Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.

• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: CORRIGAN, J.
• Citation: Griffith v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 472 Mich. 521, 697 N.W.2d 895 (Mich. 2005)
• Decision Date: 14 June 2005
• Docket Number: Docket No. 122286. Calendar No. 2.
• Parties: Phyllis L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian For Douglas W. GRIFFITH, a Legally Incapacitated Adult, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

697 N.W.2d 895

472 Mich. 521

Phyllis L. GRIFFITH, Legal Guardian For Douglas W. GRIFFITH, a Legally Incapacitated Adult, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 122286. Calendar No. 2.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

June 14, 2005.

Sinas, Dramis, Brake, Boughton & McIntyre, P.C. (by George T. Sinas, Bryan J. Waldman, and L. Page Graves), Lansing, MI, for the plaintiff.

Garan Lucow Miller, P.C. (by Daniel S. Saylor and David N. Campos), Detroit, MI, for the defendant.

Gross, Nemeth & Silverman, P.L.C. (by Steven G. Silverman), for Auto Club Insurance Association, amicus curiae.

Cochran, Foley & Associates, P.C. (by Terry L. Cochran and Mary K. Freedman), Livonia, MI, for The Coalition Protecting Auto No Fault, amicus curiae.

CORRIGAN, J.

In this case, we consider whether the no-fault act, M.C.L. § 500.3101 et seq., requires defendant, a no-fault insurer, to reimburse plaintiff for her incapacitated husband's food expenses. Because the food in this case is neither "for accidental bodily injury" under M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) nor "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation" under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a), we hold that the expenses for it may not be recovered under those provisions of the no-fault act. We thus reverse the judgment of the Court of Appeals.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On April 28, 1994, plaintiff's sixty-three-year-old husband, Douglas Griffith,¹ suffered a severe brain injury as a result of a motor vehicle accident. He received treatment at in-patient facilities and hospitals until August 1995, at which time he was transferred to a residence where he received twenty-four-hour nursing and attendant care. On August 6, 1997, Griffith returned home with plaintiff. He remains confined to a wheelchair and continues to require assistance with basic daily tasks such as eating and bathing.

After the accident, defendant provided coverage as Griffith's no-fault insurer. Until the time that Griffith returned home, the expenses that defendant covered included food expenses. After Griffith returned home, defendant denied plaintiff's claim for Griffith's food expenses, and plaintiff sued to recoup those expenses.² The trial court ruled that Griffith's food costs are an "allowable expense" under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) of the no-fault act and ordered defendant to pay a per diem food charge.

The Court of Appeals affirmed.³ The Court relied on Reed v. Citizens Ins. Co. of America, 198 Mich.App. 443, 499 N.W.2d 22 (1993), which held that a person receiving at-home care is entitled to room and board costs under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) to the same extent that such costs would constitute an allowable expense if the injured person received the same care in an institutional setting. Thus, the panel concluded that, under Reed, Griffith's food costs are an "allowable expense" under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a).

Defendant filed an application for leave to appeal to this Court, which this Court denied.⁴ Thereafter, this Court granted defendant's motion for reconsideration and granted leave to appeal.⁵

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

This case requires us to determine whether an injured person's food costs constitute an "allowable expense" under M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a). Issues of statutory interpretation are questions of law that this Court reviews de novo. Jenkins v. Patel, 471 Mich. 158, 162, 684 N.W.2d 346 (2004).

III. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

When interpreting a statute, we must ascertain the legislative intent that may reasonably be inferred from the statutory language itself. Sotelo v. Grant Twp., 470 Mich. 95, 100, 680 N.W.2d 381 (2004). When the language of a statute is unambiguous, the Legislature's intent is clear and judicial construction is neither necessary nor permitted. Koontz v. Ameritech Services, Inc., 466 Mich. 304, 312, 645 N.W.2d 34 (2002). Because the role of the judiciary is to interpret rather than write the law, courts lack authority to venture beyond a statute's unambiguous text. Id. Further, we accord undefined statutory terms their plain and ordinary meanings and may consult dictionary definitions in such situations. Halloran v. Bhan, 470 Mich. 572, 578, 683 N.W.2d 129 (2004).

IV. ANALYSIS

A. Statutory Language and Legal Background

M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) provides:

Under personal protection insurance an insurer is liable to pay benefits for accidental bodily injury arising out of the ownership, operation, maintenance or use of a motor vehicle as a motor vehicle, subject to the provisions of this chapter. [Emphasis added.]

