonment and duress per minas by reason of threats and acts done by Matthew H. Griffith, one of the plaintiffs.

We are asked to reverse this finding upon the ground that the question as to whether the notes were given under the pressure of duress or not, is a question of law upon the facts proved. We think it plain that duress is a question of fact for the jury. If this had been a common-law trial, it would have been error for the court to have withdrawn the question of duress from the jury upon the ground that there was not sufficient evidence to submit to them. We must apply the same rule where the facts are found by the court. We have nothing to do with the weight of the evidence, and have no power to grant a new trial because we think the finding might and perhaps ought to have been the other way. There was evidence that Pyle was practically restrained of his liberty without arrest under any legal process, and that the process of the law was abused for the purpose of obtaining the endorsed notes in controversey.

We are next to consider the question whether the defendant, who is sued as endorser of the notes, can take advantage of the duress practised upon the maker. In Huscombe v. Standing, Cro. Jac. 187, the defendant having been sued on a bond, on which he was surety for one Street, entered a plea that the bond was obtained by duress of his principal. The plaintiff demurred to this plea, and, without argument, it was held that "it was not any plea for the surety, although it had been a good plea for the said Street; for none shall avoid his own bond for the imprisonment or duress of any other than himself. The same doctrine is recognised in Bacon's Abridg., title Duress A., and 2 Rolle's Abridg. 124. The later authorities are conflicting, with no adjudicated case in Pennsylvania. Mantel v. Gibbs, 1 Brownlow 62; Robinson v. Gould, 11 Cush. 55; Plummer v. The People, 16 Ill. 358; McClintick v. Cummins, 3 McLean 158, and Thompson v. Lockwood, 15 Johns. 259, were cited by plaintiffs as sustaining the doctrine that the duress which will avoid a contract must be offered to the party who seeks to take advantage of it. On the other hand, Strong v. Grannis, 26 Barb. 122, Osborn v. Robbins, 36 N. Y. 365, and Fisher v. Shattuck, 17 Pick. 252, were cited on behalf of the defendant as sustaining the opposite view. I have examined these cases with some care, and do not regard them as controlling authority on either side. They depend very much upon the pleadings or their special...