Griffith v. State

• Decision Date: 16 May 2003
• Docket Number: No. 41S00-0109-CR-438.,41S00-0109-CR-438.
• Parties: Fernando C. GRIFFITH, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).
• Court: Indiana Supreme Court

788 N.E.2d 835

Fernando C. GRIFFITH, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below).

No. 41S00-0109-CR-438.

Supreme Court of Indiana.

May 16, 2003.

John P. Wilson, Wilson, Green & Cecere, Greenwood, IN, Attorney for Appellant.

Steve Carter, Attorney General of Indiana, Robin Hodapp-Gillman, Deputy Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General, Indianapolis, IN, Attorneys for Appellee. SHEPARD, Chief Justice.

While in police custody, appellant Fernando Griffith confessed that he burglarized the residence of Lloyd and Judy Georges, murdered the couple, and set fire to their home. He contends that his confession should have been suppressed because the authorities were tardy in presenting him to a magistrate after his arrest.

We agree that this delay exceeded acceptable limits, but conclude that the trial court correctly declined to suppress the confession, which was given well after Griffith's initial court appearance, during an interview which he requested.

Statement of the Facts and Procedural History

The Greenwood Fire Department responded to a fire at the home of Lloyd and Judy Georges early on May 19, 2000. Investigators discovered the bodies of Lloyd and Judy, and autopsies confirmed that stab wounds were the cause of death. Investigators further determined the fire was intentionally set with an accelerant. Jewelry was missing from the house along with Lloyd's wallet. The Georges' car was also missing from the garage.

The Greenwood police learned that a witness saw a black male carrying a gas can in the front yard of the Georges' house and walking into the front door of their home. A neighbor informed police that he saw the Georges' car pulling out of their garage the same morning around 5:05 a.m. The police found the car ablaze a few days later and ruled it arson because accelerant was used to fuel the fire.

Assisting the Greenwood Police, Indianapolis Officer Jack Tindall and Detective Thomas Richard Tudor went to Griffith's apartment building around 10:15 p.m. on May 21st, where they noticed that Griffith smelled of burnt smoke and had band-aids on his hands and fingers. At Detective Tudor's direction, Officer Tindall transported Griffith to the Greenwood Police Department where Officer John Laut noticed the strong smoke odor and the band-aids while booking Griffith. Upon further inspection, Laut found one of Lloyd's rings in Griffith's pocket. Griffith was arrested between 10:20 p.m. and 11:10 p.m.

Greenwood Detective Patti Cummings directed Officer Tindall to bring Griffith to the interrogation room for questioning. When Griffith arrived, Detective Cummings advised him of his Miranda rights during the early morning hours of May 22. Griffith was held at the Greenwood Police Department before transport to the Johnson County Jail, which caused his name to be excluded from the jail population list of suspects who were to appear before the Magistrate within forty-eight hours. Later that day, police transported Griffith to the Johnson County Jail.

Hollis Kehrt was also arrested in connection with the present case. On May 23rd, the Greenwood Police, a captain from the Johnson County Jail, and the Johnson County Prosecutor wired Kehrt and placed him in the cell with Griffith to obtain "incriminating information" about the Georges' murder. Police placed Kehrt in the cell with Griffith before he appeared before a magistrate. The police were unable to collect any information, however, because they could not decipher any data from the wire.

The following day, police asked Griffith's girlfriend Jamie Young to make a controlled call in an effort to obtain incriminating information from Griffith. Though police instructed Young not to reveal that the call was controlled, she immediately did so, and Griffith revealed nothing.

The Greenwood Police prepared a probable cause affidavit on May 22nd, and revised it on May 23rd. On May 24th, Magistrate Craig Lawson conducted an initial hearing and determined that probable cause existed for Griffith's arrest.

The following day, Griffith's wife Elizabeth phoned Greenwood police and told them that Griffith wanted to speak with them. One day later, a judge granted an order to draw a sample of Griffith's blood. While en route to the hospital for the blood draw, Griffith confirmed that he wanted to speak with the Greenwood police.

At the later meeting with the Greenwood police, officers informed Griffith of his rights, including his right to counsel and right to remain silent, and Griffith signed a waiver. Griffith then confessed to the murder of Lloyd and Judy Georges and the burglary and arson of their home.

