Griffith v. United States

• Court: U.S. Claims Court
• Writing for the Court: WHALEY, , and WHITAKER, GREEN, and LITTLETON
• Citation: Griffith v. United States, 32 F.Supp. 884, 91 Ct.Cl. 240 (Fed. Cl. 1940)
• Decision Date: 06 May 1940
• Docket Number: No. 44078.,44078.
• Parties: GRIFFITH et al. v. UNITED STATES.

32 F. Supp. 884

91 Ct. Cl. 240

GRIFFITH et al. v. UNITED STATES.

No. 44078.

Court of Claims.

May 6, 1940.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

J. H. Ward Hinkson, of Chester, Pa., for plaintiffs.

Joseph H. Sheppard, of Washington, D. C., and Samuel O. Clark, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Robert N. Anderson and Fred K. Dyar, both of Washington, D. C., on the brief), for defendants.

Before WHALEY, Chief Judge, and WHITAKER, GREEN, and LITTLETON, Judges.

LITTLETON, Judge.

The Commissioner of Internal Revenue in an audit of the estate tax return first determined and held that the property involved in the transfers by the decedent, as disclosed and described in the findings, had been made to take effect in possession and enjoyment at or after death, but later, after the decision in Hassett v. Welch, 303 U.S. 303, 58 S.Ct. 559, 82 L.Ed. 858, in which it was held that the Joint Resolution of Congress of March 3, 1931, and section 803(a) of the Revenue Act of 1932, 26 U.S.C.A.Int.Rev.Acts, page 641, could not be applied retroactively, the Commissioner rejected plaintiffs' claim for refund on the ground that the transfers constituted a testamentary disposition of property made in contemplation of death. We are of opinion from the facts established by the record, which so far as necessary to a proper determination of the question presented have been set forth in the findings and need not be repeated here, that the property transferred by the decedent on April 20, 1928, and June 20, 1929, were not transfers made in contemplation of death within the meaning of the applicable provisions of the revenue statute, and that plaintiffs are therefore entitled to recover the tax collected by reason of the inclusion of the value of such property in the gross estate. See findings 8, 10, and 11.

Counsel for defendant endeavor to sustain the action of the Commissioner in including the property in question in the gross estate on the ground that the transfers were testamentary in character and that, for that reason, the decedent must have made them in contemplation of death. In view of the facts disclosed by the record, this contention cannot be sustained. In United States v. Wells, 283 U.S. 102, 51 S.Ct. 446, 452, 75 L.Ed. 867, the court discussed at length the meaning of the term "in contemplation of death" and pointed out that the facts in each case must be carefully scrutinized to determine the dominant motive of the donor and that if the dominant motive is...