According to the plain language of M.C.L. § 500.3105(1), a no-fault insurer is only required to pay benefits "for accidental bodily injury" arising out of an automobile accident. The no-fault act further restricts a no-fault insurer's liability by defining the limited types of benefits that are payable "for accidental bodily injury ...." M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a), the statutory provision at the center of this case, states:

Except as provided in subsection (2), personal protection insurance benefits are payable for the following:

(a) Allowable expenses consisting of all reasonable charges incurred for reasonably necessary products, services and accommodations for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation. [Emphasis added.]

Thus, in addition to the requirement under M.C.L. § 500.3105(1) that benefits be "for accidental bodily injury," M.C.L. § 500.3107(1)(a) circumscribes benefits to those expenses consisting only of items or services that are reasonably necessary "for an injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation."

Both this Court and the Court of Appeals have interpreted and applied the above statutes in cases involving claims for food or "room and board" expenses. In Manley v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exchange, 127 Mich.App. 444, 448, 339 N.W.2d 205 (1983), rev'd 425 Mich. 140, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986), the plaintiffs' minor son suffered severe head trauma in an automobile accident. He resided with the plaintiffs and received care from nurse's aides. Id. at 449, 339 N.W.2d 205. The plaintiffs sued the defendant no-fault carrier, seeking, among other things, reimbursement for his room and board costs. Id. at 448-449, 339 N.W.2d 205. The defendant insurance carrier argued that because the plaintiffs already had a legal duty to care for their child, room and board costs were not compensable. Id. at 451, 339 N.W.2d 205. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument, largely on the basis of a worker's compensation case that distinguished between "ordinary household tasks" such as cleaning and washing clothes and nonordinary tasks such as "`[s]erving meals in bed and bathing, dressing, and escorting a disabled person ....'" Id. at 452, 339 N.W.2d 205, quoting Kushay v. Sexton Dairy Co., 394 Mich. 69, 228 N.W.2d 205 (1975).

The panel concluded that the distinction between ordinary and nonordinary tasks could be reconciled with the language of M.C.L. § 500.3107(a), which then provided that "products, services, and accommodations not reasonably necessary for the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation are not `allowable expenses.'" 127 Mich.App. at 453, 339 N.W.2d 205. The Court reasoned:

The necessity for the performance of ordinary household tasks has nothing to do with the injured person's care, recovery, or rehabilitation; such tasks must be performed whether or not anyone is injured.

This reasoning supports a generalization concerning the circumstances in which a product, service, or accommodation can fall within the definition of "allowable expense." Products, services, or accommodations which are as necessary for an uninjured person as for an injured person are not "allowable expenses." [Id. at 453-454, 339 N.W.2d 205 (emphasis added).]

The panel then opined that food "is as necessary for an uninjured person as for an injured person" and thus would not ordinarily constitute an "allowable expense" under M.C.L. § 500.3107 for an injured person cared for at home. 127 Mich.App. at 454, 339 N.W.2d 205.

When Manley was appealed to this Court, we effectively vacated the Court of Appeals room and board analysis. Manley v. Detroit Automobile Inter-Ins. Exchange, 425 Mich. 140, 388 N.W.2d 216 (1986). We stated that the "question whether food, shelter, utilities, clothing, and other such maintenance expenses are an allowable expense when the injured person is cared for at home" had neither been raised before the trial court nor argued in the Court of Appeals. Id. at 152, 388 N.W.2d 216. Accordingly, this Court declined to address the issue and stated that the Court of Appeals analysis of the issue "shall not be regarded as of precedential force or effect." Id. at 153, 388 N.W.2d 216.

Justice Boyle issued a concurring and dissenting opinion, asserting that the room and board issue was properly before this Court because the Court of Appeals had raised it sua sponte and discussed the issue in its opinion. Id. at 168, 388 N.W.2d 216 (Boyle, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). She could find "no principled basis" for distinguishing between food provided in an institutional setting and food provided at home, and concluded that the Court of Appeals "injured person vs. uninjured person" test was not only "unwieldy and unworkable" but that it effectively punished those who choose to care for injured family members at home. Id. at 168-169, 388 N.W.2d 216. Justice Boyle opined that M.C.L. § 500.3107 imposes three requirements for "allowable expenses": "1) the charge must be reasonable, 2) the expense must be reasonably necessary, and 3) the expense must be incurred." 425 Mich. at 169, 388 N.W.2d 216.

Thereafter, in Reed, the Court of Appeals adopted Justice Boyle's Manley analysis. The insured in Reed had been severely injured in an auto accident. Reed, supra at 445, 499 N.W.2d 22. The plaintiff, the insured's mother, filed various claims against the...