Griffith v. State
| Decision Date | 09 January 1895 |
| Citation | 39 N.E. 440,140 Ind. 163 |
| Parties | GRIFFITH v. STATE. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from circuit court, Vigo county; D. N. Taylor, Judge.
Lewis C. Griffith was convicted of assault with intent to commit manslaughter, and appeals. Reversed.
Faris & Hamill, for appellant. McNutt & McNutt, for the State.
The appellant, a physician, was tried on an indictment for assault and battery with the intent to kill the prosecuting witness, and was found guilty of assault and battery with intent to commit manslaughter. It is contended that the court erred in the admission of certain evidence and in the giving of certain instructions. The appellant was a witness in his own behalf. In rebuttal, the state introduced a great number of witnesses to prove that the general moral character of the appellant was bad. The statute (section 1872, Rev. St. 1894; section 1803, Rev. St. 1881) provides that this may be done “in all questions affecting the credibility of a witness.” Edgar D. Fagan was so called as an impeaching witness, and testified that the general reputation of appellant in the neighborhood in which he resided for general moral character was bad. On cross-examination, it appeared that this witness, together with other witnesses for the prosecution, had been in consultation with the attorneys for the state before he was called as a witness. Thereupon he was asked, in the cross-examination, “Whom did you ever hear say that his [appellant's] general reputation for morality was bad, outside of this consultation with the lawyers?” to which he answered: “Indeed, I don't know that I could name any specific person.” On redirect examination, the following was asked of this witness: This question was objected to, “for the reason that it is not responsive to anything brought out on cross-examination; and a man's reputation for morality cannot be proven by proof of specific acts of immorality, or by proof of specific acts that persons may have heard concerning him.” The court overruled the objection, and an exception was reserved to the ruling. Similar questions were afterwards put, and like objection made, and exception reserved. To these questions the witness answered: “Well, I have heard that he practiced things in his profession that wasn't right;” “that he had caused or committed abortion;” “that when he was a justice of the peace over in Clay county, that when a case was tried before him, and the parties found guilty for misdemeanor, that he would assess a fine of perhaps ten dollars, and afterwards he would erase, disfigure it, and make it fifty cents, and keep the balance after the fine had been paid.” “I have heard a great deal about his fighting qualities.” “Generally speaking, I have heard of his fighting a great deal; as being a fighter and bully; always into troubles and fights.” Of these questions and answers counsel for appellant well say: “Every man is supposed to be able to support his general character, but there is no presumption that he shall be ready to answer every particular charge that some witness may claim to have heard against him.” These collateral charges could not, of course, be disproved on this trial, and were in fact not disproved, the court rightfully refusing to admit evidence offered by appellant in denial or explanation of the charges. To have admitted evidence for and against such charges would have been to try appellant or numerous offenses in addition to that for which he was under indictment.
The reason given by the court in refusing to admit evidence to show that appellant was innocent of the collateral charges made against him was as follows: “The ground on which I refuse to allow these...
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Kestler v. State
... ... 329, 331, the ... court said: ... '* ... * * Such proof of his intoxication did not tend to rebut the ... testimony that his general character for honesty and ... integrity was good. Evidence of specific acts is not ... competent to prove general reputation. Griffith v ... State [1895], 140 Ind. 163, 39 N.E. 440; Dunn v ... State [1904], 162 Ind. 174, 182, 70 N.E. 521. And while ... the fact that defendant had been seen intoxicated could not ... have any probative value to establish whether or not his ... general character for honesty and integrity ... ...
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Morris v. State
...reputation. Boles v. State, (1973) 259 Ind. 661, 291 N.E.2d 357; Polson v. State, (1965) 246 Ind. 674, 207 N.E.2d 638; Griffith v. State, (1895) 140 Ind. 163, 39 N.E. 440. This evidence was properly excluded by the trial The appellant finally argues that the trial court erred in that it com......
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Stalcup v. The State
... ... the witness Brown proper as tending to show the reputation of ... appellant for peace and quiet. This could be shown only by ... proof of appellant's general reputation, not by proof of ... particular acts. Drew v. State, 124 Ind. 9, ... 23 N.E. 1098; Griffith v. State, 140 Ind ... 163, 39 N.E. 440 ... Counsel ... for State practically admit that this was error, but endeavor ... to show that the error was harmless. We are of opinion that, ... considering the state of the evidence before the jury, we ... cannot say that the error ... ...
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Stalcup v. State
...by proof of appellant's general reputation, not by proof of particular acts. Drew v. State, 121 Ind. 9, 23 N. E. 1098;Griffith v. State, 140 Ind. 163, 39 N. E. 440. Counsel for the state practically admit that this was error, but endeavor to show that the error was harmless. We are of opini......