Thereafter, the State charged Griffith with two counts of murder, one count of burglary as a class B felony, and one count of arson, a class B felony. A jury found him guilty of all counts. The court sentenced Griffith to life without parole for the murders, and two consecutive eighteen-year sentences for the counts of burglary and arson.

Griffith initiated this direct appeal, claiming (1) that the police did not have probable cause to arrest him without a warrant, (2) that the delay in taking him before a magistrate made his confession involuntary, and (3) that he had an Equal Protection right to counsel before being charged.

This Court reviews all challenges on a question of law under a de novo standard. We review denial of motions to suppress as a matter of sufficiency. Goodner v. State, 714 N.E.2d 638 (Ind.1999). In reviewing the trial court's ruling on the validity of a warrantless arrest, we consider the evidence favorable to the trial court's ruling and any uncontradicted substantial evidence to the contrary to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support the ruling. Vance v. State, 620 N.E.2d 687 (Ind.1993).

A trial court has broad discretion in ruling on the admissibility of evidence, and we will disturb its rulings only where it is shown that the court abused that discretion. Wilkinson v. State, 743 N.E.2d 1267 (Ind.Ct.App.2001),trans. denied. We view the circumstances in their totality and, without reweighing evidence and considering conflicting evidence most favorable to the trial court's ruling, determine if there was substantial evidence of probative value to support the trial court's ruling. Id.

I. Warrantless Arrest

Griffith first claims that the trial court should have suppressed his confession because it was the product of a warrantless arrest without probable cause.

Probable cause adequate to support a warrantless arrest exists when, at the time of the arrest, the officer has knowledge of facts and circumstances that would warrant a person of reasonable caution to believe that the suspect committed a criminal act. Borkholder v. State, 544 N.E.2d 571 (Ind.Ct.App.1989); Ind.Code Ann. § 35-33-1-1(a) (West 1998). The amount of evidence necessary to meet the probable cause requirement for a warrantless arrest is determined on a case-by-case basis. Peterson v. State, 674 N.E.2d 528 (Ind.1996).

Probable cause can rest on collective information known to the law enforcement organization as a whole, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the arresting officer. See Manson v. State, 249 Ind. 53, 229 N.E.2d 801 (1967)

. The police force is considered a unit. Where there is a police-channel communication to the arresting officer, he acts in good faith thereon, and such knowledge and information exist within the department, the arrest is based on probable cause. See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 91 S.Ct. 1031, 28 L.Ed.2d 306 (1971); see also Francis v. State, 161 Ind.App. 371, 316 N.E.2d 416 (1974).

The evidence here indicates that Lloyd recently told a friend that his relationship with Griffith, who he called "Val," had become dire because he refused to purchase a vehicle for Griffith. Griffith's son confirmed that Val was Griffith. A neighbor reported that Lloyd argued with a black man who fit Griffith's description on his porch on the day of the fire. The Georges' car was missing and found ablaze two days later. A witness saw a black male carrying a gas can in the Georges' front yard and walk into the front door of their home. Furthermore, upon approaching Griffith's apartment, Officer Tindall immediately smelled the strong odor of smoke on Griffith and noticed band-aids on Griffith's hands and fingers. He also found one of Lloyd's rings in Griffith's pocket.

The arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Griffith murdered the Georges and committed burglary and arson. The arrest was thus valid.

II. Delay in Presentation to Magistrate

In his second motion to suppress his confession, Griffith asserted that the delay between his arrest and the probable cause hearing violated his rights under the United States Constitution.

An individual detained following a warrantless arrest is entitled to a "prompt" judicial determination of probable cause as a prerequisite to any further restraint on his liberty. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 114, 95 S.Ct. 854, 43 L.Ed.2d 54 (1975). The promptness requirement is satisfied under Gerstein when the "administrative steps incident to arrest" are completed. Id. In Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 56, 111 S.Ct. 1661, 114 L.Ed.2d 49 (1991) (citations omitted), the Court was more specific about the Gerstein standard: "a jurisdiction that provides judicial determinations of probable cause within 48 hours of arrest will, as a general matter, comply with the promptness requirement of Gerstein."

The law of Due Process acknowledges that delays cannot always be avoided,¹ but the government must justify such delays. "Where an arrested individual does not receive a probable cause determination within 48 hours, ... the burden shifts to the government to demonstrate the existence of a bona fide emergency or other extraordinary circumstance." Id. at 57, 111 S.Ct. 1661. The fact that in a particular case it may take longer than...